

Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) Authorization Specification

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¹⁶ **1 Foreword**

- 17 The Security Protocols and Data Models (SPDM) Working Group of DMTF prepared the *Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) Authorization Specification* (DSP0289).
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³⁷ 2 Introduction

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The SPDM Authorization Specification defines messages, data objects, and sequences for performing authorized message exchanges. The description of message exchanges includes authorization of messages, provisioning of authorization credentials and their policies, management of authorization state, and other related capabilities.

2.1 Document conventions

- Document titles appear in *italics*.
- The first occurrence of each important term appears in *italics* with a link to its definition.
- ABNF rules appear in a monospaced font.

43 2.1.1 Reserved and unassigned values

- Unless otherwise specified, any reserved, unspecified, or unassigned values in enumerations or other numeric ranges are reserved for future definition by DMTF.
- Unless otherwise specified, field values marked as Reserved shall be written as zero (0), ignored when read, not modified, and not interpreted as an error if not zero.

46 2.1.2 Byte ordering

This section describes different byte orderings.

48 2.1.2.1 Default byte order

49 Unless otherwise specified, for all SPDM specifications *byte* ordering of multi-byte numeric fields or multi-byte bit fields is *little endian* (that is, the lowest byte offset holds the least significant byte, and higher offsets hold the more significant bytes).

50 2.1.2.2 Octet string byte order

- A string of octets is conventionally written from left to right. Also by convention, byte 0 of the octet string shall be the leftmost byte of the octet string, byte 1 of the octet string shall be the second-leftmost byte of the octet string, and this pattern shall continue. When placing an octet string into an Authorization field, the ith byte of the octet string shall be placed in the ith offset of that field.
- For example, if placing an octet stream consisting of "0xAA 0xCB 0x9F 0xD8" into LongString field, then offset 0 (the lowest offset) of LongString will contain 0xAA, offset 1 of LongString will contain 0xCB, offset 2 of LongString will contain 0x9F, and offset 3 of LongString will contain 0xD8.

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2.1.2.3 Signature byte order

For fields or values containing a signature, this specification attempts to preserve the byte order of the signature as the specification of a given signature algorithm defines. Most signature specifications define a string of octets as the format of the signature, and others may explicitly state the endianness such as in the specification for Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. Unless otherwise specified, the byte order of a signature for a given signature algorithm shall be octet string byte order.

2.1.2.3.1 ECDSA signatures byte order

FIPS PUB 186-5 defines r, s, and the ECDSA signature to be (r, s), where r and s are integers. For ECDSA signatures, excluding SM2, in SPDM, the signature shall be the concatenation of r and s. The size of r shall be the size of the selected curve. Likewise, the size of s shall be the size of the selected curve. See BaseAsymAlgo in NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS for the size of r and s. The byte order for r and s shall be big-endian order. When placing ECDSA signatures into an SPDM signature field, r shall come first, followed by s.

57 2.1.2.3.2 SM2 signatures byte order

GB/T 32918.2-2016 defines r and s and SM2 signatures to be (r, s), where r and s are integers. The sizes of r and s shall each be 32 bytes. To form an SM2 signature, r and s shall be converted to an octet stream according to GB/T 32918.2-2016 and GB/T 32918.1-2016 with a target length of 32 bytes. Let the resulting octet string of r and s be called SM2_R and SM2_s respectively. The final SM2 signature shall be the concatenation of SM2_R and SM2_s. When placing SM2 signatures into an SPDM signature field, the SM2 signature byte order shall be octet string byte order.

59 2.1.3 Text or string encoding

- When a value is indicated as a text or string data type, the encoding for the text or string shall be an array of contiguous *bytes* whose values are ordered. The first byte of the array resides at the lowest offset, and the last byte of the array is at the highest offset. The order of characters in the array shall be such that the leftmost character of the string is placed at the first byte in the array, the second leftmost character is placed in the second byte, and so forth until the last character is placed in the last byte.
- Each byte in the array shall be the numeric value that represents that character, as ASCII ISO/IEC 646:1991 defines.
- 62 Table 1 "spdm" encoding example shows an encoding example of the string "spdm":

Table 1 — "spdm" encoding example

Offset	Character	Value
0	s	0x73
1	p	0x70

Offset	Character	Value
2	d	0x64
3	m	0x6D

64 2.1.4 Other conventions

Unless otherwise specified, all figures are informative.

⁶⁶ 3 Scope

- This specification describes how to use messages, data objects, and sequences to exchange authorized messages between two entities over a variety of transports and physical media. This specification contains the message exchanges, sequence diagrams, message formats, and other relevant semantics for such message exchanges, including authorization of arbitrary messages.
- Other specifications define the mapping of these messages to different transports and physical media. This specification provides information to enable security policy enforcement but does not specify individual policy decisions.

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4 Normative references

- The following documents are indispensable for the application of this specification. For dated or versioned references, only the edition cited, including any corrigenda or DMTF update versions, applies. For references without date or version, the latest published edition of the referenced document (including any corrigenda or DMTF update versions) applies.
- DMTF DSP0274, Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) Specification, https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0274
- DMTF DSP0277, Secured Messages using SPDM Specification, https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0277
- DMTF DSP0293, Standards Body and Vendor Header Registry, https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0293
- ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, Principles and rules for the structure and drafting of ISO and IEC documents 2021 (9th edition)
- IETF RFC 4716, The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format, November 2006
- IETF RFC 7250, Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS), June 2014
- 77 TCG Algorithm Registry, Family "2.0", Level 00 Revision 01.32, June 25, 2020
- IETF RFC 8017, PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2, November, 2016
 - IETF RFC 8032, Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA), January 2017
- IETF RFC 8998, ShangMi (SM) Cipher Suites for TLS 1.3, March 2021
- GB/T 32918.1-2016, Information security technology—Public key cryptographic algorithm SM2 based on elliptic curves—Part 1: General, August 2016
- GB/T 32918.2-2016, Information security technology—Public key cryptographic algorithm SM2 based on elliptic curves—Part 2: Digital signature algorithm, August 2016
- GB/T 32918.3-2016, Information security technology—Public key cryptographic algorithm SM2 based on elliptic curves—Part 3: Key exchange protocol, August 2016
- GB/T 32918.4-2016, Information security technology—Public key cryptographic algorithm SM2 based on elliptic curves—Part 4: Public key encryption algorithm, August 2016
 - GB/T 32918.5-2016, Information security technology—Public key cryptographic algorithm SM2 based on elliptic curves—Part 5: Parameter definition, August 2016
 - GB/T 32905-2016, Information security technology—SM3 cryptographic hash algorithm, August 2016
- GB/T 32907-2016, Information security technology—SM4 block cipher algorithm, August 2016
 - ECDSA
 - Section 6, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) in FIPS PUB 186-5 Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
 - NIST SP 800-186 Recommendations for Discrete Logarithm-based Cryptography: Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters
 - IETF RFC 6979, Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), August 2013
- 92 SHA2-256, SHA2-384, and SHA2-512

- 93 FIPS PUB 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS)
- 94 SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512
 - FIPS PUB 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions
- 96 **ASCII ISO/IEC 646:1991**, 09/1991

⁹⁷ 5 Terms and definitions

- In this document, some terms have a specific meaning beyond the normal English meaning. This clause defines those terms.
- The terms "shall" ("required"), "shall not", "should" ("recommended"), "should not" ("not recommended"), "may", "need not" ("not required"), "can" and "cannot" in this document are to be interpreted as described in ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, Clause 7. The terms in parentheses are alternatives for the preceding term, for use in exceptional cases when the preceding term cannot be used for linguistic reasons. Note that ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, Clause 7 specifies additional alternatives. Occurrences of such additional alternatives shall be interpreted in their normal English meaning.
- The terms "clause", "subclause", "paragraph", and "annex" in this document are to be interpreted as described in ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, Clause 6.
- The terms "normative" and "informative" in this document are to be interpreted as described in ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, Clause 3. In this document, clauses, subclauses, and annexes labeled "(informative)" do not contain normative content. Notes and examples are always informative elements.
- The terms that DSP0274 defines also apply to this document.
- 103 This specification uses these terms:

Term	Definition	
Authorization	Process of determining whether an entity has the privilege to perform an action on a protected resource.	
Authorization initiator	A logical entity that triggers the process of granting permission or approval for accessing a protected resource. An Authorization initiator can have an associated Credential ID depending on the type of message it sends.	
Authorization message	Unit of communication when using messages defined in this specification.	
Authorization message payload	Portion of the message body of an Authorization message. This portion of the message is separate from those fields and elements that identify the authorization request and response codes and reserved fields.	
Authorization session	A secure session whose privilege levels have been escalated on behalf of either a User or an SPDM endpoint.	
Authorization target	A logical entity that determines if the Authorization initiator has the permission(s) and privilege level(s) to access the protected resource.	
Byte	Eight-bit quantity. Also known as an <i>octet</i> .	
Concurrent secure sessions	Simultaneous or parallel secure sessions between an Authorization initiator and an Authorization target.	
Credential	Information used to verify the identity of an entity, such as an asymmetric public key.	

Term	Definition	
Endpoint	Logical entity that communicates with other endpoints over one or more transport protocols.	
Message	See Authorization message.	
Owner	The user or consumer of the Authorization target operating in an environment and who is either in physical possession or is a tenant of the Authorization target. Examples of an Owner are the data center administrators, cloud providers, tenants of Infrastructure-as-a-Service or equivalent services, typically, offered by cloud providers. These Owners are generally not considered part of the supply chain such as a distributor, reseller, vendor, silicon manufacturer, OEM, or ODM.	
Protected Resource	A software or hardware resource that requires authorization before being used.	
User	An Authorization initiator that is not an SPDM endpoint of the corresponding secure session. A User is identified by a Credential ID.	
User-Specific Authorization Session	An Authorization session that is escalated specifically on behalf of a specific User.	

¹⁰⁴ 6 Symbols and abbreviated terms

The following additional abbreviations are used in this document.

Abbreviation	Term
AODS	Authorization ODS
AUTH	Authorization
ODS	Opaque Data Structure
SEAP	SPDM Endpoint Authorization Process
SPDM	Security Protocol and Data Model
SVH	Standards body and Vendor-defined Header. See the Standards body or vendor-defined header in DSP0293.
USAP	User-Specific Authorization Process
USAS	User-Specific Authorization Session
VDM	Vendor-Defined Messages

¹⁰⁶ 7 Notations

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The Authorization Specification uses the following notations:

Notation	Description
Concatenate()	The concatenation function Concatenate(a, b,, z), where the first entry occupies the least-significant bits and the last entry occupies the most-significant bits.
M:N	In field descriptions, this notation typically represents a range of byte offsets starting from byte M and continuing to and including byte M (where M \leq M). The lowest offset is on the left. The highest offset is on the right.
[4]	Square brackets around a number typically indicate a bit offset. Bit offsets are zero-based values. That is, the least significant bit ([LSb]) offset = 0.
[M:N]	A range of bit offsets where M is greater than or equal to N. The most significant bit is on the left, and the least significant bit is on the right.
1b	A lowercase b after a number consisting of 0 s and 1 s indicates that the number is in binary format.
0x12A	Hexadecimal, as indicated by the leading 0x .
N+	Variable-length byte range that starts at byte offset N.
<pre>[\${message_name}] . \${field_name} or [\${message_name}] . \${field_name} / \${field_name0} // \${field_nameN}</pre>	Used to indicate a field in a message. • \${message_name} is the name of the request or response message. • \${field_name} is the name of the field in the request or response message. An asterisk (*) instead of a field name means all fields in that message except for any conditional fields that are empty. • One or more optional forward slash characters (/) can follow to indicate hierarchy of field names similar to a directory path in many operating systems

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Notation	Description
	This notation is used only in tables and indicates the length of the corresponding field only for that table. The value x can be a number greater than 0, as in the case that multiple fields in the same table are using this notation.
	Note that Lenx in one table has no connection to a Lenx with the same value of x in any other table. By way of example, consider two hypothetical tables: in the first table, Len@ has a value of 44 bytes, and in the second table Len@ has a value of 1024 bytes. These two Len@ s have no connection to each other. A table could have Len1 and Len2 (and so on), and those Len1 and Len2 will have no connection to the Len1 s or Len2 s in any other table.

¹¹¹ 8 Authorization architecture

- This authorization architecture serves as a foundation for managing access to a protected resource on an endpoint. The messages and behavior defined by this specification shall apply between two SPDM endpoints within an SPDM session, except when using a trusted environment. The messages are defined in a generic fashion that allows them to be communicated across different physical mediums and over different transport protocols.
- When messages defined by this specification are exchanged in a trusted environment, such as during initial provisioning, they may be performed outside an SPDM session. The authorization requirements for these messages may also be overridden. The security implications of such exchanges are outside the scope of this specification.

114 8.1 Architecture overview

- The specification defines message exchanges to enable an entity to have the following capabilities:
- Discover capabilities related to authorization in an endpoint.
- Discover and securely provision credentials and their policies into an endpoint.
- Securely manage endpoint state related to authorization.
- Authorize access to protected resources in an endpoint.
- A large part of this architecture is the use of an Authorization process to achieve many of the capabilities listed above. There are two Authorization processes: SPDM Endpoint Authorization Process (SEAP) and User-Specific Authorization Process (USAP). SEAP is the process to authorize an SPDM endpoint whereas USAP authorizes an external user.
- These capabilities are built on top of well-known and established security practices across the computing industry.

 The following clauses provide further details of the message exchanges related to authorization.

122 8.2 Authorization version

- The Authversion field in the SELECT_AUTH_VERSION message shall indicate the version of the Authorization specification that the format of an Authorization message conforms to.
- For example, for version 1.2 of this specification, the value of AuthVersion is 0x12, which also corresponds to an Authorization Major Version of 1 and an Authorization Minor Version of 2.
- The version of this specification can be found on the title page and in the footer of the other pages in this document.
- The AuthVersionString shall be a string formed by concatenating the major version, a period (.), and the minor version. For example, if the version of this specification is 1.2.3, then AuthVersionString is "1.2".
- The AuthVersion for this version of this specification shall be 0x10. The AuthVersionString for this version of this specification shall be "1.0".

128 8.3 Authorization flows


- 129 At a high level, the authorization flow involves these processes:
- 130 Credential provisioning
- 131 Authorization

132 8.3.1 Credential provisioning overview

133 Credential provisioning is the process where an endpoint is securely equipped with a credential. In the context of this specification, a credential consists of an asymmetric key pair. The specifics of the key generation are outside the scope of the specification. For an asymmetric credential, the public portion is provisioned into the endpoint and the private key is held securely by the Authorization initiator. The credential is also associated with a policy that describes the privileges, scope of access, lifetime or other access related attributes, to a protected resource. This specification defines a set of messages by which credentials and their policies can be securely provisioned into an endpoint with protected resources, typically an SPDM endpoint.

134 8.3.2 Authorization overview


- Authorization is the process by which an Authorization initiator, typically an SPDM endpoint, interacts with another endpoint to gain access to a protected resource. The endpoints exchange messages defined in this specification to discover capabilities related to authorization such as supported cryptographic algorithms, number of provisioned credentials and other related information. To gain access to a protected resource, the endpoint with the protected resource challenges the Authorization initiator, which signs the challenge along with a message to be authorized, with the private key that it holds. The signature is then verified, and the credential checked against its policy, to determine if the message has the required privileges or access to operate on the protected resource.
- Note that the specification does not mandate an Authorization initiator be an SPDM endpoint, however the interactions specified are between two SPDM endpoints. In cases where an Authorization initiator is not an SPDM endpoint, it is expected that an SPDM endpoint acts as a proxy to the initiator to facilitate communication to the endpoint with the protected resource.
- Figure 1 Model with SPDM endpoint as Authorization initiator shows a model where an SPDM endpoint acts as an Authorization initiator. Figure 2 Model with external Authorization initiator with SPDM endpoint proxy shows a model where the Authorization initiator is an entity that is not an SPDM endpoint, but communicates with the protected resource via a proxy SPDM endpoint.



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Figure 1 — Model with SPDM endpoint as Authorization initiator

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Figure 2 — Model with external Authorization initiator with SPDM endpoint proxy

8.4 Credentials

A credential is a cryptographic secret that identifies the Authorization initiator and allows messages sent by the Authorization initiator to be authenticated as Authorization flows describes.

145 8.4.1 Identifying the Authorization initiator

- This specification supports more than one Authorization initiator. There can be multiple Authorization initiators at any given time within or across multiple secure sessions. The same Authorization initiator can be in multiple secure sessions. This raises the need to associate a credential and authorization policies with the Authorization initiator to which they belong. This specification uses a numeric identifier, called the Credential ID (CredentialID), to make this association. In other words, the Credential ID identifies the Authorization initiator much like a username identifies a person's online account.
- Furthermore, for the Credential ID to identify a particular Authorization initiator, this architecture presumes the secret portion of a credential is only accessible to the associated Authorization initiator. If this presumption does not hold,

then security issues can arise. This presumption allows this specification to use the Credential ID (CredentialID) to represent or refer to the associated Authorization initiator.

- 148 A single Credential ID associates exactly one credential to one Authorization initiator.
- An Authorization target shall support a minimum of 8 Credential IDs, and these CredentialID s shall increase sequentially starting from 0.

8.4.2 Credential structure

- A single Table 2 Credential structure contains all the credential information relating to a single Authorization initiator that an Authorization target needs to know in order to properly authenticate messages requiring authorization. Depending on the algorithm, credential information may contain secrets. However, for this version of the specification, only asymmetric algorithms are supported and the credential structure needs only public information, such as the public key, the exact asymmetric algorithm used, and other parameters generally deemed public information.
- Each credential structure uses the CredentialID field to associate the credential information with the corresponding Authorization initiator.
- At a minimum, the Authorization target should store credentials in integrity-protected storage. An endpoint may use the Table 2 Credential structure as defined in this specification or use an implementation-specific data structure to store credentials.
- The SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request can be used to provision credentials into a credential structure as Credential provisioning defines.
- 155 Table 2 Credential structure describes the structure and format for a credential.

Table 2 — Credential structure

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	CredentialID	2	A unique identifier to associate the credential information in this structure with the corresponding Authorization initiator. The value of 0xFFFF shall be reserved unless other parts of this specification define the use for this value.
2	CredentialType	1	 Shall be the type of the credential. 0x01. Asymmetric Key. All other values reserved. Shall be 0x01 for this version of the specification.

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Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
3	BaseAsymAlgo	BaseAsymAlgoLen	The format of this field shall be as Table 70 — Base asymmetric algorithm format defines. The value of BaseAsymAlgoLen shall be as Common variable names defines. If CredentialType is 0x01, this field shall have exactly one bit set.
3 + BaseAsymAlgoLen	BaseHashAlgo	BaseHashAlgoLen	The format of this field shall be as Table 71 — Base hash algorithm format defines. The value of BaseHashAlgoLen shall be as Common variable names defines. If CredentialType is 0x01, this field shall have exactly one bit set.
3 + BaseAsymAlgoLen + BaseHashAlgoLen	Reserved	4	Reserved
7 + BaseAsymAlgoLen + BaseHashAlgoLen	CredentialDataSize	4	Size of the CredentialData field in bytes.
11 + BaseAsymAlgoLen + BaseHashAlgoLen	CredentialData	CredentialDataSize	When CredentialType is 0x01, the size and format of this field shall be the same size and format as the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure encoded in DER format as specified by RFC 7250.

159 8.4.3 Credential attributes

This section discusses various attributes that can be associated with each Credential ID. The Authorization initiator can use the <code>GET_CRED_ID_PARAMS</code> to see the supported attributes and their current state for the requested Credential ID. An Authorization target can support different attributes for different Credential IDs.

161 8.4.3.1 Locking and unlocking attributes

- A locked credential cannot be modified by any request for the given Credential ID and its associated policy regardless of authorization or the policy settings of the requesting Credential ID. Consequently, unlocking the credential makes the credential and its associated policy modifiable according to the policy of the requesting Credential ID. Furthermore, a Credential ID can lock and unlock only its own credentials and policy. In other words, a Credential ID cannot unlock or lock the credentials and the associated policies of other Credential IDs.
- A Credential ID can lock and unlock its own credential and policy only if the LockUnlockSelfPrivilege bit is set in its own policy as Authorization policies defines.
- The Authorization initiator should exercise caution before locking the credential and associated policies of a Credential ID, because recovery of locked credentials and their associated policies is outside the scope of this specification.

165 8.4.4 Credential change requirements

When the credential for a given Credential ID is changed, the new credential shall take effect immediately for that Credential ID. Consequently, the Authorization target shall terminate all active and saved Authorization processes using the given Credential ID.

8.5 Authorization policies

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- Authorization policies specify an Authorization initiator's access privileges to one or more protected resources.
- All Credential IDs shall be associated with an Authorization policy. Similar to credentials, a single Credential ID associates a set of policies to exactly one Authorization initiator. Except for initial provisioning, a Credential ID shall not be usable for authorization without an associated policy. Each Credential ID has its own instance of policies. A policy can be provisioned for a given Credential ID using the SET_AUTH_POLICY command. Policies should be stored by the endpoint in integrity protected storage. An endpoint may use the Table 3 Policy List as defined in this specification or use an implementation-specific data structure to store authorization policies.
 - Table 3 Policy List describes the structure and format for a list of policies.

171 Table 3 — Policy List

Byte Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	CredentialID	2	Shall be the Credential ID of the Authorization initiator.
2	NumPolicies	2	Shall be the number of policies listed in the Policies field. The value of this field shall be at least one.
4	Policies	Variable	List of policies as defined by Table 4 — Policy structure.

Table 4 — Policy structure describes the structure and format for a policy.

Table 4 — Policy structure

Byte Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	PolicyOwnerID	LenSVH	This field shall indicate the owner of the policy. The format of this field shall be the same as the SVH, as DSP0293 defines. The value of LensvH shall be set as Common variable names defines.

Byte Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
LenSVH	PolicyVersion	4	This field shall indicate the version of the policy in the Policy field associated with the Policy Owner identified in PolicyOwnerID field. The Policy Owner defines the format and values of this field and its association with its policy in the Policy field. When the PolicyOwnerID is DSP0289 using DMTF-DSP as the ID in the SVH, the format of this field shall be the same as Table 25 — VersionNumberEntry definition defines and the value of this field shall be the same as the version of this specification. Because Table 23 only defines bits [15:0], bits [31:16] shall be zero.
4 + LenSVH	PolicyLen	2	Shall be the length of Policy .
6 + LenSVH	Policy	PolicyLen	This field indicates the policy as PolicyOwnerID defines. The PolicyOwnerID shall define the size and format of this field. If PolicyOwnerID is DSP0289 using DMTF-DSP as the ID in the SVH, the structure of this field is defined in Table 5 — DSP0289 Policy structure.

Table 5 — DSP0289 Policy structure describes the structure and format for DMTF defined policy.

Table 5 — DSP0289 Policy structure

Byte Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	PolicyType	2	Policy Type column in Table 6 — DSP0289 Policy Types shall define the value for this field.
2	PolicyLen	2	Table 7 — DSP0289 general policy definitions shall define the value of this field corresponding to PolicyType .
4	PolicyValue	PolicyLen	Table 7 — DSP0289 general policy definitions shall define the value of this field corresponding to PolicyType.

176 8.5.1 DSP0289 Authorization policy

- This section defines the privileges for commands, actions, and other resources that this specification defines. Each Credential ID has an associated policy. An Authorization initiator uses the SET_AUTH_POLICY command to change the policy associated with the Credential ID provided in the request.
- This section uses the term "given Credential ID" to refer to the Credential ID used in many scenarios. In general, there are two types of Credential IDs: the Credential ID populated in the Credential ID field, if present, of an Authorization request message and the requesting Credential ID of a message. These two Credential IDs are not always the same for a message. When authorizing a message, the given Credential ID is the Credential ID of the Authorization initiator of the corresponding message. After authorization succeeds and when fulfilling the request of an Authorization request message with a Credential ID field present, the term, given Credential ID, refers to the Credential ID populated in the Credential ID field of the corresponding request message.
- 179 The tables in this section are structured into different field types:

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- Privilege. A privilege field type is a bit field where setting a bit grants the ability to perform the corresponding action and clearing the bit revokes the ability to perform the corresponding action.
- Allowable. An allowable field type is a bit field where setting one or more bits allows the use of one or more characteristics (usually configuration parameters) associated with that field.
- All Authorization initiators can modify their own credentials, limited by their associated Authorization policy. All Authorization initiators can retrieve their own Authorization policy or revoke their own privileges for all fields of Privilege field type.
- Table 6 DSP0289 Policy Types lists all the policies specific to this specification. The values in the **Policy Type** column shall map to the PolicyType field as Table 5 DSP0289 Policy structure defines.

Table 6 — DSP0289 Policy Types

Policy Type	Policy Name	Description
0	Reserved	Reserved
1	GeneralPolicy	This policy type governs the possible actions an Authorization initiator can perform that are specific to this specification. The format and size of PolicyValue shall be the format and size as Table 7 — DSP0289 general policy definitions defines.
All other values	Reserved	All other values reserved

Table 7 — DSP0289 general policy definitions defines the credential policies for the resources (for example, commands, and actions) that this specification defines.

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Table 7 — DSP0289 general policy definitions

Byte Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Field Type	Description
0	AllowedBaseAlgo	BaseAsymAlgoLen	Allowable	The format of this field shall be as Table 70 — Base asymmetric algorithm format defines. The value of BaseAsymAlgoLen shall be as Common variable names defines. This field reflects the base algorithms the given Credential ID may use. If a bit is set, the given Credential ID shall be capable of utilizing the corresponding algorithm when CredentialType is 1. If a bit is not set, the given Credential ID shall be prohibited from utilizing the corresponding algorithm. At least one bit should be set. If no bits are set, then the given Credential ID cannot be used. The Authorization initiator can set any bit regardless of the supported asymmetric algorithm. The Authorization initiator.
BaseAsymAlgoLen	AllowedBaseHashAlgo	BaseHashAlgoLen	Allowable	The format of this field shall be as Table 71 — Base hash algorithm format defines. The value of BaseHashAlgoLen shall be as Common variable names defines. This field reflects the base hash algorithms the given Credential ID may use. If a bit is set, the given Credential ID shall be capable of utilizing the corresponding hash when CredentialType is 1. If a bit is not set, the given Credential ID shall be prohibited from utilizing the corresponding hash. At least one bit should be set. If no bits are set, then CredentialType = 1 cannot be used. The Authorization initiator can set any bit regardless of the supported hash algorithm. The Authorization target shall accept and retain any bit that is set by the Authorization initiator.
BaseAsymAlgoLen + BaseHashAlgoLen	CredentialPrivileges	4		The format of this field shall be as Table 8 — DSP0289 Authorization policy bit definitions defines.
4 + BaseAsymAlgoLen + BaseHashAlgoLen	AuthProcessPrivileges	1		The format of this field shall be as Table 9 — DSP0289 Authorization process policy bit definitions defines. At least one bit should be set for the Authorization target to authorize any messages for the given Credential ID. Thus, when no bits are set, the Authorization target cannot authorize any messages for the given Credential ID which effectively disables the use of the given Credential ID.

Table 8 — DSP0289 Authorization policy bit definitions defines the credentials provisioning policies.

Table 8 — DSP0289 Authorization policy bit definitions

Byte Offset	Bit Offset	Field	Field Type	Description
0	0	ModifyOtherCredentialParamPrivilege	Privilege	If this bit is set, the given Credential ID shall be capable of modifying the Credential ID parameters of other Credential IDs through the SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request using the ParameterChange operation.
0	1	QueryOtherCredentialParamPrivilege	Privilege	If this bit is set, the given Credential ID shall be capable of retrieving the Credential ID parameters of other Credential IDs through the <code>GET_CRED_ID_PARAMS</code> request.
0	2	GrantOtherPolicyPrivilege	Privilege	If this bit is set, the given Credential ID shall be capable of granting privileges for all fields of the Privilege field type for other Credential IDs through the SET_AUTH_POLICY request. Also, setting this bit allows the given Credential ID to modify all fields of Allowable field type in any manner. If this bit is set, the QueryPolicyPrivilege shall also be set.
0	3	RevokeOtherPolicyPrivilege	Privilege	If this bit is set, the given Credential ID shall be capable of revoking privileges for all fields of the Privilege field type for other Credential IDs through the SET_AUTH_POLICY request. If this bit is set, the QueryPolicyPrivilege shall also be set.
0	4	QueryPolicyPrivilege	Privilege	If this bit is set, the given Credential ID shall be capable of retrieving the Authorization policy of other Credential IDs through the GET_AUTH_POLICY request.
0	5	ResetToDefaultsPrivilege	Privilege	If this bit is set, the given Credential ID shall be capable of using the AUTH_RESET_TO_DEFAULT request.
0	6	LockUnlockSelfPrivilege	Privilege	When this bit is set, the given Credential ID shall be capable of locking or unlocking its own Credential parameters and its policy. Note that this specification does not support a Credential ID being able to lock or unlock the Credential parameters and policies of other Credential IDs.
0	7	RetrieveAuthProcListPrivilege	Privilege	When this bit is set, the given Credential ID shall be capable of retrieving the Authorization process information of other Credential IDs using the GET_AUTH_PROCESSES request.
1	0	KillAuthProcPrivilege	Privilege	When this bit is set, the given Credential ID shall be capable of terminating the Authorization process of any unlocked Credential ID using the KILL_AUTH_PROCESS request.
1	[7:1]	Reserved	Reserved	Reserved
2-3	All bits	Reserved	Reserved	Reserved

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Table 9 — DSP0289 Authorization process policy bit definitions defines the Authorization process policies.

Table 9 — DSP0289 Authorization process policy bit definitions

Byte Offset	Bit Offset	Field	Field Type	Description
0	0	PrivilegeSEAP	Privilege	If this bit is set, the given Credential ID shall be capable of invoking the SEAP process as an Authorization initiator.
0	1	PrivilegeUSAP	Privilege	If this bit is set, the given Credential ID shall be capable of being a user in the USAP Process.
0	2	PrivilegePersistUSAS	Privilege	If this bit is set, the given Credential ID shall be capable of persisting its own USAS as USAS continuation defines. If this bit is set, the PrivilegeUSAP bit shall also be set.
0	[7:3]	Reserved	Reserved	Reserved

8.5.1.1 DSP0289 Authorization policy changes requirements

- When changing the Authorization policy for a given Credential ID, the new policy settings shall take effect immediately for that Credential ID. The Authorization target should enforce the new policy in the least-invasive manner possible. For example, if the new settings grant or revoke a privilege in the ModifyOtherCredentialParamPrivilege field, the Authorization target can apply the new settings to incoming messages without ending an active Authorization process. As another example, if a bit is cleared in AllowedBaseAlgo and if an active Authorization process is using the corresponding asymmetric algorithm, then the Authorization target will have to fail authorization for all messages requiring authorization for the affected Credential ID, unless the affected Credential ID changes its own Credential ID parameters to comply with the new policy.
- Here are some specific policy change requirements. If a new policy clears a bit in an Allowable field type and the current Credential ID parameters associated with that Credential ID use the corresponding bit, the Authorization target shall still allow the Authorization initiator to use the existing Credential ID parameters to change the parameters to comply with the new policy through SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS and GET_CRED_ID_PARAMS while failing authorization for all other messages requiring authorization.
- The Authorization target can return an AUTH_ERROR message with ErrorCode=TermAuthProc for the corresponding CredentialID to notify the Authorization initiator that the corresponding Authorization processes are terminated.

195 8.5.1.2 DSP0289 additional Authorization policy requirements

An Authorization initiator should initially configure the Authorization policy for a given Credential ID using the SET_AUTH_POLICY request before initially setting the Credential ID parameters via SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request for the same Credential ID.

197 8.5.2 Policy attributes

This section describes attributes associated with policies. The Authorization initiator can use GET_AUTH_POLICY to

read the supported attributes and their current state for the requested Credential ID. An Authorization target can support different attributes for different Credential IDs.

199 See Locking and unlocking attributes for attribute details applicable to policy.

200 8.6 Initial provisioning

- Initial provisioning covers provisioning requirements needed by entities in the supply chain and the Owner of the Authorization target. Provisioning is the process of setting up persistent authorization data, such as Credential ID parameters and associated policies.
- The Authorization initiator can discover the device provisioning state by issuing a GET_AUTH_CAPABILITIES request and checking the DeviceProvisioningState field in the response.

203 8.6.1 Supply chain provisioning

- As the Authorization target traverses the many entities involved in the manufacturing and distribution of the Authorization target, which in whole is called the supply chain, each entity may need to provision one or more Credential IDs with their credentials and associated policies for many scenarios such as in-the-field debugging or return merchandise authorization. Details of these scenarios are outside the scope of this specification.
- When the supply chain entity provisions a Credential ID, that entity should utilize the highest numerically available and lockable Credential ID that the Authorization target supports. When the supply chain entity completes provisioning, that entity can decide to lock the provisioning for its Credential IDs so that it is modifiable only by that supply chain entity itself. If the supply chain entity does not lock its provisioning, the Owner can modify those credentials and policy associated with that Credential ID.
- Supply chain entities shall not issue the TAKE_OWNERSHIP request because this can prevent the Owner from completing its provisioning.

207 8.6.2 Default state

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The default state is the state of the Authorization target where ownership has not been taken, authorization is not enforced for unlocked Credential IDs, and only locked credentials remain, if any. In this state, supply chain entities are expected to have locked their provisioned credentials and associated policies. The Authorization target uses locked provisioning as an indicator of those Credential IDs provisioned by a supply chain entity that should not be modified by others.

8.6.3 Default state and additional supply chain requirements

- This section defines requirements for an Authorization target in the default state and the state of the Authorization target as it traverses the supply chain.
- While the Authorization target is in the default state or as it traverses through the supply chain, messages, including messages from other protocols or from entities other than the Authorization initiator, can still flow to the Authorization

target over multiple transports. To ensure proper setup of the Authorization target and its protected resources, the Authorization target shall fail authorization of all messages requiring authorization, with the following exceptions:

- The Authorization target shall verify authorization for these messages:
- 213
 All messages requiring authorization that retrieve or modify protected resources associated with the locked Credential ID
- A SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS message when locking or unlocking Credential IDs
- o A TAKE_OWNERSHIP request message
 - The Authorization target shall bypass authorization verification for Authorization messages described in
 Credential provisioning and in Authorization policy provisioning and management and for
 AUTH_RESET_TO_DEFAULT messages for unlocked Credential IDs. In these cases, the Authorization target shall not require an Authorization process to occur. In other words, the Authorization target shall fulfill the request without requiring credentials if no other error occurs.

217 8.6.4 Taking ownership

- Taking ownership is the Owner performing its initial provisioning of the Authorization target. Taking ownership is important to ensure proper operation of the Authorization target in the operational environment of the Owner.
- While the Authorization target is in the default state, an Authorization initiator can modify both the Credential ID parameters and Authorization policy of all unlocked Credential IDs without credentials and as many times as the Owner needs as the Default state and additional supply chain requirements section defines. Once the Owner finishes its initial provisioning, the Authorization initiator shall issue the TAKE_OWNERSHIP request to exit the default state and enter an operational state where authorization is fully enforced for all messages.
- The Owner should check provisioning of all Credential IDs to ensure they are provisioned as expected before sending the TAKE OWNERSHIP request.
- Lastly, an Authorization target can return to the default state using the AUTH_RESET_TO_DEFAULT request if the requesting Credential ID's Authorization policy permits.

222 8.6.5 Other provisioning considerations

- This section discusses general provisioning considerations or requirements.
- 224 Provisioning of credentials and associated policies in the default state or throughout the supply chain should be done only in a trusted environment (such as a secure production sandbox environment or secure manufacturing). If messages used for provisioning are exchanged outside an SPDM session, there are additional factors and any binding specification that allows such exchanges should ensure there are no gaps in functionality. After taking ownership, an Owner can provision in a trusted environment or use a credential already provisioned to authorize provisioning of other Credential ID parameters or their associated policies in an untrusted environment.
- During and after initial provisioning, the supply chain and the Owner can configure one or more Credential IDs to have the highest privilege levels or assign privileges across two or more Credential IDs. Furthermore, the Owner can configure privileges in such a way that significantly restricts operation of the Authorization target; recovery from such a state is outside the scope of this specification.

226 8.7 Discovery

- This section describes the methodology to discover support information for an SPDM endpoint as an Authorization target. The discovery process has two phases: an announcement phase followed by the Discover-Select Flow phase.
- In the announcement phase, an Authorization target announces itself at the start of a secure session, such as the Handshake phase of an SPDM session. For an SPDM session, if an SPDM Requester is an Authorization target, the SPDM Requester shall populate the AUTH_HELLO AODS in the Session-Secrets-Exchange request. Likewise, if an SPDM Responder is an Authorization target, the SPDM Responder shall populate the AUTH_HELLO AODS in the Session-Secrets-Exchange response.
- The next phase is the Discover-Select Flow phase and this phase only occurs after a secure session is fully established, such as in the Application phase of an SPDM session. If the Authorization initiator receives an AUTH_HELLO AODS in an SPDM session, the Authorization initiator can begin this phase by issuing the GET_AUTH_VERSION message, followed by the SELECT_AUTH_VERSION and ending with GET_AUTH_CAPABILITIES. The GET_AUTH_VERSION request can be issued at any time and may be skipped if the version information is already known. The GET_AUTH_CAPABILITIES request, if issued, shall always follow the successful completion of the SELECT_AUTH_VERSION request.
- The Discover-Select Flow phase does not need to fully complete for every secure session. However, the Authorization initiator shall send a successful SELECT_AUTH_VERSION request in every secure session. The Discover-Select Flow phase should fully complete between the Authorization initiator and Authorization target in at least one secure session. Furthermore, for each secure session, the Authorization target shall return an AUTH_ERROR response with ErrorCode=UnexpectedRequest to all Authorization requests other than GET_AUTH_VERSION and SELECT_AUTH_VERSION requests until successfully fulfilling a SELECT_AUTH_VERSION request for the corresponding secure session.
- The Authorization initiator should only send exactly one successful SELECT_AUTH_VERSION request. If the Authorization target receives additional SELECT_AUTH_VERSION requests after a version is already selected and the additional requests change the selected version, the Authorization target shall respond with an AUTH_ERROR of ErrorCode=InvalidRequest. Otherwise, it shall respond with SELECT_AUTH_VERSION_RSP because the subsequent requests could be a retry.
- Figure 3 Most common discovery phase illustrates the most common discovery methodology for an SPDM Responder that is an Authorization target.




Figure 3 — Most common discovery phase

8.8 Authorization process

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- The Authorization process is the process by which an Authorization target grants or denies access to a protected resource based on policy.
- 237 Prior to the Authorization process, the Authorization target should have credentials and policy provisioned appropriate to its usage model. Otherwise, the Authorization target may inappropriately grant or deny access. See Credential provisioning and Authorization policy provisioning and management for details.
- To properly prepare for the execution of the Authorization process, an Authorization initiator shall successfully establish a secure session such as an SPDM session as DSP0274 defines or use an already established secure session.
- The Authorization process establishes an authorization session and allows for establishing different types of authorization sessions. This specification supports these Authorization processes:
- User-Specific Authorization Process
- SPDM Endpoint Authorization Process

8.8.1 User-Specific Authorization Process (USAP)


243 The User-Specific Authorization process occurs completely within a secure session. This process establishes an

authorization session bound to the user. Thus, one or more User-specific authorization sessions can occur simultaneously within a secure session, and the Authorization session identifier shall be the Credential ID of the corresponding User.

- The USAP starts with the Discovery-Select flow as Discovery defines. To ensure the Authorization initiator has current information, in each secure session the Authorization initiator should perform the Discovery-Select flow completely before the first User-Specific Authorization session.
- To establish a User-Specific Authorization session, the Authorization initiator shall send a START_AUTH request to the target with the User's corresponding information and the Authorization target shall respond with START_AUTH_RSP for a successful response. This request and response pair is important for these reasons:
- It elevates the privilege level of the secure session for that specific User. This portion of a secure session is called an Authorization session.
- It initializes critical cryptographic parameters for the authorization session. Messages that traverse the authorization session can be messages of any protocol and are not restricted to SPDM or Authorization messages.
- It enables the message format of all messages using the authorization session to accommodate authorization data for the corresponding User. The format for such messages is defined in Authorization record.
- The successful completion of the START_AUTH request and START_AUTH_RSP response establishes the Authorization session for the corresponding User. While the authorization session is active, messages requiring authorization shall contain authorization data, called the Authorization tag, for the corresponding User. When the Authorization target receives a message from any protocol in the corresponding secure session, the Authorization target shall determine whether the message requires authorization regardless of whether the message contains an Authorization tag. If a message requires authorization, the Authorization target shall validate the Authorization tag according to the provisioned credentials, associated policies, and the User associated with the corresponding Authorization session. Upon successful validation of the Authorization tag, the Authorization target shall process the message accordingly. If a message requiring authorization does not contain an Authorization tag or if the validation of the Authorization tag fails, the Authorization target shall take one of these actions:
- Respond with an AUTH_ERROR message
- Respond with the corresponding protocol-specific error
- Silently discard the message
- Even in error scenarios, the Authorization target still processes the Authorization tag, if present, as USAP

 Authorization record details. For messages that do not require authorization, the Authorization target can process the message according to the definitions of its respective protocol.
- The User-Specific Authorization session shall terminate for the corresponding User when the Authorization target receives an END_AUTH request from the Authorization initiator or the corresponding secure session terminates. The termination of the Authorization session restores a secure session to its original privilege level for that User.

 Additionally, the termination of a User-Specific Authorization session does not end the corresponding secure session. The termination of a USAS does not terminate the processing of received messages to completion according to the definition of their respective protocol and this specification by the Authorization target.
- Figure 4 Authorization process illustrates an example of the User-Specific Authorization process using an SPDM session.



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Figure 4 — Authorization process

8.8.1.1 General USAP error handling, requirements, and notes

A User is identified by its Credential ID. The START_AUTH, END_AUTH, and the Authorization record contain the Credential ID of the user.

- A User shall have only one Authorization session active at a time within its corresponding secure session. Therefore, a START_AUTH request shall be prohibited for the same User when the User has a corresponding active User-Specific Authorization session. The User-Specific Authorization shall be terminated before another START_AUTH request can be issued. If a START_AUTH is received for a User with a corresponding active User-Specific Authorization Session, the Authorization target shall either respond with an AUTH_ERROR or silently discard the request.
- A User can repeat the User-Specific Authorization Process as many times as it deems necessary as long as each iteration of the process starts and ends as User-Specific Authorization Process defines. Additionally, the Authorization target can limit the number of simultaneous active User-Specific Authorization sessions for a given secure session.
- If the Authorization target receives a message with an Authorization tag but the message does not require an Authorization tag, the Authorization target shall still process the Authorization tag as this specification defines.

263 8.8.1.2 USAS continuation

- USAS continuation allows a Credential ID to continue a prior USAS from where it ended, if supported by the Authorization target as indicated by PermPersistCap or ResetPersistCap in the AUTH_CAPABILITIES response. USAS continuation is similar to save and load operations common in numerous consumer applications. To save the USAS, the Authorization initiator sets the [END_AUTH]. Attributes / PersistMethod as desired. To restore the USAS, the Authorization initiator sets the [START_AUTH]. Attributes / Continue accordingly. See Authorization process management for more details.
- On a request to persist, both the Authorization target and Authorization initiator shall persist the USAS information corresponding to the END_AUTH request. The USAS information shall be as follows:
- 4 Authorization initiator nonce
- Authorization target nonce
- SavedSequenceNumber
- 269 Credential ID
- The SavedSequenceNumber shall be calculated as: the last-used sequence number in the USAP Authorization tag plus

 1. To ensure the correct sequence number is saved, the User should ensure completion of all messages containing an Authorization tag before issuing the END_AUTH request for the USAS corresponding to that User.
- Once a saved USAS is continued, the USAS becomes active and is no longer a saved USAS. However, the Authorization target should wait for at least one successfully authorized message before erasing the saved USAS information from its persistent storage. See [END_AUTH] . Attributes / PersistMethod for additional requirements.
- If a saved USAS cannot be continued for any reason, the Authorization target shall still preserve the USAS according to its original persistence method. The preserved USAS shall be saved until the Authorization target receives a KILL_AUTH_PROCESS request from the Authorization initiator. To ensure maximum compatibility, the Authorization initiator should select the same Authorization version as the saved USAS for the corresponding secured session.
- 273 Additionally, the Authorization target shall persist no more than one USAS per Credential ID at a time.
- The PrivilegePersistUSAS privilege governs the ability of USAS continuation for the given Credential ID.

275 8.8.2 SPDM Endpoint Authorization Process (SEAP)

- The SPDM Endpoint Authorization Process (SEAP) is a process that specifically authorizes an SPDM Requester or both SPDM endpoints in an SPDM session. If SEAP authorizes only the SPDM Requester, then the SPDM Requester plays the role of the Authorization initiator. If SEAP authorizes both endpoints, then the SPDM Requester and SPDM Responder can play the role of either an Authorization initiator or an Authorization target at any time within the session.
- SEAP requires SPDM mutual authentication as SPDM defines. This version of the specification only supports asymmetric algorithms and, therefore, SEAP supports secure session establishment only through SPDM KEY_EXCHANGE. Additionally, SPDM mutual authentication can use certificates or a raw public key.
- SEAP is broken into two parts as Figure 5 SPDM Endpoint Authorization Process (SEAP) illustrates. The first part occurs during the Session handshake phase as SPDM defines. The second part occurs during the SPDM Application phase.
- The first part of SEAP begins with a Session-Secrets-Exchange request. If an SPDM Requester wants to invoke this Authorization process, the SPDM Requester shall add the INVOKE_SEAP data structure to the OpaqueData field of a Session-Secrets-Exchange request. Additionally, if the SPDM Responder wants to send messages requiring authorization to the SPDM Requester using SEAP in the same session, the SPDM Responder shall also add the INVOKE_SEAP data structure to the OpaqueData field of the Session-Secrets-Exchange response. Lastly, the SPDM endpoints shall populate all fields appropriately in a Session-Secrets-Exchange request and response message to perform mutual authentication.
- The first part of SEAP ends with the Session-Secrets-Finish message exchange. If the SPDM Requester successfully authenticates and finds a matching Credential ID for the SPDM Responder, the SPDM Requester shall populate the SEAP_SUCCESS data structure in the OpaqueData field of the Session-Secrets-Finish request. Likewise, if the SPDM Responder successfully authenticates and finds a matching Credential ID for the SPDM Requester, the SPDM Responder shall populate the SEAP_SUCCESS data structure in the OpaqueData field of the Session-Secrets-Finish response. Otherwise, if there is a failure or if the OpaqueData field does not exist, the SEAP_SUCCESS data structure in either the request or the response depending of which endpoint failed shall be absent. A failure of the SEAP process does not end the SPDM session.
- A matching Credential ID has three different definitions depending on ownership and lock Credential ID status. They are as follows:
- Ownership Taken: A matching Credential ID is a supported Credential ID whose credential parameters and
 policies are properly provisioned and whose public key matches that of the leaf certificate or raw public key of
 the Authorization initiator used to authenticate the Authorization initiator.
- Ownership Not Taken: A matching Credential ID is a supported Credential ID whose credential parameters and policies may not be properly or fully provisioned.
- Locked Credential IDs. A matching Credential ID is the same definition as a matching Credential ID in the Ownership Taken case regardless of ownership status.
- Before the second part of SEAP can begin, the Authorization initiator performs the Discovery-Select flow as the Discovery section defines. The Authorization initiator should completely perform the Discovery-Select flow before the

second part of SEAP in each SPDM session to ensure the Authorization initiator has the current information. Additionally, the SPDM Requester and the SPDM Responder may not support the same versions or capabilities even though they can be both Authorization initiators in the same session.

- The second part of SEAP can begin at any time during the SPDM application phase. Additionally, the second part of SEAP can occur as many times as needed in the corresponding SPDM session. To initiate the second part of SEAP, the Authorization initiator shall send an ELEVATE_PRIVILEGE request and the Authorization target shall respond with PRIVILEGE_ELEVATED for a successful response. This request and response pair elevates the privilege level of the SPDM session for the Authorization initiator for all subsequent messages until the privilege level is lowered. An Authorization target shall return an AUTH_ERROR if there is a failure in authorization during the first part of SEAP (that is, if the SEAP_SUCCESS was absent for the corresponding Authorization initiator).
- This portion of an SPDM session is called an Authorization session. In SEAP, at most two Authorization sessions can occur at any time simultaneously in the corresponding SPDM session. One Authorization session would be for the SPDM Requester who is acting as an Authorization initiator and the other Authorization session would be for the SPDM Responder who is acting as an Authorization initiator.
- The successful completion of this request and response establishes the Authorization session for the corresponding Authorization initiator. In an Authorization session, when the Authorization target receives a message from any protocol in the corresponding SPDM session, the Authorization target shall determine if the message requires authorization or not. If a message requires authorization, the Authorization target shall validate the message according to the provisioned policies associated with the corresponding Authorization initiator. Upon successful validation of the message, the Authorization target shall process the message accordingly. If the validation of the message fails, the Authorization target shall take one of these actions:
- Respond with an AUTH_ERROR message
- Respond with the corresponding protocol-specific error
- Silently discard the message
- 292 For messages that do not require authorization, the Authorization target can process the message accordingly.
- The Authorization session shall terminate for the corresponding Authorization initiator when the Authorization target receives an END_ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE request from the Authorization initiator or the corresponding SPDM session terminates. The termination of the Authorization session restores an SPDM session to its original privilege level for that Authorization initiator. The termination of a SEAP Authorization session does not end the corresponding SPDM session. The termination of a SEAP Authorization session does not terminate the processing of received messages to completion according to the definition of their respective protocol and this specification by the Authorization target.
- Figure 5 SPDM Endpoint Authorization Process (SEAP) illustrates the SPDM Endpoint Authorization Process (SEAP). Note, for simplicity, the figure does not illustrate all the required AODS during the SPDM handshake. See Authorization Opaque Data Structures for details on all AODS.




Figure 5 — SPDM Endpoint Authorization Process (SEAP)

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297 8.8.2.1 SEAP error handling, requirements, and notes

- If the INVOKE_SEAP data structure is absent in the Session-Secrets-Exchange request, then the SEAP_SUCCESS shall be absent in the OpaqueData field of the corresponding Session-Secrets-Finish response. Likewise, if the INVOKE_SEAP data structure is absent in the Session-Secrets-Exchange response, then the SEAP_SUCCESS shall be absent in the OpaqueData field of the corresponding Session-Secrets-Finish request.
- If SEAP uses SPDM version 1.3 or earlier, then SEAP_SUCCESS cannot be supported because there is no OpaqueData field in the Session-Secrets-Finish message. Thus, if the first part of SEAP fails, the Authorization target shall return an AUTH_ERROR using ErrorCode=OperationFailed for the ELEVATE_PRIVILEGE request in all versions of SPDM.
- If an SPDM session uses SEAP, then that session cannot use USAP because it is not possible to differentiate the Authorization initiator of a message requiring authorization especially when an Authorization tag is not present. Specifically, if an Authorization initiator invokes SEAP, then the Authorization target shall prohibit the use of USAP in the corresponding SPDM session.
- 301 If INVOKE_SEAP is present in a Session-Secrets-Exchange message, it shall be present exactly once.

8.8.3 Terminating Authorization process

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- There are two types of Authorization process termination. The first type is natural termination in which the Authorization initiator sends an end Authorization process request such as END_AUTH to the Authorization target. The other type is forced termination. Both types achieve the same effect, except for the case in which the Authorization process is preserved. An Authorization process can only be preserved through natural termination.
- Note that other parts of this specification use forced termination.
- In cases that do not preserve an Authorization process or that kill a saved Authorization process, terminating an Authorization process destroys all metadata (for example, nonce, sequence numbers) associated with that Authorization process and returns the associated Credential ID to an unprivileged state where all messages requiring authorization fail authorization checks. The affected Credential ID can start a new Authorization process afterward.

306 8.8.4 Other error handling, requirements, and notes

- When an Authorization session is not active in a secure session for a given User or Authorization initiator, the processing of messages, regardless of whether they require authorization, is outside the scope of this specification but likely follows the definitions of its respective protocol. From an authorization perspective, however, this specification recommends one of these three options:
 - Have the Authorization target use another form of authorization, which is outside the scope of this specification
 - Respond with an AUTH_ERROR response for all messages requiring authorization
- Silently discard the message
- Authorization sessions do not limit the types of messages that can traverse a secure session, but rather they enable explicit validation of authority for all messages according to provisioned credentials and policies. Furthermore, this

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specification strongly recommends that messages requiring authorization be denied access for Users or Authorization entities outside of an Authorization session.

The use of the same Credential ID across multiple secure sessions can occur at any time, including simultaneously. The Authorization target and Authorization initiator shall ensure that authorization data associated with a given Credential ID is bound to their respective secure session and Authorization session. In other words, the authorization data cannot be reused in another secure session. Here is a small example involving SPDM sessions: the sequence number, Authorization tag, or nonce that is bound to SPDM session ID 33 cannot be used again in SPDM session ID 88.

8.9 Authorization record

- An Authorization record is a wrapper structure that carries authorization information and the message itself for messages requiring authorization. The Authorization record provides the transport with a protocol-agnostic way to send and receive messages requiring authorization.
 - Table 10 Authorization record format shows the Authorization record format:

316 Table 10 — Authorization record format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	AuthRecordType	1	Specifies the record type. The values in this field shall be the values defined in Table 11 — Authorization record types.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	GenericPayloadLen	4	Length, in bytes, of GenericPayload .
6	GenericPayload	GenericPayloadLen	The format of this field shall be as specified by the AuthRecordType .

Table 11 — Authorization record types shows the supported Authorization record types.

Table 11 — Authorization record types

Value	Description
0	Authorization message. The GenericPayload field shall contain an Authorization message that this specification defines and which does not require authorization. The size and format of this field shall be the size and format of the specific Authorization message.
1	Encapsulated message requiring authorization. The GenericPayload field shall contain data in the format specified by Table 12 — Generic Authorization Record Type Format for Messages Requiring Authorization. When using DSP0277 as the transport, the format and size of the MsgToAuthPayload field shall be the same as the Application data as DSP0277 defines. Otherwise, the format and size of the MsgToAuthPayload field are specific to the message protocol or the transport.

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Value	Description
2	Record Error. The GenericPayload field shall contain data in the format specified by Table 13 — Type 2 Authorization Record Failure.
	The Authorization target can use this record type to convey errors associated with the Authorization record or AUTH record over SPDM VDM. It can also silently discard the Authorization record or AUTH record over SPDM VDM.
	DSP0289-defined Authorization messages requiring authorization.
3	The GenericPayload field shall contain data in the format specified by Table 12 — Generic Authorization Record Type Format for Messages Requiring Authorization. Additionally, the size and format of the MsgToAuthPayload field in the Message Requiring Authorization Record shall be the same format and size as an Authorization message.
	This Authorization record type is strictly for Authorization messages requiring authorization.
All other values	Reserved

319 8.9.1 Authorization record on the transport

- While the Authorization record can traverse any transport, there are some requirements the transport should define. The transport should define at least one mechanism to indicate the presence and absence of the Authorization record, so that it can be identified and forwarded to the authorization logic for further processing. For example, this can be accomplished through a single bit indicating presence or by stating that the Authorization record is always present. The transport can also choose to use the mechanism defined in Authorization record over SPDM Vendor-Defined Messages (VDM) to transmit the Authorization record since this may help prevent significant modifications to the transport.
- The transport can provide additional requirements, changes, or constraints, if any.

8.9.2 Authorization types

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323 This section defines the format and requirements for all Authorization record types.

324 8.9.2.1 Authorization record in Authorization process

325 This section gives additional details on the Authorization records specific to each Authorization process.

326 8.9.2.1.1 USAP Authorization record

- This section defines requirements for all messages requiring authorization in USAP. These are the requirements for all messages requiring authorization in USAP:
- The Authorization record shall be present for all messages requiring authorization.
- The Authorization record shall be transmitted exclusively from the Authorization initiator to the Authorization

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- target, and transmission in the opposite direction is prohibited.
- For messages not requiring authorization in USAP, the transport can use the Authorization record. If the Authorization record is used for messages not requiring authorization, the AuthRecordType shall be set to 0.
- Table 12 Generic Authorization Record Type Format for Messages Requiring Authorization shows the format for the GenericPayload field when AuthRecordType is 1:

Table 12 — Generic Authorization Record Type Format for Messages Requiring Authorization

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	AuthRecID	4	This field indicates a unique number for this Authorization record. The Authorization endpoints use this number for message tracking and error-handling purposes. The value of this field should increment by 1. Values can repeat as long as the Authorization initiator ensures that the Authorization target finishes authorization checks on this process. The value 0xFFFF_FFFF shall not be used.
4	AuthTagLen	4	This field shall contain the length, in bytes, of AuthTag . The value of this field shall be greater than zero.
8	AuthTag	AuthTagLen	This field shall contain the Authorization tag for the MsgToAuthPayload .
8 + AuthTagLen	MsgToAuthPayloadLen	4	Shall be the length, in bytes, of MsgToAuthPayload . The value of this field shall be greater than zero.
12 + AuthTagLen	MsgToAuthPayload	MsgToAuthPayloadLen	Shall contain the message requiring authorization. The message can be a message of any protocol. The format and size of this field are specific to the message protocol. For Authorization messages, this field shall only contain Authorization requests. The size and format shall be the size and format of the respective Authorization request.

8.9.2.1.2 SEAP Authorization record

The transport shall specify its use of an Authorization record.

8.9.2.2 Authorization record Failures

The Authorization target can send an Authorization record with an Authorization tag verification failure type (Type 2) to indicate an authorization verification failure.

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Table 13 — Type 2 Authorization Record Failure

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	ErrorAuthRecID	4	Shall be the AuthRecID of the Authorization record that contains the error. If the AuthRecID is not known, such as when a message requiring authorization does not have an Authorization tag, the value of this field shall be 0xFFFF_FFFF.
4	AuthRecErrorInfo	Len0	This field contains the error information. The format and size of this field shall be the same as AUTH_ERROR response. Note, Type 2 can use only certain types of ErrorCode s.

8.10 Authorization tag

- The Authorization tag is the cryptographic data that accompanies a message that requires authorization. An Authorization tag may or may not be present in every Authorization process or in every message. The Authorization record embeds the Authorization tag. This section details the Authorization tag for each Authorization process.
- Furthermore, Authorization tags support only asymmetric signature algorithms.

341 8.10.1 SEAP Authorization tag

The Authorization tag is not present in SEAP, as SEAP Authorization record discusses. The Credential ID to use for SEAP shall be the one provided in the INVOKE SEAP AODS.

343 8.10.2 USAP Authorization tag

- This section provides details about the Authorization tag in a USAP.
- In a User-specific authorization session, the Authorization tag identifies the user requesting authorization.

 Specifically, the Authorization tag contains a Credential ID that numerically identifies the User and verifiable cryptographic information that authenticates the user to ensure the message came from the corresponding User.

346 8.10.2.1 USAP Authorization tag format

- The format and size for the Authorization record shall be the format and size as Table 14 Authorization tag format defines.
- 348 Table 14 Authorization tag format shows the format for the USAP Authorization tag.

Table 14 — Authorization tag format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	CredentialID	2	Shall be the Credential ID of an active User-Specific Authorization session.

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Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
2	Signature	Len0	Shall be the signature of the selected asymmetric algorithm associated with CredentialID as USAP Authorization tag signature generation and verification defines. The size of this field shall be the size of the selected signature associated with CredentialID.

If CredentialID is present in the Authorization record, the Authorization target shall use it to locate the credential in order to verify the Authorization tag.

8.10.2.2 USAP Authorization tag signature generation and verification

- This section defines the operations for signature generation and verification when using asymmetric signature algorithms for USAP.
- The verifiable cryptographic information in an Authorization tag shall be a digital signature whose signature algorithm is the provisioned asymmetric signature algorithm corresponding to the User.
- To compute the signature, the User shall create AuthMsgBody by concatenating the following fields in order:
 - The Credential ID of the User
 - 2. The requester's nonce provided in the START_AUTH request
 - 3. The responder's nonce provided in the START_AUTH_RSP response
 - The sequence number
 - 5. The message body, which is the MsgToAuthPayload field of the Authorization record
 - If [START_AUTH] . Attributes / Continue is set, the sequence number shall start with SavedSequenceNumber as USAS continuation defines with the successful completion of START_AUTH request. Otherwise, the sequence number shall start at 1. Thereafter, the sequence number shall increment by 1 after each message requiring authorization and corresponding to the User. For the Authorization target, the sequence number shall increment by 1 after receiving a message containing an Authorization tag from the corresponding User regardless of whether the Authorization verification succeeds or fails.
- The message body shall be all the bytes of the MsgToAuthPayload field of the Authorization record. Because this specification regards the message body as opaque data, the message body shall have an octet string byte order.
- The size of the sequence number shall be 32 bits. Once the sequence number equals the maximum value of 0xFFF_FFFF, the User-Specific Authorization Session shall terminate.
- Finally, the User shall compute AuthMsgSignature using this function and the corresponding selected asymmetric signature algorithm.

AuthMsgSignature = AuthSign(UserPrivKey, AuthMsgBody, context)

364 where:

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- The UserPrivKey shall be the private key associated with the corresponding User.
- The context shall be the string "usap signing".

- The AuthMsgSignature shall be the signature in an Authorization tag for the corresponding user and corresponding message.
- Likewise, the Authorization target shall verify the message requiring the authorization through this method:

AuthValResult = AuthSigVerify(UserPublicKey, AuthSignature, AuthMsgBody, context)

- 369 where:
- The UserPublicKey shall be the public key associated with the User that is associated with the corresponding Credential ID.
- The AuthSignature shall be the signature in the Authorization tag that accompanied the message.
- The context shall be the string "usap signing".
- If AuthValResult is success, the Authorization tag has been successfully validated. Otherwise, the Authorization tag has failed validation.
- The message requiring authorization shall be successful if all the following conditions are met:
- The message contains an Authorization tag.
- The AuthValResult is success.
- The policy associated with the message grants the corresponding User access.
- 378 Otherwise, the message fails authorization.

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9 Authorization messages

9.1 Authorization messages overview

Authorization messages are messages defined by this specification that are sent between the Authorization initiator and target and form a request-response protocol. The following clauses describe the rules and requirements for the messaging protocol.

9.1.1 Bi-directional Authorization message processing

- This clause describes the specifications and requirements for handling bi-directional and overlapping authorization request messages.
- If an endpoint can act as both an Authorization initiator and Authorization target, it shall be able to send request messages and response messages independently.
- When an SPDM endpoint acts as a proxy between an Authorization initiator and an Authorization target, how the proxy SPDM endpoint enforces the rules specified in the following clauses is outside the scope of this specification.
- While the specification anticipates that, in common scenarios, an SPDM Requester acts as the Authorization initiator and an SPDM Responder serves as the Authorization target, this configuration is not mandated by the architecture. The following clause assumes that an SPDM endpoint is the Authorization initiator.

9.1.2 Requirements for Authorization initiators

- An Authorization initiator shall not have multiple outstanding Authorization requests to the same Authorization target, within a single secure session. This restriction shall only apply to the messages defined by this specification. For messages defined by other protocols, the rules on multiple outstanding requests are outside the scope of this specification.
- An outstanding request is a request where the request message has begun transmission and the corresponding response has not yet been fully received.
- Within a secure session, if the Authorization initiator has sent a request to an Authorization target and wants to send a subsequent request to the same target, then the Authorization initiator shall wait to send the subsequent request until after the Authorization initiator completes one of the following actions:
- Receives the response from the Authorization target for the outstanding request.
- Times out waiting for a response.
- Receives an indication from the transport layer that transmission of the request message failed.
- The Authorization initiator encounters an internal error or reset.
- An Authorization initiator might send simultaneous request messages to the same Authorization target across multiple secure sessions or to different Authorization targets.

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9.1.3 Requirements for Authorization targets

- An Authorization target is not required to process more than one request message at a time, within a single secure session.
- An Authorization target that is not ready to accept a new request message shall either respond with an AUTH_ERROR message of ErrorCode=Busy or silently discard the request message.
- If an Authorization target supports Authorization messages across concurrent secure sessions, a pending request in one session shall not affect pending requests in another session.

9.1.4 Authorization messages bits-to-bytes mapping

- All fields, regardless of size or endianness, map the highest numeric bits to the highest numerically assigned byte in sequentially decreasing order down to and including the least numerically assigned byte of that field. The following two figures illustrate this mapping.
- Figure 6 One-byte field bit map shows the one-byte field bit map:

Example:

A One-Byte Field Starting at Byte Offset 3

Byte Offset 3								
Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	
7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	

Figure 6 — One-byte field bit map

Figure 7 — Two-byte field bit map shows the two-byte field bit map:

Example:

A Two-Byte Field Starting at Byte Offset 5

	Byte Offset 6					Byte Offset 5									
Bit 15				Bit 11		l .		Bit	Bit 6	Bit 5	Bit 4	Bit	Bit	Bit 1	Bit 0

Figure 7 — Two-byte field bit map

408 9.1.5 Version encoding

The AuthVersion field in the SELECT_AUTH_VERSION message represents the version of the specification through a combination of *Major* and *Minor* nibbles, encoded as follows:

Version	Matches	Incremented when
Мајог	Major version field in the AuthVersion field in the SELECT_AUTH_VERSION message.	Protocol modification breaks backward compatibility.
Minor	Minor version field in the AuthVersion field in the SELECT_AUTH_VERSION message.	Protocol modification maintains backward compatibility.

410 For example:

- Version 1.0 would be 0x10.
- Version 1.2 would be 0x12.
- Version 3.7 would be 0x37.
- An *endpoint* that supports version 1.2 can interoperate with an older endpoint that supports version 1.0 or other previous minor versions. Whether an endpoint supports inter-operation with previous minor versions of the authorization specification is an implementation-specific decision.
- An endpoint that supports version 1.2 only and an endpoint that supports version 3.7 only are not interoperable and shall not attempt to communicate beyond <code>GET_AUTH_VERSION</code>.
- This specification considers two minor versions to be interoperable when it is possible for an implementation that is conformant to a higher minor version number to also communicate with an implementation that is conformant to a lower minor version number with minimal differences in operation. In such a case, the following rules apply:
- Both endpoints shall use the same lower version number in the AuthVersion field for all messages.
- Functionality shall be limited to what the lower minor version of the authorization specification defines.
- Computations and other operations between different minor versions of the authorization specification should remain the same, unless security issues of lower minor versions are fixed in higher minor versions and the fixes require changes in computations or other operations. These differences are dependent on the value in the AuthVersion field in the message.
- In a newer minor version of the authorization specification, a given message can be longer, bit fields and
 enumerations can contain new values, and reserved fields can gain functionality. Existing numeric and bit fields
 retain their existing definitions. Also, fields within a message may grow in length.
- Errata versions (indicated by a non-zero value in the UpdateVersionNumber field of the AUTH_VERSION response
 message after a GET_AUTH_VERSION request) clarify existing behaviors in the authorization specification. They
 maintain bitwise compatibility with the base version, except as required to fix security vulnerabilities or to correct
 mistakes from the base version.
- For details on the version agreement process, see GET_AUTH_VERSION request and AUTH_VERSION response messages and SELECT_AUTH_VERSION request and SELECT_AUTH_VERSION_RSP response messages. The detailed version encoding that the AUTH_VERSION response message returns contains an additional byte that indicates specification bug fixes or development versions. See Table 24 AUTH_VERSION response message format.

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9.1.6 Generic Authorization message format

Table 15 — Generic Authorization message field definitions defines the fields that constitute a generic Authorization message, including the message header and payload:

Table 15 — Generic A	Nuthorization message	field definitions
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Byte offset	Bit offset	Size (bits)	Field	Description
0	[7:0]	8	RequestResponseCode	Shall be the request message code or response code, which Table 16 — Authorization message request codes and Table 17 — Authorization message response codes enumerate. 0x00 through 0x7F represent response codes and 0x80 through 0xFF represent request codes. In request messages, this field is considered the request code. In response messages, this field is considered the response code.
1	[7:0]	8	Reserved	Reserved
2	See the description.	Variable	Authorization message payload	Shall be zero or more bytes that are specific to the RequestResponseCode .

426 9.2 Authorization message definitions

This section discusses all authorization request and response messages.

428 9.2.1 Authorization message request codes

- Table 16 Authorization message request codes defines the Authorization message request codes. The **Implementation requirement** column indicates requirements on the Requester.
- The **Authorization requirements** column indicates whether or not the message requires authorization. If a value in this column is *Mandatory*, the Authorization target shall perform authorization checks for the corresponding request. If a value in this column is *None*, the Authorization target shall not perform authorization checks for the corresponding request. Finally, when the value in this column is *Conditional*, the section of this specification for the corresponding request details the requirements. If a request message fails authorization checks, the Authorization target shall respond with an AUTH_ERROR using ErrorCode=AccessDenied.
- If an Authorization target receives an unsupported request, the Authorization target shall respond with an AUTH_ERROR using ErrorCode=UnsupportedRequest.

Table 16 — Authorization message request codes

Request	Code value	Implementation requirement	Authorization Requirements	Message format
GET_AUTH_VERSION	0x81	Mandatory	None	Table 23 — GET_AUTH_VERSION request message format
SELECT_AUTH_VERSION	0x82	Mandatory	None	Table 26 — SELECT_AUTH_VERSION request message format
SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS	0x83	Optional	Conditional	Table 33 — SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request message format
GET_CRED_ID_PARAMS	0x84	Mandatory	Conditional	Table 36 — GET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request message format
SET_AUTH_POLICY	0x85	Optional	Conditional	Table 39 — SET_AUTH_POLICY request message format
GET_AUTH_POLICY	0x86	Mandatory	Conditional	Table 42 — GET_AUTH_POLICY request message format
START_AUTH	0x87	Optional	None	Table 49 — START_AUTH request message format
END_AUTH	0x88	Optional	None	Table 52 — END_AUTH request message format
ELEVATE_PRIVILEGE	0x89	Optional	None	Table 55 — ELEVATE_PRIVILEGE request message format
END_ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE	0x8A	Optional	None	Table 57 — END_ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE request message format
GET_AUTH_CAPABILITIES	0x8B	Mandatory	None	Table 28 — GET_AUTH_CAPABILITIES request message format
AUTH_RESET_TO_DEFAULT	0x8C	Optional	Conditional	Table 61 — AUTH_RESET_TO_DEFAULT request message format
TAKE_OWNERSHIP	0x8D	Mandatory	Mandatory	Table 59 — TAKE_OWNERSHIP request message format

Request	Code value	Implementation requirement	Authorization Requirements	Message format
GET_AUTH_PROCESSES	0x8E	Optional	Mandatory	Table 44 — GET_AUTH_PROCESSES request message format
KILL_AUTH_PROCESS	0x8F	Optional	Mandatory	Table 47 — KILL_AUTH_PROCESS request message format
Reserved	All other values	Reserved	Reserved	Authorization implementations compatible with this version shall not use the reserved request codes.

9.2.2 Authorization message response codes

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- The RequestResponseCode field in the Authorization response message shall specify the appropriate response code for a request.
- On a successful completion of an Authorization message request, the specified response message shall be returned.

 Upon an unsuccessful completion of an authorization command, the AUTH_ERROR response message should be returned.
- Table 17 Authorization message response codes defines the response codes for Authorization messages. The **Implementation requirement** column indicates requirements on the Responder.

Table 17 — Authorization message response codes

Response	Code value	Implementation requirement	Message format
AUTH_VERSION	0x01	Mandatory	Table 24 — AUTH_VERSION response message format
SELECT_AUTH_VERSION_RSP	0x02	Mandatory	Table 27 — SELECT_AUTH_VERSION_RSP response message format
SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS_DONE	0x03	Optional	Table 35 — SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS_DONE response message format
CRED_ID_PARAMS	0x04	Mandatory	Table 37 — CRED_ID_PARAMS response message format
SET_AUTH_POLICY_DONE	0x05	Optional	Table 41 — SET_AUTH_POLICY_DONE response message format

Response	Code value	Implementation requirement	Message format
AUTH_POLICY	0x06	Mandatory	Table 43 — AUTH_POLICY response message format
START_AUTH_RSP	0x07	Optional	Table 51 — START_AUTH_RSP response message format
END_AUTH_RSP	0x08	Optional	Table 53 — END_AUTH_RSP response message format
PRIVILEGE_ELEVATED	0x09	Optional	Table 56 — PRIVILEGE_ELEVATED response message format
ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE_ENDED	0x0A	Optional	Table 58 — ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE_ENDED response message format
AUTH_CAPABILITIES	0x0B	Mandatory	Table 29 — AUTH_CAPABILITIES response message format
AUTH_DEFAULTS_APPLIED	0x0C	Optional	Table 64 — AUTH_DEFAULTS_APPLIED response message format
OWNERSHIP_TAKEN	0x0D	Mandatory	Table 60 — OWNERSHIP_TAKEN response message format
AUTH_PROCESSES	0x0E	Optional	Table 45 — AUTH_PROCESSES response message format
PROCESS_KILLED	0x0F	Optional	Table 48 — PROCESS_KILLED response message format
AUTH_ERROR	0x7F	Mandatory	Table 20 — AUTH_ERROR response message format
Reserved	All other values	Reserved	Authorization implementations compatible with this version shall not use the reserved response codes.

438 9.2.3 Authorization Message Validity

Certain Authorization messages are associated with a specific Authorization process. Table 18 — Authorization message and Authorization process association shows this high level association. More specific information can be found in the specific message's section.

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Table 18 — Authorization message and Authorization process association

Message	Authorization Process
SET_AUTH_POLICY/START_AUTH_RSP	USAP
END_AUTH/END_AUTH_RSP	USAP
ELEVATE_PRIVILEGE/PRIVILEGE_ELEVATED	SEAP
END_ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE/ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE_ENDED	SEAP
All other Authorization messages	None

9.2.4 Common variable names

This section defines some frequent variable names used in various Authorization messages. Table 19 — Common variables used in Authorization messages defines these variable names.

Table 19 — Common variables used in Authorization messages

Variable Names	Value
BaseAsymAlgoLen	Shall be 8.
BaseHashAlgoLen	Shall be 8.
LenSVH	Shall be the size of the SVH as DSP0293 defines.

444 9.2.5 Error handling

This section discusses general error handling for all Authorization messages.

446 9.2.5.1 AUTH_ERROR response message

- For an authorization request message that results in an error, the Authorization target should send an AUTH_ERROR message to the Requester. The Authorization record also uses this response message for errors in the Authorization record itself.
- Table 20 AUTH_ERROR response message format shows the AUTH_ERROR response format.
- Table 21 Error code and error data shows the detailed error code, error data, and extended error data. The Layer column indicates which layer can use the corresponding <code>ErrorCode</code>. A value of **M** in this column indicates that the <code>ErrorCode</code> shall be allowed in response to an Authorization request. A value of **R** indicates that the <code>ErrorCode</code> shall be allowed in a Type 2 Authorization record. More than one value can be present in the <code>Layer</code> column for an <code>ErrorCode</code>, in which case they are comma separated.

Table 20 — AUTH_ERROR response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for AUTH_ERROR in Table 17 — Authorization message response codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	ErrorCode	1	Shall be the ErrorCode. See Table 21 — Error code and error data.
3	ErrorData	1	Shall be the Error data. See Table 21 — Error code and error data.
4	ExtendedErrorData	0-32	Shall be the Extended error data. See Table 21 — Error code and error data.

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Table 21 — Error code and error data

ErrorCode	Value	Layer	Description	Error data	ExtendedErrorData
Reserved	0x00	Reserved	Reserved	Reserved	Reserved
InvalidRequest	0x01	M	One or more request fields are invalid	0x00	No extended error data is provided.
ResetRequired	0x02	М	The operation or request requires a reset to successfully complete.	0x00	No extended error data is provided.
Busy	0x03	M, R	The Authorization target received the request message, and the Authorization target decided to ignore the request message but might be able to process the request message if the request message is sent again in the future.	0x00	No extended error data is provided.

ErrorCode	Value	Layer	Description	Error data	ExtendedErrorData
UnexpectedRequest	0x04	М	The Authorization target received an unexpected request message.	0x00	No extended error data is provided.
Unspecified	0x05	M, R	Unspecified error occurred.	0x00	No extended error data is provided.
AccessDenied	0x06	R	Authorization checks failed.	0x00	No extended error data is provided.
OperationFailed	0x07	М	The request was valid but the requested operation failed.	0×00	No extended error data is provided.
VersionMismatch	0x08	М	Requested AuthVersion is not supported or is a different version from the selected version.	0×00	No extended error data is provided.
UnsupportedRequest	0x09	М	The Table 16 — Authorization message request codes in the request message is unsupported.	Table 16 — Authorization message request codes in the request message.	No extended error data is provided.
InvalidRecord	0x0A	R	One or more fields in the Authorization record are invalid.	0x0	No extended error data is provided.

ErrorCode	Value	Layer	Description	Error data	ExtendedErrorData
TermAuthProc	0x0B	M	The User or Authorization initiator associated with the Credential ID in Error data should terminate their active Authorization process, if any. The Authorization target has already terminated Authorization processes associated with the given Credential ID. Further use of the active Authorization processes associated with the given Credential ID can result in access denials to the protected resource. The User or Authorization initiator can start new Authorization processes.	0x00	The format and size of this field shall be the same as CredentialID field as Table 2 — Credential structure defines. A value of <code>@xffff</code> shall indicate all Credential IDs.
Vendor or Standards-Defined	0xFF	M, R	Vendor or standards- defined	Shall indicate the registry or standards body using one of the values in the ID column of Table 1 — Registry or standards body ID in DSP0293.	See Table 22 — ExtendedErrorData format for vendor or standards defined ERROR response message.
Reserved	All other values		Reserved.	Reserved	Reserved

Table 22 — ExtendedErrorData format for vendor or standards defined ERROR response message

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	VendorIDLen	1	Shall be the VendorIDLen as defined by DSP0293 Table 2 — Standards body or vendor-defined header (SVH).
1	VendorID	VendorIDLen	Shall be the VendorID as defined by DSP0293 Table 2 — Standards body or vendor-defined header (SVH).
1 + VendorIDLen	OpaqueErrorData	Variable	The vendor or standards body defines this value.

453 9.2.6 Discovery message

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Messages in this section allow an Authorization initiator to discover aspects of the Authorization target. These aspects provide basic information to understand support and establish basic communication parameters.

9.2.6.1 GET_AUTH_VERSION request and AUTH_VERSION response messages

- This request message shall retrieve the authorization specification version of an endpoint. Table 23 —

 GET_AUTH_VERSION request message format shows the GET_AUTH_VERSION request message format and Table 24

 AUTH VERSION response message format shows the AUTH VERSION response message format.
- In all future authorization versions, the GET_AUTH_VERSION and AUTH_VERSION response messages will be backward compatible with all earlier versions.
- The Authorization initiator should begin the discovery process by sending a GET_AUTH_VERSION request message. It may skip this message if the information provided by the AUTH_VERSION response is known beforehand from a prior or concurrent secure session. All Authorization targets shall always support the GET_AUTH_VERSION request message and provide an AUTH_VERSION response containing all supported versions, as Table 23 GET_AUTH_VERSION request message format describes.
- When GET_AUTH_VERSION is used, the Authorization initiator should consult the AUTH_VERSION response to obtain information on a common supported version. The Authorization initiator shall use one of the supported versions in all future communication of other requests. An Authorization target shall not respond to the GET_AUTH_VERSION request message with an AUTH_ERROR message except for ErrorCode s specified in this clause.
- 460 Table 23 GET AUTH VERSION request message format shows the GET_AUTH_VERSION request message format:

Table 23 — GET_AUTH_VERSION request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for GET_AUTH_VERSION in Table 16 — Authorization message request codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved

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Table 24 — AUTH_VERSION response message format shows the successful AUTH_VERSION response message format:

Table 24 — AUTH_VERSION response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for AUTH_VERSION in Table 17 — Authorization message response codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	VersionNumberEntryCount	1	Number of version entries in VersionNumberEntries .
3	VersionNumberEntries	2 * VersionNumberEntryCount	16-bit version entry. See Table 25 — VersionNumberEntry definition. Each entry should be unique. The number of entries in this field shall be the same value as VersionNumberEntryCount. The versions in this field shall be in ascending order sorted by MajorVersion, MinorVersion, UpdateVersionNumber, and Alpha.

Table 25 — VersionNumberEntry definition shows the VersionNumberEntry definition. See Version encoding for more details.

Table 25 — VersionNumberEntry definition

Bit offset	Field	Description
[15:12]	MajorVersion	Shall be the version of the specification having changes that are incompatible with one or more functions in earlier major versions of the specification.
[11:8]	MinorVersion	Shall be the version of the specification having changes that are compatible with functions in earlier minor versions of this major version specification.
[7:4]	UpdateVersionNumber	Shall be the version of the specification with editorial updates and errata fixes. Informational; ignore when checking versions for interoperability.
[3:0]	Alpha	Shall be the pre-release work-in-progress version of the specification. Because the Alpha value represents an in-development version of the specification, versions that share the same major and minor version numbers but have different Alpha versions might not be fully interoperable. Released versions shall have an Alpha value of zero (0).

466 9.2.6.2 SELECT_AUTH_VERSION request and SELECT_AUTH_VERSION_RSP response messages

The SELECT_AUTH_VERSION request shall be used to specify the version of this specification that an Authorization target shall use when interpreting request messages and providing response messages for authorization commands.

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The request and response parameters for this message are listed in Table 26 — SELECT_AUTH_VERSION request message format and Table 27 — SELECT_AUTH_VERSION_RSP response message format. The version selected using this request applies only to the secure session in which the message was sent and is valid until the session terminates. See Discovery section for additional requirements.

- The selected version for communication with an Authorization target shall be the version in the AuthVersion field of the SELECT_AUTH_VERSION. The AuthVersion shall be one of the supported versions of an Authorization target.

 Otherwise, the Authorization target shall either return an AUTH_ERROR message of ErrorCode=VersionMismatch or silently discard the request.
- In all future authorization versions, the SELECT_AUTH_VERSION and SELECT_AUTH_VERSION_RSP response messages will be backward compatible with all earlier versions.
- Table 26 SELECT_AUTH_VERSION request message format shows the SELECT_AUTH_VERSION request message format:

Table 26 — SELECT AUTH VERSION request message format	Table 26 —	SELECT A	AUTH	VERSION	request	message f	ormat
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Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for SELECT_AUTH_VERSION in Table 16 — Authorization message request codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	AuthVersion	1	The version that shall be used for all subsequent communication between the Authorization initiator and target, as Version encoding describes.

Table 27 — SELECT_AUTH_VERSION_RSP response message format shows the successful SELECT_AUTH_VERSION_RSP response message format:

Table 27 — SELECT_AUTH_VERSION_RSP response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for SELECT_AUTH_VERSION_RSP in Table 17 — Authorization message response codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved

474 9.2.6.3 GET AUTH CAPABILITIES request and AUTH CAPABILITIES response messages

The GET_AUTH_CAPABILITIES request and AUTH_CAPABILITIES response shall retrieve capability information from the Authorization target. The request and response parameters for this message are listed in Table 28 — GET_AUTH_CAPABILITIES request message format and Table 29 — AUTH_CAPABILITIES response message format respectively. This request can be sent multiple times and should be sent as the Discovery section describes. If the request is sent multiple times in the same secure session, the corresponding responses shall be identical to the first.

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Table 28 — GET_AUTH_CAPABILITIES request message format shows the GET_AUTH_CAPABILITIES request message format:

Table 28 — GET_AUTH_CAPABILITIES request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for <code>GET_AUTH_CAPABILITIES</code> in Table 16 — Authorization message request codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved

Table 29 — AUTH_CAPABILITIES response message format shows the successful AUTH_CAPABILITIES response message format:

Table 29 — AUTH_CAPABILITIES response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for AUTH_CAPABILITIES in Table 17 — Authorization message response codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	MessageCaps	2	The format of this field shall be as Table 30 — Message supported bit definitions defines.
4	AuthProcessCaps	2	The format of this field shall be as Table 31 — Authorization process supported bit definitions defines.
6	DeviceProvisioningState	1	The format of this field shall be as Table 32 — Device provisioning state values defines.
7	AuthRecordProcessTime	1	This field shall specify the additional amount of time a message of any protocol that is encapsulated in an Authorization record takes to process the Authorization record excluding the MsgToAuthPayload field. This time includes the time it takes to perform authorization verification. The time shall be calculated using this equation and shall be in units of milliseconds: 2AuthRecordProcessTime milliseconds The value of this field shall not exceed 31. See Timing requirements for additional requirements.

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Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
8	BaseAsymAlgoSupported	BaseAsymAlgoLen	If a bit is set, the Authorization target supports the corresponding asymmetric algorithm. Otherwise, the bit shall be clear. The format of this field shall be as Table 70 — Base asymmetric algorithm format defines. The value of BaseAsymAlgoLen shall be as Common variable names defines.
8 + BaseAsymAlgoLen	BaseHashAlgoSupported	BaseHashAlgoLen	If a bit is set, the Authorization target supports the corresponding hash algorithm. Otherwise, the bit shall be clear. The format of this field shall be as Table 71 — Base hash algorithm format defines. The value of BaseHashAlgoLen shall be as Common variable names defines.
8 + BaseAsymAlgoLen + BaseHashAlgoLen	SupportedPolicyOwnerIDCount	2	The value of this field shall be the number of policy owners in SupportedPolicyOwnerIDList . If the value of this field is zero, then the SupportedPolicyOwnerIDList field shall be absent.
10 + BaseAsymAlgoLen + BaseHashAlgoLen	SupportedPolicyOwnerIDList	Variable	This field summarizes the policies the Authorization target supports by only listing the policy owners (PolicyOwnerID). The format of this field shall be the concatenation of one or more PolicyOwnerID fields, as Table 4—Policy structure defines, for each policy the Authorization target supports. The number of PolicyOwnerID s in this list shall be the value in the SupportedPolicyOwnerIDcount field. If multiple policies share the same PolicyOwnerID, that PolicyOwnerID shall only be included once. This list shall be considered to be unordered. To retrieve more details of policy support, the Authorization initiator can use the GET_AUTH_POLICY and the corresponding response.

Table 30 — Message supported bit definitions defines the messages the Authorization endpoint supports.

Table 30 — Message supported bit definitions

Byte Offset	Bit Offset	Field	Description
0	0	ChangeCredIDParamsCap	If the Authorization target supports <code>SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS_DONE</code> , then this bit shall be set. Otherwise, this bit shall not be set.

Byte Offset	Bit Offset	Field	Description
0	1	ChangeAuthPolicyCap	If the Authorization target supports <code>SET_AUTH_POLICY_DONE</code> , then this bit shall be set. Otherwise, this bit shall not be set.
0	2	AuthEventCap	If the Authorization target supports Authorization events as Authorization events define, then this bit shall be set.
0	3	AuthProcListCap	If the Authorization target supports AUTH_PROCESSES , then this bit shall be set. Otherwise, this bit shall not be set.
0	4	AuthProcKillCap	If the Authorization target supports PROCESS_KILLED, then this bit shall be set. Otherwise, this bit shall not be set. If this bit is set, the AuthProcListCap shall also be set.
0	5	ResetToDefaultCap	If the Authorization target supports AUTH_RESET_TO_DEFAULT , then this bit shall be set. Otherwise, this bit shall not be set.
0	[7:6]	Reserved	Reserved
1	[7:0]	Reserved	Reserved

Table 31 — Authorization process supported bit definitions defines the Authorization processes the Authorization endpoint supports.

Table 31 — Authorization process supported bit definitions

Byte Offset	Bit Offset	Field	Description
0	0	USAPcap	If the Authorization target supports USAP, then this bit shall be set. Otherwise, this bit shall not be set. If this bit is set, the START_AUTH_RSP and END_AUTH_RSP response messages shall be supported.
0	1	SEAPcap	If the Authorization target supports SEAP, then this bit shall be set. Otherwise, this bit shall not be set. If this bit is set, the PRIVILEGE_ELEVATED and ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE_ENDED response messages shall be supported.
0	2	ResetPersistCap	If the Authorization target supports USAS continuation until device reset, this bit shall be set. Otherwise, this bit shall not be set. If USAPcap is not set, this bit shall not be set.
0	3	PermPersistCap	If the Authorization target supports USAS continuation across device reset, this bit shall be set. Otherwise, this bit shall not be set. If USAPcap is not set, this bit shall not be set.
0	[7:4]	Reserved	Reserved

Byte Offset	Bit Offset	Field	Description
1	[7:0]	Reserved	Reserved

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Table 32 — Device provisioning state values

Value	Name	Description	
0	Unprovisioned	Device does not have any credentials provisioned.	
1	DefaultState	Device is in the default state. See Default state for details.	
2	Owned	Device has had ownership taken via TAKE_OWNERSHIP. See Taking ownership for additional details.	
All other values	Reserved	Reserved	

9.2.7 Credential provisioning

9.2.7.1 SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request and SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS_DONE response messages

- The SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request shall be used to provision credentials into an Authorization target, as described in the Credentials section. When CredParams provides an invalid credential type, Credential ID or algorithm, the Authorization target shall respond with AUTH_ERROR and ErrorCode=InvalidRequest.
- The Authorization initiator shall use the SetCredInfoOp field to specify the operation for the request. An Authorization target shall ensure that the operation is atomic, that is, the requested operation can successfully complete for all credentials in CredParams, and fail if that is not possible. When CredParams provides an invalid Credential ID or other invalid values, the Authorization target shall respond with AUTH_ERROR and ErrorCode=InvalidRequest. When SetCredInfoOp is valid but authorization checks fail, the Authorization target shall respond with AUTH_ERROR and ErrorCode=AccessDenied.
- Table 33 SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request message format shows the SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request message format:

Table 33 — SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS in Table 16 — Authorization message request codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	SetCredInfoOp	1	The field indicates the requested operation. The format of this field shall be as Table 34 — Values for SetCredInfoOp field defines.

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Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
3	CredParams	Variable	This field represents identity information associated with the given Credential ID. The format and size of this field shall be the same format and size as Table 2 — Credential structure defines. If SetCredInfoOp field indicates a lock or unlock operation, the format and size of this field shall be the same format and size as the CredentialID field defined in Table 2 — Credential structure. Additionally, the value of the CredentialID shall be the same as the Credential ID of the Requester.

Table 34 — Values for `SetCredInfoOp` field

Value	Operation Name	Description	
0	Reserved	Reserved	
1	ParameterChange	Shall indicate an operation that modifies credential parameters associated with the given Credential IDs.	
2	Lock	Shall indicate an operation that locks the credential parameters and its Authorization policy for the given Credential ID. The Authorization target shall only permit this operation if the Lockable credential attribute is set for the requested Credential ID.	
3	Unlock	Shall indicate an operation that unlocks the credential parameters and its Authorization policy for the given Credential ID. The Authorization target shall only permit this operation if the Unlockable credential attribute is set for the requested Credential ID.	
All other values	Reserved	Reserved	

Table 35 — SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS_DONE response message format shows the successful SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS_DONE response message format:

Table 35 — SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS_DONE response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS_DONE in Table 17 — Authorization message response codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved

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9.2.7.1.1 Additional requirements on SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS

When locking or unlocking, the requested Credential ID shall only be capable of locking its own credential parameters and associated policy if the LockUnlockSelfPrivilege policy bit is set. See Locking and unlocking attributes and DSP0289 Authorization policy for additional requirements.

9.2.7.2 GET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request and CRED_ID_PARAMS response messages

The GET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request shall be used to retrieve information about credentials provisioned in a credential structure. If the request contains an invalid Credential ID or the corresponding credential structure is not provisioned, the Authorization target shall respond with AUTH_ERROR and ErrorCode=InvalidRequest. When CredentialID is valid but authorization checks fail, the Authorization target shall respond with AUTH_ERROR and ErrorCode=AccessDenied.

Table 36 — GET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request message format shows the GET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request message format:

Table 36 — GET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for GET_CRED_ID_PARAMS in Table 16 — Authorization message request codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	CredentialID	2	Shall be the Credential ID that identifies the requested credential.

Table 37 — CRED_ID_PARAMS response message format shows the successful <code>CRED_ID_PARAMS</code> response message format:

Table 37 — CRED_ID_PARAMS response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for <code>CRED_ID_PARAMS</code> in Table 17 — Authorization message response codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	CredAttributes	2	The field indicates credential attributes of the requested Credential ID. The format of this field shall be as Table 38 — Credential attributes bit definitions defines.
4	CredParams	Variable	This field represents identity information associated with the requested Credential ID. The size and format of this field shall be the same size and format as Table 2 — Credential structure defines.

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Table 38 — Credential attributes bit definitions defines the various Credential ID attributes:

Table 38 — Credential attributes bit definitions

Byte Offset	Bit Offset	Field	Description
0	0	Lockable	If the Authorization target supports the ability to lock the credentials and associated policies of the requested Credential ID, this bit shall be set.
0	1	Unlockable	If the Authorization target supports the ability to unlock the credentials and associated policies of the requested Credential ID, this bit shall be set. If this bit is set, the Lockable bit shall also be set.
0	2	Locked	If the credentials and associated policy of the requested Credential ID are locked, this bit shall be set. This bit can be set or cleared through the Lock or Unlock operation in either SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS or SET_AUTH_POLICY request. If this bit is set, the Lockable bit shall also be set.
0	[7:3]	Reserved	Reserved
1	[7:0]	Reserved	Reserved

504 9.2.7.3 Credential provisioning authorization requirements

The Authorization target shall perform authorization checks for SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS and GET_CRED_ID_PARAMS requests except for the scenarios that Initial provisioning details.

9.2.8 Authorization policy provisioning and management

9.2.8.1 SET_AUTH_POLICY request and SET_AUTH_POLICY_DONE response messages

- The SET_AUTH_POLICY request shall be used to modify a policy associated with a Credential ID as Authorization policies discusses. When PolicyList provides an invalid Credential ID, the Authorization target shall respond with AUTH_ERROR and ErrorCode=InvalidRequest.
- The Authorization initiator shall use the SetAuthPolicyOp field to specify the operation for the request. An Authorization target shall ensure that the operation is atomic, that is, the requested operation can successfully complete for all policies in the PolicyList and fail if that is not possible. When PolicyList provides an invalid Credential ID or invalid values, the Authorization target shall respond with AUTH_ERROR and ErrorCode=InvalidRequest. When SetAuthPolicyOp is valid but authorization checks fail, the Authorization target shall respond with AUTH_ERROR and ErrorCode=AccessDenied.
- 510 Table 39 SET_AUTH_POLICY request message format shows the SET_AUTH_POLICY request message format:

Table 39 — SET_AUTH_POLICY request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for SET_AUTH_POLICY in Table 16 — Authorization message request codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	SetAuthPolicyOp	1	The field indicates the requested operation. The format of this field shall be as Table 40 — Values for SetAuthPolicyOp field defines.
3	PolicyList	Variable	If SetAuthPolicyOp field indicates a PolicyChange operation, this field represents the policy information to change that is associated with the given Credential ID. This field shall only represent the policies associated with a single Credential ID. The size and format of this field shall be the same size and format as Table 3 — Policy List defines. If SetAuthPolicyOp field indicates a lock or unlock operation, the format and size of this field shall be the same format and size as the CredentialID field defined in Table 3 — Policy List.

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Table 40 — Values for `SetAuthPolicyOp` field

Value	Operation Name	Description	
0	Reserved	Reserved	
1	PolicyChange	Shall indicate an operation that modifies the Authorization policy associated with the given Credential ID.	
2	Lock	This field shall have the same definition as the Lock operation as Table 34 — Values for SetCredInfoOp field defines.	
3	Unlock	This field shall have the same definition as the Unlock operation as Table 34 — Values for SetCredInfoOp field defines.	
All other values	Reserved	Reserved	

Table 41 — SET_AUTH_POLICY_DONE response message format shows the successful SET_AUTH_POLICY_DONE response message format:

Table 41 — SET_AUTH_POLICY_DONE response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for SET_AUTH_POLICY_DONE in Table 17 — Authorization message response codes.

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Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
1	Reserved	1	Reserved

515 9.2.8.1.1 Additional requirements on SET_AUTH_POLICY

When locking or unlocking, see locking and unlocking requirements in Additional requirements on SET CRED ID PARAMS.

517 9.2.8.2 GET_AUTH_POLICY request and AUTH_POLICY response messages

The GET_AUTH_POLICY request shall be used to retrieve the policy associated with a provisioned Credential ID. If an invalid Credential ID is requested, the Authorization target shall respond with AUTH_ERROR and ErrorCode=InvalidRequest. When CredentialID is valid but authorization checks fail, the Authorization target shall respond with AUTH_ERROR and ErrorCode=AccessDenied.

Table 42 — GET_AUTH_POLICY request message format shows the GET_AUTH_POLICY request message format:

Table 42 — GET_AUTH_POLICY request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for GET_AUTH_POLICY in Table 16 — Authorization message request codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	CredentialID	2	Shall be the Credential ID that identifies the requested policy.

Table 43 — AUTH_POLICY response message format shows the successful AUTH_POLICY response message format:

Table 43 — AUTH_POLICY response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for AUTH_POLICY in Table 17 — Authorization message response codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	PolicyAttributes	2	The field indicates attributes of all policies associated with the requested Credential ID. The format of this field shall be as Table 38 — Credential attributes bit definitions defines.
4	PolicyList	Variable	This field contains all the policy information associated with the requested Credential ID. The size and format of this field shall be the same size and format as Table 3 — Policy List defines.

9.2.8.3 Authorization requirements

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The Authorization target shall perform authorization checks for SET_AUTH_POLICY and GET_AUTH_POLICY requests except for the scenarios that Initial provisioning details.

9.2.9 Authorization process management

9.2.9.1 General Authorization process management

Authorization requests and responses in this section apply to all Authorization processes.

9.2.9.1.1 GET_AUTH_PROCESSES request and AUTH_PROCESSES response messages

The GET_AUTH_PROCESSES request and AUTH_PROCESSES response messages retrieve the list of active or saved Authorization processes associated with the requested Credential ID. A Credential ID shall always be capable of retrieving its own information regardless of the value of RetrieveAuthProcListPrivilege bit.

Table 44 — GET_AUTH_PROCESSES request message format shows the GET_AUTH_PROCESSES request message format:

Table 44 — GET_AUTH_PROCESSES request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description	
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for <code>GET_AUTH_PROCESSES</code> in Table 16 — Authorization message request codes.	
1	Reserved	1	Reserved	
2	CredentialID	2	Shall be a Credential ID.	
_	Z CredentialiD		A value of 0xFFFF shall indicate all Credential IDs.	

Table 45 — AUTH_PROCESSES response message format shows the AUTH_PROCESSES response message format:

Table 45 — AUTH_PROCESSES response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for AUTH_PROCESSES in Table 17 — Authorization message response codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	AuthProcInfoCount	2	Shall be a count of the number of Authorization processes information in AuthProcInfoList associated with the requested Credential ID. If there are no saved or active Authorization processes for the requested
			Credential ID, the value of this field shall be zero.

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Byte	offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
4		AuthProcInfoList	Variable	Shall be a list of active or saved Authorization processes. The format of this field shall be the concatenation of one or more Authorization process information as Table 46 — Authorization process information format defines. The size of this field shall be the size of an Authorization process information multiplied by [AuthProcInfoCount].

Table 46 — Authorization process information format shows the Authorization process information format:

Table 46 — Authorization process information format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	CredentialID	2	Shall be the Credential ID associated with the Authorization process.
2	AuthProcessType	1	Shall indicate the type of active or saved Authorization process type associated with CredentialID. The values of this field shall be as follows:
3	AuthProcID	48	Shall be the Authorization Process ID associated with the CredentialID and AuthProcessType , as Authorization Process ID calculation defines.

9.2.9.1.2 KILL_AUTH_PROCESS request and PROCESS_KILLED response messages

- The KILL AUTH PROCESS request and PROCESS KILLED response messages terminate an Authorization process.
- If the requested Authorization process to terminate is an active USAS, the USAS shall end immediately and incoming messages requiring authorization shall fail authorization checks for the given Credential ID. If the requested Authorization process is a saved USAS, the saved USAS information shall no longer persist and consequently, the User shall not be able to continue the requested USAS.
- If the requested Authorization process to terminate is an active SEAP, all messages requiring authorization shall fail authorization checks, but the secure session shall remain unaffected. The Authorization target can consequently end the secure session.
- An Authorization initiator shall be capable of killing only its own Authorization process, regardless of the value of KillAuthProcPrivilege bit.
- Table 47 KILL_AUTH_PROCESS request message format shows the KILL_AUTH_PROCESS request message format:

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Table 47 — KILL_AUTH_PROCESS request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for KILL_AUTH_PROCESS in Table 16 — Authorization message request codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	CredentialID	2	Shall be the Credential ID of the desired Authorization process to terminate.
4	AuthProcID	48	Shall be the Authorization Process ID associated with the CredentialID to terminate, as Authorization Process ID calculation defines.

Table 48 — PROCESS_KILLED response message format shows the PROCESS_KILLED response message format:

Table 48 — PROCESS KILLED response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for PROCESS_KILLED in Table 17 — Authorization message response codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	AuthProcID	48	Shall be the requested Authorization process ID.

9.2.9.1.2.1 Additional requirements for KILL_AUTH_PROCESS

If the Authorization target fails to kill a process after passing authorization checks, the Authorization target shall respond with an AUTH_ERROR message using the ErrorCode=OperationFailed.

9.2.9.1.3 Authorization Process ID calculation

- The Authorization Process ID shall use the TPM_ALG_SHA_384 hash algorithm.
- To calculate the SHA2-384 hash, the Authorization endpoint shall form auth_proc_id_octet_string for a given Authorization process by concatenating the following four elements in the order shown. (Note that some elements will be omitted depending on conditions.)
 - 1. String prefix
 - For USAP, this element shall be omitted.
 - $\circ~$ For SEAP, the prefix shall be one of the following:
 - If the SPDM Responder is an Authorization target, the prefix shall be "Responder".
 - If the SPDM Requester is an Authorization target, the prefix shall be "Requester".
 - 2. The Authorization initiator's nonce
 - For USAP, this shall be the [START_AUTH] . Nonce .
 - For SEAP, this shall be the SPDM Requester's nonce provided in the Session-Secrets-Exchange Request.
- 3. Authorization target's nonce

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- ∘ For USAP, this shall be the [START_AUTH_RSP]. Nonce.
 - For SEAP, this shall be the SPDM Responder's nonce provided in the Session-Secrets-Exchange Response.
 - · 4. Saved sequence number
 - If the Authorization process is a saved USAS, this shall be the SavedSequenceNumber. Otherwise this element shall be omitted.
- The auth_proc_id_octet_string shall be the message to hash, resulting in the Authorization Process ID.

9.2.9.2 USAP Management

9.2.9.2.1 START_AUTH request and START_AUTH_RSP response messages

The START_AUTH request and START_AUTH_RSP messages are used to establish a User-specific authorization session as described in USAP. The Authorization target shall respond with an AUTH_ERROR of ErrorCode=UnexpectedRequest or silently discard the request if a START_AUTH is received for a User with a corresponding active USAS. See General USAP error handling for more information.

Table 49 — START_AUTH request message format shows the START_AUTH request message format:

Table 49 — START_AUTH request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for START_AUTH in Table 16 — Authorization message request codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	CredentialID	2	The value of this field shall be the Credential ID of the User making this request.
4	Attributes	1	Shall be the same format as Table 50 — START_AUTH Request Attributes definition defines.
5	NonceLen	1	Length of the Nonce field. Shall be 32 bytes for this version of the specification
6	Nonce	NonceLen	Random sequence of bytes chosen by the user identified by CredentialID.

573 Table 50 — START AUTH Request Attributes definition shows the field definition for [START_AUTH] . Attributes field:

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Table 50 — START_AUTH Request Attributes definition

Bit offset	Field	Description
0	Continue	If set, the Authorization target shall continue a prior USAS associated with the requested CredentialID. The Authorization target shall use the requested CredentialID and Nonce to ensure the correct USAS information is loaded. See more details in USAS continuation section.
[7:1]	Reserved	Reserved

Table 51 — START AUTH RSP response message format shows the START AUTH RSP response message format:

Table 51 — START_AUTH_RSP response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for START_AUTH_RSP in Table 17 — Authorization message response codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	CredentialID	2	Shall be the CredentialID from the corresponding START_AUTH request.
4	NonceLen	1	Length of the Nonce field. Shall be 32 bytes for this version of the specification
5	Nonce	NonceLen	Random sequence of bytes chosen by the Authorization target. If the Continue bit in the Attributes field of the corresponding request is set, the Authorization target shall populate this field with the saved Nonce corresponding to the Nonce in the corresponding request.

9.2.9.2.1.1 START_AUTH Additional Errors

If the Continue bit is set and an Authorization target cannot find a preserved USAS associated with the requested CredentialID and Nonce, the Authorization target shall return an AUTH_ERROR with ErrorCode=InvalidRequest.

9.2.9.2.2 END_AUTH request and END_AUTH_RSP response messages

The END_AUTH request and END_AUTH_RSP messages are used to terminate a USAS established using the START_AUTH command. The termination of the Authorization session restores a secure session to its original privilege level for that User. Additionally, the termination of a USAS does not end the corresponding secure session. If a session for the corresponding user does not exist, the Authorization target shall return an AUTH_ERROR with ErrorCode=InvalidRequest.

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Table 52 — END_AUTH request message format shows the END_AUTH request message format:

Table 52 — END_AUTH request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for END_AUTH in Table 16 — Authorization message request codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	CredentialID	2	The value of this field shall be the Credential ID of the User making this request.
4	Attributes	1	Shall be the format as Table 54 — END_AUTH Request Attributes definition.

Table 53 — END_AUTH_RSP response message format shows the END_AUTH_RSP response message format:

Table 53 — END_AUTH_RSP response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for END_AUTH_RSP in Table 17 — Authorization message response codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	CredentialID	2	Shall be the CredentialID from the corresponding END_AUTH request.

Table 54 — END_AUTH Request Attributes definition shows the field definition for [END_AUTH] . Attributes field:

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Table 54 — END AUTH Request Attributes definition

	Bit offset	Field	Description
587			Shall indicate the persistence type for the USAP associated with the requested CredentialID. This field shall have the following definition: • 0 . The Authorization target shall erase the USAS information immediately upon the successful completion of this request. If the USAS information was previously persisted, the USAS information shall no longer be persisted.
588			1. The Authorization target shall persist or continue to persist the USAS information until the next device reset.
589			The Authorization target shall persist or continue to persist the USAS information across resets until credential information associated with the requested Credential ID changes.
590	[1:0]	PersistMethod	3 . Reserved
			USAS continuation defines the USAS information associated with CredentialID to persist or erase.
			An Authorization initiator can change the value of this field the next time it continues and ends the same USAS. However, if a User continues a saved USAS and ends the USAS without issuing a successfully authorized message, then the value of this field shall remain the same persist method as before the continuation.
			The KILL_AUTH_PROCESS request can terminate all Authorization processes, regardless of the value of this field.
	[7:2]	Reserved	Reserved

9.2.9.3 SEAP Management

9.2.9.3.1 ELEVATE_PRIVILEGE request and PRIVILEGE_ELEVATED response messages

593 ELEVATE_PRIVILEGE request and PRIVILEGE_ELEVATED response are used to start the authorization session when the SPDM Endpoint Authorization Process is used. These messages shall be used only during the application phase of the secure session. To initiate the authorization session, the Authorization initiator shall send an ELEVATE_PRIVILEGE request and the Authorization target shall respond with PRIVILEGE_ELEVATED for a successful response. This request and response pair elevates the privilege level of the SPDM session for the Authorization initiator for all subsequent messages until the privilege level is lowered. An Authorization target shall return an AUTH_ERROR with ErrorCode=InvalidRequest if there is a failure during the first part of SEAP (that is, the SEAP_SUCCESS was absent for the corresponding Authorization initiator). An Authorization target shall return an AUTH_ERROR with ErrorCode=InvalidRequest or silently discard the ELEVATE_PRIVILEGE request if the session's privilege level is already elevated.

Table 55 — ELEVATE_PRIVILEGE request message format shows the ELEVATE_PRIVILEGE request message format:

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Table 55 — ELEVATE_PRIVILEGE request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for ELEVATE_PRIVILEGE in Table 16 — Authorization message request codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved

596 Table 56 — PRIVILEGE_ELEVATED response message format shows the PRIVILEGE_ELEVATED response message format:

597 Table 56 — PRIVILEGE_ELEVATED response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for PRIVILEGE_ELEVATED in Table 17 — Authorization message response codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved

9.2.9.3.2 END_ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE request and ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE_ENDED response message

599 END_ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE request and ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE_ENDED response are used to terminate the authorization session when SEAP is used. An Authorization target shall return an AUTH_ERROR with ErrorCode=InvalidRequest if there is no SEAP in progress.

Table 57 — END_ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE request message format shows the END_ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE request message format:

Table 57 — END_ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for END_ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE in Table 16 — Authorization message request codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved

Table 58 — ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE_ENDED response message format shows the ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE_ENDED response message format:

Table 58 — ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE_ENDED response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for ELEVATED_PRIVILEGE_ENDED in Table 17 — Authorization message response codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved

9.2.10 Basic management

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Messages in this section provide general management of the Authorization target.

9.2.10.1 TAKE_OWNERSHIP request and OWNERSHIP_TAKEN response

The TAKE_OWNERSHIP request and its successful OWNERSHIP_TAKEN response shall cause the Authorization target to exit the default state and fully enforce authorization for all messages requiring authorization. This request and response has no associated policy bit and thus any Credential ID has the authority to issue this request. However, the Authorization target still performs authorization checks.

If Ownership is already taken, the Authorization target shall respond with an AUTH_ERROR message using ErrorCode=UnexpectedRequest.

Table 59 — TAKE_OWNERSHIP request message format shows the TAKE_OWNERSHIP request message format:

Table 59 — TAKE_OWNERSHIP request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for TAKE_OWNERSHIP in Table 16 — Authorization message request codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved

Table 60 — OWNERSHIP_TAKEN response message format shows the OWNERSHIP_TAKEN response message format:

Table 60 — OWNERSHIP_TAKEN response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for OWNERSHIP_TAKEN in Table 17 — Authorization message response codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved

9.2.10.2 AUTH_RESET_TO_DEFAULT request and AUTH_DEFAULTS_APPLIED response

- The AUTH_RESET_TO_DEFAULT request and its successful AUTH_DEFAULTS_APPLIED response shall cause the Authorization target to reset the requested data types (such as credentials and policies) to initial or default values for unlocked credentials. This request and response shall not affect locked credentials and their associated policies and data types.
- The Authorization target shall reset all data associated with the requested DataType and/or SVResetDataType of the SVH owner for the requested CredentialID to initial or default values.
- Table 61 AUTH_RESET_TO_DEFAULT request message format shows the AUTH_RESET_TO_DEFAULT request message format:

Table 61 — AUTH_RESET_TO_DEFAULT request message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for AUTH_RESET_TO_DEFAULT in Table 16 — Authorization message request codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved
2	DataType	2	This field indicates the type of data to reset to initial or default values. The format of this field shall be as Table 62 — DataType bit definitions defines. Zero or more bits can be set.
4	CredentialID	2	The value of this field shall indicate the unlocked Credential ID(s) of the data type(s) to reset to initial or default values. The value of 0xFFFF shall indicate all unlocked Credential IDs.
6	SVResetDataTypeCount	2	This field shall be the count of Standard or Vendor Reset Data Type Elements in SVResetDataTypeList . A value of zero shall indicate the absence of SVResetDataTypeList .
8	SVResetDataTypeList	Variable	This field shall cause data types defined by a standard body or vendor to reset to their initial or default values. The format of this field shall be the concatenation of Standard or Vendor Reset Data Type Element as Table 63 — Standard or Vendor Reset Data Type Element format defines. If a standard or vendor is present in this list, then the list can contain more than one instance of that standard or vendor because a standard body may have multiple standards with their corresponding data types. This specification recommends that the standard or vendor prevent duplicate instances to minimize payload.

Table 62 — DataType bit definitions shows the DataType bit definitions:

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Table 62 — `DataType` bit definitions

Byte Offset	Bit Offset	Field	Description
0	0	CredIDParams	If this bit is set, Credential ID parameters shall be reset to initial or default values for the specified Credential IDs.
0	1	AuthPolicy	If this bit is set, the Authorization policy associated with the SVH in SVResetDataTypeList shall reset to initial or default values for the specified Credential IDs.
0	[7:2]	Reserved	Reserved
1	[7:0]	Reserved	Reserved

Table 63 — Standard or Vendor Reset Data Type Element format shows the definition for the standard or vendor data type to reset to initial or default values:

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Table 63 — Standard or Vendor Reset Data Type Element format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	SVResetDataTypeOwner	LenSVH	This field shall specify the owner of the SVResetDataType field. The format and size of this field shall be the format and size of the SVH as DSP0293 defines. The value of LensvH shall be set as Common variable names defines. If other DMTF DSP uses the format as this table defines, then the other DMTF DSP specifications shall use the value associated with DMTF-DSP for the ID field as DSP0293 defines.
LenSVH	SVResetDataTypeLen	1	The value of this field shall specify the length of SVResetDataType, in bytes. The value of this field shall not exceed 32.
1 + LenSVH	SVResetDataType	SVResetDataTypeLen	This field shall indicate the standard or vendor specific data types to reset to initial or default values. The SVResetDataTypeOwner defines the format and size for this field. For this specification, the SVResetDataType is not present and thus the SVResetDataTypeLen shall have a value of zero.

Table 64 — AUTH_DEFAULTS_APPLIED response message format shows the AUTH_DEFAULTS_APPLIED response message format:

Table 64 — AUTH_DEFAULTS_APPLIED response message format

Byte offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	RequestResponseCode	1	Shall be the code value for AUTH_DEFAULTS_APPLIED in Table 17 — Authorization message response codes.
1	Reserved	1	Reserved

9.2.10.2.1 AUTH_RESET_TO_DEFAULT additional requirements

- The DataType field indicates either a global data type or a data type specific to this specification. For global data types, note that SVH owners or any specifications that implement this specification do not need to define an equivalent bit in their SVResetDataType.
- To restore the Authorization target back to default state as Initial provisioning describes, the request shall have these values:
- CredentialID field shall have a value of 0xFFFF.
 - All non-reserved bits shall be set in the DataType field of the request.
- SVResetDataTypeCount shall be zero.
- 630 Upon receiving the above request, the Authorization target shall return to the default state upon successful

completion. For all other parameter combinations, the Authorization target shall remain in the Owned state and shall reset to initial or default values for the requested data types.

- If the Authorization requires a reset to successfully complete the request and there are no other errors, the Authorization target shall reply with an AUTH_ERROR of ErrorCode=ResetRequired. Otherwise, a successful response shall indicate the Authorization target has successfully completed the requested operation.
- AUTH_RESET_TO_DEFAULT request is an invasive operation. Thus, an Authorization target shall immediately terminate all active and saved Authorization processes associated with the requested Credential IDs after the AUTH DEFAULTS APPLIED response has been sent.

9.3 Timing requirements

This section discusses timing requirements for Authorization messages and all messages requiring authorization.

9.3.1 Message transmission time

The message transmission time is the worst-case transmission time it takes the Authorization initiator to completely transmit a message to the Authorization target plus the worst-case transmission time for the Authorization target to completely send a message to the Authorization initiator. The actual value and method of measurement of the message transmission time is outside the scope of this specification.

9.3.2 Authorization messages timing

- For messages not requiring authorization, the Authorization target shall respond within AuthResponseTime as measured from the reception of the Authorization request to the transmission of the corresponding response. The value of AuthResponseTime shall be 100 ms.
- If an Authorization initiator wants to retry a request, the Authorization initiator shall wait at least AuthResponseTime plus Message transmission time.

9.3.3 All messages requiring Authorization

- Because this specification provides a mechanism for authorizing messages for any protocol, the Authorization target can consume additional processing time to process the messages. Protocols that implement this specification should consider the additional processing time needed and adjust existing timing requirements accordingly.
- The Authorization target provides this additional processing time in [AUTH_CAPABILITIES]. AuthRecordProcessTime field to process the Authorization record. The transport can use this value if it uses the Authorization record.
- If an Authorization initiator wants to retry an Authorization request, the Authorization initiator shall wait at least the sum of these timing parameters:
- AuthResponseTime
- [AUTH CAPABILITIES].AuthRecordProcessTime

- The Message transmission time.
- Unless otherwise specified by the transport, the Authorization initiator should wait at least the sum of these timing parameters before performing any error handling for messages of other protocols encapsulated in an Authorization record:
- AuthRecordProcessTime
- The process time of MsgToAuthPayload in the Authorization record as specified by the transport
- The Message transmission time.

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10 Authorization Opaque Data Structures (AODS)

- Authorization Opaque Data Structures (AODS) are data structures that are populated into the OpaqueData field of various SPDM messages. Other parts of this specification define which AODS populate into which SPDM messages. This section defines the format for each AODS.
- AODS requirements shall apply only when the secure session is an SPDM session. AODS can be used for other types of secure sessions. However, the use of AODS to fulfill the requirements in this specification while outside of an SPDM session is outside the scope of this specification.

10.1 General Authorization Opaque Data Structure

- All AODS formats shall follow the General opaque data format as SPDM defines. This section binds the AODS to the General opaque data format.
- Table 65 AODS general format defines the general format of all AODS.

Table 65 — AODS general format

Byte Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	ID	1	The value of this field shall be 0xB to identify DMTF-DSP as the standards body.
1	VendorIDLen	1	The value of this field shall be 2 to identify DMTF-DSP as the owner of the definition of all AODS.
2	DMTFspecID	2	The value of this field shall be 289. This field indicates that the definition of the OpaqueElementData belongs to this DMTF specification.
4	OpaqueElementDataLen	2	The value of this field shall be the total size of these fields: AODSid and AODSbody field.
6	AODSid	1	This field identifies the AODS and its format in AODSbody . The value of this field shall be one of the values in the AODS ID column of Table 66 — AODS IDs.
7	AODSbody	AODSbodyLen	This field shall contain the actual AODS content according to the value in AODSid . See the respective AODS section for the actual definition. The size of this field shall be the size of AODSbody corresponding to the value in AODSid field.
7 + AODSbodyLen	AlignPadding	Variable	See the field of the same name in SPDM for definition and requirements. The <code>OpaqueElementData</code> are the fields following <code>DMTFspecID</code> (without including the <code>DMTFspecID</code> field itself).

SPDM 1.2 or later defines the General opaque data format for all opaque data populated in all OpaqueData fields of SPDM messages when OpaqueDataFmt1 is selected as the Opaque data format for the SPDM connection. Prior to

SPDM 1.2 or when OpaqueDataFmt1 is not the selected Opaque data format for the SPDM connection, the format of the OpaqueData field is out of scope of this specification.

⁶⁵⁹ 10.2 AODS error handling

This specification defines which SPDM message an AODS can be present in and other AODS requirements. An error arises when an Authorization endpoint does not meet these AODS requirements, such as an unexpected presence. When an error occurs, an Authorization endpoint can terminate the session, prevent Authorization processes in the corresponding session, or use other error-handling mechanisms that are outside the scope of this specification.

10.3 AODS IDs

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Table 66 — AODS IDs lists out all AODS in this specification with a short description.

Table 66 —	AODS IDs
	AODO IDS

AODS ID	AODS Name	Description
0	INVOKE_SEAP	Shall invoke the SEAP process for an SPDM endpoint. The format of the ADDSbody shall be the INVOKE_SEAP AODS.
1	SEAP_SUCCESS	Shall indicate the SPDM session handshake phase of the SEAP process has successfully passed for the corresponding SPDM endpoint. The format of the AODSbody shall be the SEAP_SUCCESS AODS.
2	AUTH_HELLO	Shall indicate the SPDM endpoint supports being an Authorization target. The format of the AODSbody shall be the AUTH_HELLO AODS.
All other values	Reserved	Reserved

10.4 INVOKE_SEAP AODS

The INVOKE_SEAP AODS shall request the other SPDM endpoint to invoke the SEAP process for the requesting SPDM endpoint. Table 67 — INVOKE_SEAP Body definition defines the format for the AODSbody in the AODS general format when AODS ID is INVOKE_SEAP.

Table 67 — INVOKE_SEAP Body definition

Byte Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	PresenceExtension	1	This field shall indicate the presence of extra fields. The value of this field shall be reserved.
1	CredentialID	2	The field shall contain the Credential ID of the requesting SPDM endpoint.

Because the INVOKE_SEAP AODS occurs before the SPDM endpoint knows the supported Authorization versions

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of the other SPDM endpoint, the PresenceExtension field helps maintain future compatibility. Future versions of this specification could define the next lowest unused bit. If a bit is set, the corresponding field shall be present.

This allows a current implementation to skip the remaining fields and process only the fields it knows about. An implementation can skip the remaining fields it doesn't know about by taking into account the OpaqueElementDataLen in the Table 65 — AODS general format.

10.5 SEAP_SUCCESS AODS

The SEAP_SUCCESS AODS shall indicate the SEAP process during the SPDM session handshake phase for the requesting SPDM endpoint is successful. Table 68 — SEAP_SUCCESS Body definition defines the format for the AODSbody in the AODS general format when AODS ID is SEAP_SUCCESS.

Table 68 — SEAP_SUCCESS Body definition

Byte Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	PresenceExtension	1	This field shall indicate the presence of extra fields. The value of this field shall be reserved.

- Because the SEAP_SUCCESS AODS occurs before the SPDM endpoint knows the supported Authorization versions of the other SPDM endpoint, the PresenceExtension field helps maintain future compatibility. Future versions of this specification could define the next lowest unused bit. If a bit is set, the corresponding field shall be present.
- This allows a current implementation to skip the remaining fields and process only the fields it knows about. An implementation can skip the remaining fields it doesn't know about by taking into account the OpaqueElementDataLen in the Table 65 AODS general format.

10.6 AUTH_HELLO AODS

The AUTH_HELLO AODS shall indicate the SPDM endpoint providing this AODS is an Authorization target. Table 69

— AUTH_HELLO Body definition defines the format for the AODSbody in the AODS general format when AODS ID is AUTH_HELLO.

Table 69 — AUTH_HELLO Body definition

Byte Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	PresenceExtension	1	This field shall indicate the presence of extra fields. The value of this field shall be reserved.

- Because the AUTH_HELLO AODS occurs before the SPDM endpoint knows the supported Authorization versions of the other SPDM endpoint, the PresenceExtension field helps maintain future compatibility. Future versions of this specification could define the next lowest unused bit. If a bit is set, the corresponding field shall be present.
- This allows a current implementation to skip the remaining fields and process only the fields it knows about. An

implementation can skip the remaining fields it doesn't know about by taking into account the OpaqueElementDataLen in the Table 65 — AODS general format.

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11 Other transport requirements

This section describes other or additional requirements that are not discussed elsewhere in this specification.

11.1 Authorization record over SPDM Vendor-Defined Messages (VDM)

- This clause defines the Authorization record over SPDM Vendor-Defined Messages (VDM) to enable transmission of Authorization messages, Authorization records and messages of any protocol requiring authorization over existing transports. By leveraging SPDM's Vendor-defined messages, existing transports can utilize their current SPDM bindings without requiring significant modifications. These requests and responses are intended for use between SPDM endpoints acting as an Authorization initiator and an Authorization target.
- AUTH record over SPDM VDM messages shall not affect the SPDM transcript defined in the SPDM specification. Additionally, depending on the type of Authorization record and its content, one or more SPDM requests can be outstanding at any time. Furthermore, an Authorization record over SPDM VDM request can have a response that is not encapsulated in an Authorization record over SPDM VDM response. In a way, AUTH record over SPDM VDM behaves more like a transport than a request and response model.
- All Authorization record over SPDM VDM shall use the SPDM VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST and VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE request and response with these requirements:
- The StandardID shall be 0xB to indicate DMTF-DSP.
- The VendorID shall be 289 (0x121) to indicate this specification.
- The VendorDefinedReqPayload field of the VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST and VendorDefinedRespPayload field of the VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE shall be the same format and size as Table 10 Authorization record format. If LargeVendorDefinedReqPayload is present in the VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST Or LargeVendorDefinedRespPayload is present in the VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE, then the format of these fields shall be the same format and size as Table 10 Authorization record format.

11.1.1 Additional AUTH over SPDM VDM requirements

- The timing requirements for the AUTH Record over SPDM VDM requirements shall be the same as defined in Timing requirements.
- The Authorization target should size MaxSPDMmsgSize in the GET_CAPABILITIES request and CAPABILITIES response messages in SPDM appropriately to receive all supported Authorization record types especially when the Authorization record carries a message requiring authorization.

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12 Cryptographic operations

This section describes or defines cryptographic functions specific to Authorization.

12.1 Asymmetric algorithms

This section defines the supported asymmetric algorithms.

Table 70 — Base asymmetric algorithm format lists the bit definitions and other parameters associated with the respective asymmetric algorithms. BaseAsymAlgoLen is defined in Common variable names.

Table 70 — Base asymmetric algorithm format

Byte Offset	Bit Offset	Algorithm	Signature Length (bytes)	Description
0	0	TPM_ALG_RSASSA_2048	256	
0	1	TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_2048	256	
0	2	TPM_ALG_RSASSA_3072	384	
0	3	TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_3072	384	
0	4	TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256	64	The signature format shall be 32-byte r followed by 32-byte s .
0	5	TPM_ALG_RSASSA_4096	512	
0	6	TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_4096	512	
0	7	TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384	96	The signature format shall be 48-byte $\ r$ followed by 48-byte $\ s$.
1	0	TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P521	132	The signature format shall be 66-byte $\ r$ followed by 66-byte $\ s$.
1	1	TPM_ALG_SM2_ECC_SM2_P256	64	The signature format shall be 32-byte SM2_R followed by 32-byte SM2_S .
1	2	EdDSA ed25519	64	The signature format shall be 32-byte ${{\rm R}}$ followed by 32-byte ${{\rm S}}$.
1	3	EdDSA ed448	114	The signature format shall be 57-byte ${{\rm R}}$ followed by 57-byte ${{\rm S}}$.
1	[7:4]	Reserved	Reserved	
2:7	All bits	Reserved	Reserved	

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12.2 Hash algorithms

This section defines the supported hash algorithms.

Table 71 — Base hash algorithm format lists the bit definitions of all supported base hash algorithms.

BaseHashAlgoLen is defined in Common variable names.

700 Table 71 — Base hash algorithm format

Byte Offset	Bit Offset	Algorithm
0	0	TPM_ALG_SHA_256
0	1	TPM_ALG_SHA_384
0	2	TPM_ALG_SHA_512
0	3	TPM_ALG_SHA3_256
0	4	TPM_ALG_SHA3_384
0	5	TPM_ALG_SHA3_512
0	6	TPM_ALG_SM3_256
0	7	Reserved
1:7	All bits	Reserved

⁷⁰¹ 12.3 Signature generation and validation

This section describes the AuthSign and AuthSigVerify functions.

12.3.1 Signature algorithm references

Refer to the Signature algorithm references section in the SPDM specification (DSP0274) for details on signature algorithms.

705 12.3.2 Signature generation

- The AuthSign function used in various parts of this specification defines the signature generation algorithm while accounting for the differences in the various supported cryptographic signing algorithms.
- 707 The signature generation function takes this form:

```
signature = AuthSign(PrivKey, data_to_be_signed, context);
```

- 708 The AuthSign function shall take these input parameters:
- PrivKey: a secret key associated with the given Credential ID
- odata_to_be_signed: a bit stream of the data that will be signed
- 711 context : a string

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- The function shall output a signature using Privkey and the selected cryptographic signing algorithm.
- 713 The signing function shall follow these steps to create auth_prefix and auth_context (See Text or string encoding for encoding rules):
 - 1. Create auth_prefix . The auth_prefix shall be the repetition, four times, of the concatenation of "dmtf-auth-v", AuthVersionString and ".*". This will form a 64-character string.
 - 2. Create auth_context . If the User is generating the signature, auth_context shall be the concatenation of "user-" and context .
- Now follows an example, designated Example 1, of creating a <code>combined_auth_prefix</code> .
- In this example, the version of this specification is 1.9.3, the User is generating a signature, and the context is "my example context". Thus, the auth_prefix is "dmtf-auth-v1.9.*dmtf-auth-v1.9.*dmtf-auth-v1.9.*dmtf-auth-v1.9.*dmtf-auth-v1.9.*dmtf-auth-v1.9.*". The auth_context is "user-my example context".
- Next, the combined_auth_prefix is formed. The combined_auth_prefix shall be the concatenation of four elements: auth_prefix, a byte with a value of zero, zero_pad, and auth_context. The size of zero_pad shall be the number of bytes needed to ensure that the length of combined_auth_prefix is 100 bytes. The size of zero_pad can be zero. The value of zero_pad shall be zero.
- Continuing Example 1, Table 72 Example combined_auth_prefix structure shows the combined_auth_prefix with offsets. Offsets increase from left to right and top to bottom. As shown, the length of combined_auth_prefix is 100 bytes. Furthermore, a number surrounded by double quotation marks indicates that the ASCII value of that number is used. See Text or string encoding for encoding rules. Table 72 Example combined_auth_prefix structure concludes Example 1.

Table 72 — Example	`combined_	_auth_	_prefix`	structure

Offset	0x0	0x1	0x2	0x3	0x4	0x5	0x6	0x7	0x8	0x9	0xA	0xB	0xC	0xD	0xE	0xF
0	d	m	t	f	-	а	u	t	h	-	v	"1"		"9"		*
0x10	d	m	t	f	-	а	u	t	h	-	V	"1"		"9"	•	*
0x20	d	m	t	f	-	а	u	t	h	-	v	"1"		"9"		*
0x30	d	m	t	f	-	а	u	t	h	-	V	"1"		"9"		*
0x40	0x0	u	s	е												

Offset	0x0	0x1	0x2	0x3	0x4	0x5	0x6	0x7	0x8	0x9	0xA	0xB	0xC	0xD	0xE	0xF
0x50	r	-	m	у	space (0x20)	е	х	а	m	р	I	е	space (0x20)	С	О	n
0x60	t	е	x	t												

- The next step is to form the <code>message_hash</code>. The <code>message_hash</code> shall be the hash of <code>data_to_be_signed</code> using the selected hash function associated with the given Credential ID. Many hash algorithms allow implementations to compute an intermediate hash, sometimes called a running hash. An intermediate hash allows for the updating of the hash as each byte of the ordered data of the message becomes known. Consequently, the ability to compute an intermediate hash allows for memory utilization optimizations where an Authorization endpoint can discard bytes of the message that are already covered by the intermediate hash while waiting for more bytes of the message to be received.
- Because cryptographic signing algorithms can vary widely, the following clauses define the binding of SPDMsign to these algorithms.

723 12.3.2.1 RSA and ECDSA signing algorithms

- All RSA and ECDSA specifications do not define a specific hash function. Thus, the hash function to use shall be the selected hash function associated with the given Credential ID.
- 725 The private key, defined by the specification for these algorithms, shall be PrivKey.
- In the specification for these algorithms, the letter M denotes the message to be signed. M shall be the concatenation of combined_auth_prefix and message_hash.
- 727 RSA and ECDSA algorithms are described in Signature algorithm references.
- The FIPS PUB 186-5 supports deterministic ECDSA as a variant of ECDSA. RFC 6979 describes this deterministic digital signature generation procedure. This variant does not impact the signature verification process. How an implementation chooses to support ECDSA or deterministic ECDSA is outside the scope of this specification.

729 12.3.2.2 EdDSA signing algorithms

- 730 These algorithms are described in RFC 8032.
- The private key, defined by RFC 8032, shall be PrivKey.
- 732 In the specification for these algorithms, the letter M denotes the message to be signed.

733 12.3.2.2.1 Ed25519 sign

- This specification defines only Ed25519 usage and not its variants.
- 735 M shall be the concatenation of combined_auth_prefix and message_hash.

736 12.3.2.2.2 Ed448 sign

- This specification defines only Ed448 usage and not its variants.
- 738 M shall be the concatenation of combined_auth_prefix and message_hash.
- 739 Ed448 defines a context string, c. c shall be the auth_context.

740 12.3.2.3 SM2 signing algorithm

- This algorithm is described in GB/T 32918.2-2016. GB/T 32918.2-2016 also defines the variable M and IDA.
- The private key defined by GB/T 32918.2-2016 shall be PrivKey.
- In the specification for SM2, the letter M denotes the message to be signed. M shall be the concatenation of combined_auth_prefix and message_hash.
- The SM2 specification does not define a specific hash function. Thus, the hash function to use shall be the selected hash function associated with the given Credential ID.
- Lastly, SM2 expects a distinguishing identifier, which identifies the signer and is indicated by the variable ID_A. If this algorithm is selected, the ID shall be an empty string of size 0.

746 12.3.3 Signature verification

- 747 The AuthSigVerify function, used in various parts of this specification, defines the signature verification algorithm while accounting for the differences in the various supported cryptographic signing algorithms.
- 748 The signature verification function takes this form:

```
AuthSigVerify(PubKey, signature, unverified_data, context);
```

- 749 The AuthSigVerify function shall take these input parameters:
- Ривкеу: the public key associated with the given Credential ID
- signature : a digital signature
- unverified_data: a bit stream of data that needs to be verified
- 753 context : a string
- The function shall verify the unverified_data using signature, PubKey, and a selected cryptographic signing algorithm. AuthSigVerify shall return success if the signature is successfully verified and failure otherwise. Each cryptographic signing algorithm states the verification steps or criteria for successful verification.
- The verifier of the signature shall create auth_prefix , auth_context , and combined_auth_prefix as described in Signature generation.

- The next step is to form the unverified_message_hash. The unverified_message_hash shall be the hash of the unverified_data using the selected hash function associated with the given Credential ID.
- The selected cryptographic signature verification algorithm is the one associated with the given Credential ID.
- Because cryptographic signature verification algorithms can vary widely, the following clauses define the binding of AuthSigVerify to these algorithms.

759 12.3.3.1 RSA and ECDSA signature verification algorithms

- All RSA and ECDSA specifications do not define a specific hash function. Thus, the hash function to use shall be the selected hash function associated with the given Credential ID.
- The public key, defined in the specification for these algorithms, shall be Pubkey.
- In the specification for these algorithms, the letter M denotes the message that is signed. M shall be the concatenation of the combined_auth_prefix and unverified_message_hash.
- For RSA algorithms, AuthSigVerify shall return success when the output of the signature verification operation, as defined in the RSA specification, is "valid signature". Otherwise, AuthSigVerify shall return failure.
- For ECDSA algorithms, AuthSigVerify shall return success when the output of "ECDSA Signature Verification Algorithm" as defined in FIPS PUB 186-5 is "accept". Otherwise, AuthSigVerify shall return failure.
- RSA and ECDSA algorithms are described in Signature algorithm references.

766 12.3.3.2 EdDSA signature verification algorithms

- 767 RFC 8032 describes these algorithms. RFC 8032, also, defines the M, PH, and c variables.
- The public key, also defined in RFC 8032, shall be PubKey.
- In the specification for these algorithms, the letter M denotes the message to be signed.

770 12.3.3.2.1 Ed25519 verify

- 771 M shall be the concatenation of combined_auth_prefix and unverified_message_hash.
- AuthSigVerify shall return success when step 1 does not result in an invalid signature and when the constraints of the group equation in step 3 are met as described in RFC 8032 section 5.1.7. Otherwise, AuthSigVerify shall return failure.

773 12.3.3.2.2 Ed448 verify

- 774 M shall be the concatenation of combined_auth_prefix and unverified_message_hash.
- 775 Ed448 defines a context string, c . c shall be the auth_context .
- AuthSigVerify shall return success when step 1 does not result in an invalid signature and when the constraints of the group equation in step 3 are met as described in RFC 8032 section 5.2.7. Otherwise, AuthSigVerify shall return failure.

777 12.3.3.3 SM2 signature verification algorithm

- 778 This algorithm is described in GB/T 32918.2-2016, which also defines the variable M and IDA.
- The public key, also defined in GB/T 32918.2-2016, shall be PubKey.
- In the specification for SM2, the variable M' is used to denote the message that is signed. M' shall be the concatenation of combined_auth_prefix and unverified_message_hash.
- The SM2 specification does not define a specific hash function. Thus, the hash function to use shall be the selected hash function associated with the given Credential ID.
- Lastly, SM2 expects a distinguishing identifier, which identifies the signer, and is indicated by the variable ID_A. See SM2 signing algorithm to create the value for ID_A.
- AuthSigVerify shall return success when the Digital signature verification algorithm, as described in GB/T 32918.2-2016, outputs an "accept". Otherwise, AuthSigVerify shall return failure.

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13 Authorization events

- The Authorization events are sent using the SPDM Event mechanism. This section uses many variable names that SPDM defines. See DSP0274 for details, especially the eventing mechanism sections.
- Authorization event requirements apply only when AuthEventCap is set. Otherwise, an Authorization target does not support Authorization events. The **Requirement** column indicates whether or not the event is mandatory or conditional. If a value in this column is *Mandatory*, the event shall be supported. If a value in this column is *Conditional*, the section for the corresponding request details the requirements.
- The EventGroupId in SPDM events identifies the owner of the event. For Authorization, the EventGroupId shall indicate DMTF-DSP with a Vendor ID value of 289.
- Table 73 Authorization event types shows the supported Authorization event types for the Authorization event group. The values in the **Event Type ID** column shall be the same values for EventTypeId field in the SPDM Event data table for the Authorization event group for the corresponding event in the **Event Name** column. The version (EventGroupVer) of the Authorization Event Group shall be 1.

Table 73 — Authorization event types

Event Type ID	Event Name	Requirement	Description
0	Reserved	Reserved	Reserved
1	CredIDparamsChanged	Conditional	A change to one or more parameters via SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS has occurred for a Credential ID.
2	AuthPolicyChanged	Conditional	One or more parameters associated with <code>SET_AUTH_POLICY</code> have changed for a Credential ID.
All others	Reserved	Reserved	Reserved

⁷⁹⁰ 13.1 Event type details

791 Each Authorization event type has its own event-specific information, referred to as EventDetail, to describe the event. These clauses describe the format for each Authorization event type. The event types are listed in Table 73 — Authorization event types.

792 13.1.1 Credential ID Parameters Changed Event

An Authorization target shall use this event (EventTypeId=CredIDparamsChanged) to notify the Event Recipient as SPDM defines that the Authorization target made a change to one or more parameters by the SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request. The event shall apply to all operations indicated by the SetCredInfoOp field in the SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request.

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- The event shall be supported if the Authorization target supports the SET CRED ID PARAMS request.
- 795 Table 74 Credential ID Parameters Changed Event format describes the format for EventDetail as SPDM defines.

Table 74 — Credential ID Parameters Changed Event format

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	CredentialIdCount	2	Shall be the number of Credential IDs in CredentialIdList
2	CredentialIdList	Variable	Shall be a list of Credential IDs whose Credential ID parameters changed through the SET_CRED_ID_PARAMS request. The format of this field shall be the concatenation of CredentialID s as Table 2 — Credential structure defines. Thus, the size of this field shall be CredentialIdCount * the size of CredentialID.

The Authorization initiator can issue GET_CRED_ID_PARAMS to obtain details of this change.

13.2 Protecting the Authorization record

- The Authorization record carries both messages requiring authorization and Authorization messages. To protect Authorization records, Authorization records should traverse a secured transport that provides, minimally, the ability to authenticate the message. The secured transport should also provide the ability to obfuscate messages.
- If an SPDM session is used, then both the SPDM Requester and SPDM Responder shall set the MAC_CAP bit in their corresponding GET_CAPABILITIES or CAPABILITIES message. The SPDM endpoints can set their corresponding ENCRYPT CAP bit as well.

13.2.1 Authorization Policy Changed Event

- An Authorization target shall use the Authorization Policy Changed Event (EventTypeId=AuthPolicyChanged) to notify the Event Recipient as SPDM defines when one or more authorization policies have changed through the SET_AUTH_POLICY request. The event shall apply to all operations indicated by the SetAuthPolicyOp field in the SET_AUTH_POLICY request. The EventDetail format for this event type shall be as the Table 75 Authorization Policy Changed Event format defines. This event only indicates a single policy change. If more than one policy changes, then each change will have its own event.
- The event shall be supported if the Authorization target supports the SET_AUTH_POLICY request.
- Table 75 Authorization Policy Changed Event format describes the format for EventDetail for the AuthPolicyChanged event.

Table 75 — Authorization Policy Changed Event format

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
0	CredentialID	2	Shall be the Credential ID associated with the Authorization policy that changed.

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Description
2	PolicyOwnerID	LenSVH	Shall identify the owner of the definition of the policy that changed. The format of this field shall be the SVH as DSP0293 defines.
2 + LenSVH	PolicyldLen	2	Shall be the length of PolicyID field.
4 + LenSVH	PolicyID	PolicyIdLen	Shall identify the actual policy, defined by PolicyOwnerID, that changed. If the PolicyOwnerID indicates DSP0289 using DMTF-DSP as standards body registry, then the format and size of this field is the PolicyType field as Table 7 — DSP0289 general policy definitions defines.

The Authorization initiator can issue <code>GET_AUTH_POLICY</code> to obtain further details on the change.

14 ANNEX A (informative) change log

808 **14.1 Version 1.0.0 (in progress)**

809 • Initial release

⁸¹⁰ 15 Bibliography

DMTF DSP4014, DMTF Process for Working Bodies, https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP4014