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19 This document's normative language is English. Translation into other languages is permitted.

1 Foreword	6
1.1 Acknowledgments	6
2 Introduction	7
2.1 Conventions	7
2.1.1 Document conventions	7
2.1.2 Reserved and unassigned values	7
2.1.3 Byte ordering	7
2.1.4 SPDM data types	7
2.1.5 Version encoding	8
2.1.6 Notations	8
3 Scope	10
4 Normative references	11
5 Terms and definitions	13
6 Symbols and abbreviated terms	16
7 SPDM message exchanges	17
7.1 Security capability discovery and negotiation	17
7.2 Identity authentication	17
7.2.1 Identity provisioning	18
7.2.2 Runtime authentication	18
7.3 Firmware and configuration measurement	18
7.4 Secure sessions	19
7.5 Mutual authentication overview	19
8 SPDM messaging protocol	20
8.1 SPDM bits-to-bytes mapping	22
8.2 Generic SPDM message format	22
8.3 SPDM request codes	23
8.4 SPDM response codes	24
8.5 SPDM request and response code issuance allowance	26
8.6 Concurrent SPDM message processing	27
8.7 Requirements for Requesters	27
8.8 Requirements for Responders	28
9 Timing requirements	29
9.1 Timing measurements	29
9.2 Timing specification table	29
10 SPDM messages	32
10.1 Capability discovery and negotiation	32
10.2 GET_VERSION request and VERSION response messages	33
10.3 GET_CAPABILITIES request and CAPABILITIES response messages	35
10.4 NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request and ALGORITHMS response messages	40
10.5 Responder identity authentication	52
10.6 Requester identity authentication	54

10.6.1 Certificates and certificate chains	54
10.7 GET_DIGESTS request and DIGESTS response messages	55
10.8 GET_CERTIFICATE request and CERTIFICATE response messages.	56
10.8.1 Mutual authentication requirements for GET_CERTIFICATE and CERTIFICATE messages	58
10.8.2 Leaf certificate	58
10.9 CHALLENGE request and CHALLENGE_AUTH response messages	60
10.9.1 CHALLENGE_AUTH signature generation	62
10.9.2 CHALLENGE_AUTH signature verification	63
10.9.2.1 Request ordering and message transcript computation rules for M1 and M2	64
10.9.3 Basic mutual authentication	66
10.9.3.1 Mutual authentication message transcript	67
10.10 Firmware and other measurements.	68
10.11 GET_MEASUREMENTS request and MEASUREMENTS response messages.	69
10.11.1 Measurement block	71
10.11.1.1 DMTF specification for the Measurement field of a measurement block	72
10.11.2 MEASUREMENTS signature generation	73
10.11.3 MEASUREMENTS signature verification	75
10.12 ERROR response message	77
10.13 RESPOND_IF_READY request message format	81
10.14 VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST request message	82
10.15 VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE response message	83
10.16 KEY_EXCHANGE request and KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP response messages	84
10.16.1 Mutual authentication	90
10.16.2 Specifying Requester certificate for mutual authentication	90
10.17 FINISH request and FINISH_RSP response messages	91
10.17.1 Transcript hash calculation rules.	92
10.18 PSK_EXCHANGE request and PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP response messages	95
10.19 PSK_FINISH request and PSK_FINISH_RSP response messages	100
10.20 HEARTBEAT request and HEARTBEAT_ACK response messages.	101
10.20.1 Heartbeat additional information	102
10.21 KEY_UPDATE request and KEY_UPDATE_ACK response messages	102
10.21.1 Session key update synchronization.	103
10.21.2 KEY_UPDATE transport allowances.	106
10.22 GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request and ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response messages.	109
10.22.1 Encapsulated request flow	109
10.22.2 Optimized encapsulated request flow	109
10.22.3 Triggering GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST	113
10.22.4 Additional constraints	113
10.23 DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE request and ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK response messages.	114
10.23.1 Additional information	116

10.24 END_SESSION request and END_SESSION_ACK response messages	116
11 Session.	118
11.1 Session handshake phase.	118
11.2 Application phase.	119
11.3 Session termination phase.	119
11.4 Simultaneous active sessions	119
11.5 Records and session ID.	120
12 Key schedule	121
12.1 Transcript hash in key derivation	123
12.2 TH1 definition	123
12.3 TH2 definition	124
12.4 Key schedule major secrets	125
12.4.1 Request-direction handshake secret.	125
12.4.2 Response-direction handshake secret	125
12.4.3 Requester-direction data secret	125
12.4.4 Responder-direction data secret.	125
12.5 Encryption key and IV derivation	126
12.6 finished_key derivation	127
12.7 Deriving additional keys from the Export Master Secret	127
12.8 Major secrets update	127
13 Application data	128
13.1 Nonce derivation	128
14 ANNEX A (informative) TLS 1.3.	129
15 ANNEX B (normative) Leaf certificate example.	130
16 ANNEX C (informative) Change log.	132
17 Bibliography	133

21 **1 Foreword**

22 The Platform Management Components Intercommunication (PMCI) working group of the [DMTF](#) prepared the *Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) Specification* (DSP0274). DMTF is a not-for-profit association of industry members that promotes enterprise and systems management and interoperability. For information about the DMTF, see [DMTF](#).

23 **1.1 Acknowledgments**

24 The DMTF acknowledges the following individuals for their contributions to this document:

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26 **2 Introduction**

27 The *Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) Specification* defines [messages](#), data objects, and sequences for performing message exchanges between [devices](#) over a variety of transport and physical media. The description of message exchanges includes [authentication](#) of hardware identities, measurement for firmware identities and session key exchange protocols to enable confidentiality and integrity protected data communication. The SPDM enables efficient access to low-level security capabilities and operations. Other mechanisms, including non-PMCI- and DMTF-defined mechanisms, can use the SPDM.

28 **2.1 Conventions**

29 The following conventions apply to all SPDM specifications.

30 **2.1.1 Document conventions**

- Document titles appear in *italics*.
- The first occurrence of each important term appears in *italics* with a link to its definition.
- ABNF rules appear in a monospaced font.

31 **2.1.2 Reserved and unassigned values**

32 Unless otherwise specified, any reserved, unspecified, or unassigned values in enumerations or other numeric ranges are reserved for future definition by the DMTF.

33 Unless otherwise specified, reserved numeric and bit fields shall be written as zero (0) and ignored when read.

34 **2.1.3 Byte ordering**

35 Unless otherwise specified, for all SPDM specifications [byte](#) ordering of multi-byte numeric fields or multi-byte bit fields is "Little Endian"(that is, the lowest byte offset holds the least significant byte, and higher offsets hold the more significant bytes).

36 **2.1.4 SPDM data types**

37 The [SPDM data types](#) table lists the abbreviations and descriptions for common data types that SPDM message fields and data structure definitions use. These definitions follow [DSP0240](#).

38 **SPDM data types**

Data type	Interpretation
ver8	Eight-bit encoding of the SPDM version number. Version encoding defines the encoding of the version number.
bitfield8	Byte with eight bit fields. Each bit field can be separately defined.
bitfield16	Two-byte word with 16-bit fields. Each bit field can be separately defined.

39 2.1.5 Version encoding

40 The `SPDMVersion` field represents the version of the specification through a combination of *Major* and *Minor* nibbles, encoded as follows:

Version	Matches	Incremented when
Major	Major version field in the <code>SPDMVersion</code> field in the SPDM message header.	Protocol modification breaks backward compatibility.
Minor	Minor version field in the <code>SPDMVersion</code> field in the SPDM message header.	Protocol modification maintains backward compatibility.

41 EXAMPLE:

42 Version 3.7 → `0x37`

43 Version 1.0 → `0x10`

44 Version 1.2 → `0x12`

45 An *endpoint* that supports Version 1.2 can interoperate with an older endpoint that supports Version 1.0 only, but the available functionality is limited to what SPDM specification Version 1.0 defines.

46 An endpoint that supports Version 1.2 only and an endpoint that supports Version 3.7 only are not interoperable and shall not attempt to communicate beyond `GET_VERSION`.

47 The detailed version encoding that the `VERSION` response message returns contains an additional byte that indicates specification bug fixes or development versions. See the [Successful VERSION response message format](#) table.

48 2.1.6 Notations

49 SPDM specifications use the following notations:

Notation	Description
<code>M:N</code>	<p>In field descriptions, this notation typically represents a range of byte offsets starting from byte <code>M</code> and continuing to and including byte <code>N</code> ($M \leq N$).</p> <p>The lowest offset is on the left. The highest offset is on the right.</p>
<code>[4]</code>	<p>Square brackets around a number typically indicate a bit offset.</p> <p>Bit offsets are zero-based values. That is, the least significant bit.</p>
<code>[M:N]</code>	<p>A range of bit offsets where <code>M</code> is greater than or equal to <code>N</code>.</p> <p>The most significant bit is on the left, and the least significant bit is on the right.</p>
<code>1b</code>	<p>A lowercase <code>b</code> after a number consisting of <code>0</code> s and <code>1</code> s indicates that the number is in binary format.</p>
<code>0x12A</code>	<p>Hexadecimal, indicated by the leading <code>0x</code>.</p>
<code>N+</code>	<p>Variable-length byte range that starts at byte offset <code>N</code>.</p>
<code>{ Payload }</code>	<p>Used mostly in figures, this notation indicates the payload specified in the enclosing curly brackets is encrypted and/or authenticated by the keys derived from one or more major secrets. The specific secret used is described throughout this specification. For example, <code>{ HEARTBEAT }</code> shows that the Heartbeat message is encrypted and/or authenticated by the keys derived from one or more major secrets.</p>
<code>{ Payload }::[[S_x]]</code>	<p>Used mostly in figures, this notation indicates the payload specified in the enclosing curly brackets is encrypted and/or authenticated by the keys derived from major Secret <code>X</code>.</p> <p>For example, <code>{ HEARTBEAT }::[[S₂]]</code> shows that the Heartbeat message is encrypted and/or authenticated by the keys derived from major secret <code>S₂</code>.</p>

50 **3 Scope**

51 This specification describes how to use messages, data objects, and sequences to exchange messages between two devices over a variety of transports and physical media. This specification contains the message exchanges, sequence diagrams, message formats, and other relevant semantics for such message exchanges, including authentication of hardware identities and firmware measurement.

52 Other specifications define the mapping of these messages to different transports and physical media. This specification provides information to enable security policy enforcement but does not specify individual policy decisions.

4 Normative references

54 The following documents are indispensable for the application of this specification. For dated or versioned references, only the edition cited, including any corrigenda or DMTF update versions, applies. For references without a date or version, the latest published edition of the referenced document (including any corrigenda or DMTF update versions) applies.

- *ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, Principles and rules for the structure and drafting of ISO and IEC documents - 2018 (8th edition)*
- DMTF DSP0004, *Common Information Model (CIM) Metamodel*, https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/DSP0004_3.0.1.pdf
- DMTF DSP0223, *Generic Operations*, https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/DSP0223_1.0.1.pdf
- DMTF DSP0236, *MCTP Base Specification 1.3.0*, https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/DSP0236_1.3.0.pdf
- DMTF DSP0239, *MCTP IDs and Codes 1.6.0*, https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/DSP0239_1.6.0.pdf
- DMTF DSP0240, *Platform Level Data Model (PLDM) Base Specification*, https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/DSP0240_1.0.0.pdf
- DMTF DSP0275, *Security Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) over MCTP Binding Specification*, <https://www.dmtf.org/dsp/DSP0275>
- DMTF DSP1001, *Management Profile Usage Guide*, https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/DSP1001_1.2.0.pdf
- IETF RFC4716, *The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format*, November 2006
- IETF RFC5234, *Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF*, January 2008
- IETF RFC7250, *Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)*, June 2014
- IETF RFC7919, *Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*, August 2016
- IETF RFC8446, *The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3*, August 2018
- *USB Authentication Specification Rev 1.0 with ECN and Errata through January 7, 2019*
- *TCG Algorithm Registry, Family "2.0", Level 00 Revision 01.27*, February 7, 2018
- NIST Special Publication 800-38D, *Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC*, November 2007
- IETF RFC8439, *ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols*, June 2018
- **ASN.1 — ISO-822-1-4**
 - ITU-T X.680, 08/2015
 - ITU-T X.681, 08/2015

- [ITU-T X.682](#), 08/2015
- [ITU-T X.683](#), 08/2015
- **DER — ISO-8825-1**
 - [ITU-T X.690](#), 08/2015
- **X.509 — ISO-9594-8**
 - [ITU-T X.509](#), 08/2015
- **ECDSA**
 - Section 6, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) in [FIPS PUB 186-4 Digital Signature Standard \(DSS\)](#)
 - Appendix D: Recommended Elliptic Curves for Federal Government Use in [FIPS PUB 186-4 Digital Signature Standard \(DSS\)](#)
- **RSA**
 - Table 3 in [TCG Algorithm Registry Family "2.0" Level 00 Revision 01.22](#), February 9, 2015
- **SHA2-256, SHA2-384, and SHA2-512**
 - [FIPS PUB 180-4 Secure Hash Standard \(SHS\)](#)
- **SHA3-256, SHA3-384, and SHA3-512**
 - [FIPS PUB 202 SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions](#)
- **Transport Layer Security 1.3**
 - [TLS 1.3 RFC 8446](#)

55 5 Terms and definitions

56 In this document, some terms have a specific meaning beyond the normal English meaning. This clause defines those terms.

57 The terms "shall" ("required"), "shall not", "should" ("recommended"), "should not" ("not recommended"), "may", "need not" ("not required"), "can" and "cannot" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2](#), Clause 7. The terms in parenthesis are alternatives for the preceding term, for use in exceptional cases when the preceding term cannot be used for linguistic reasons. Note that [ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2](#), Clause 7 specifies additional alternatives. Occurrences of such additional alternatives shall be interpreted in their normal English meaning.

58 The terms "clause", "subclause", "paragraph", and "annex" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2](#), Clause 6.

59 The terms "normative" and "informative" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2](#), Clause 3. In this document, clauses, subclauses, or annexes labeled "(informative)" do not contain normative content. Notes and examples are always informative elements.

60 The terms that [DSP0004](#), [DSP0223](#), [DSP0236](#), [DSP0239](#), [DSP0275](#), and [DSP1001](#) define also apply to this document.

61 This specification uses these terms:

Term	Definition
application data	Data that is specific to the application and whose definition and format is outside the scope of this specification. Application data usually exist at the application layer, which is, in general, the layer above SPDM and the transport layer. Examples of data that could be application data include: messages carried as DMTF MCTP payloads; Internet traffic (PCIe transaction layer packets (TLPs)); camera images and video (MIPI CSI-2 packets); video display stream (MIPI DSI-2 packets) and touchscreen data (MIPI I3C Touch).
authentication	Process of determining whether an entity is who or what it claims to be.
authentication initiator	Endpoint that initiates the authentication process by challenging another endpoint.
byte	Eight-bit quantity. Also known as an <i>octet</i> .
certificate	Digital form of identification that provides information about an entity and certifies ownership of a particular asymmetric key-pair.
certificate authority (CA)	Trusted entity that issues certificates.
certificate chain	Series of two or more certificates. Each certificate is signed by the preceding certificate in the chain.

Term	Definition
component	Physical entity similar to the PCI Express specification's definition.
device	Physical entity such as a network controller or a fan.
DMTF	Formerly known as the Distributed Management Task Force, the DMTF creates open manageability standards that span diverse emerging and traditional information technology (IT) infrastructures, including cloud, virtualization, network, servers, and storage. Member companies and alliance partners worldwide collaborate on standards to improve the interoperable management of IT.
endpoint	Logical entity that communicates with other endpoints over one or more transport protocol.
intermediate certificate	Certificate that is neither a root certificate nor a leaf certificate.
leaf certificate	Last certificate in a certificate chain.
measurement	Representation of firmware/software or configuration data on an endpoint.
message	See SPDM message .
message body	Portion of a SPDM message that carries additional data.
message originator	Original transmitter, or source, of a SPDM message.
message transcript	The concatenation of a sequence of messages in the order in which they are sent and received by an endpoint. The final message included in the message transcript may be truncated to allow inclusion of a signature in that message which is computed over the message transcript. If an endpoint is communicating with multiple peer endpoints concurrently, the message transcripts for the peers are accumulated separately and independently.
most significant byte (MSB)	Highest order <i>byte</i> in a number consisting of multiple bytes.
Negotiated State	Set of parameters that represent the state of the communication between a corresponding pair of Requester and Responder at the successful completion of the <code>NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS</code> messages. These parameters may include values provided in <code>VERSION</code> , <code>CAPABILITIES</code> and <code>ALGORITHMS</code> messages. Additionally, they may include parameters associated with the transport layer. They may include other values deemed necessary by the Requester or Responder to continue or preserve communication with each other.
nibble	Computer term for a four-bit aggregation, or half of a byte.
nonce	Number that is unpredictable to entities other than its generator. The probability of the same number occurring more than once is negligible. Nonce may be generated by combining a pseudo random number of at least 64 bits, optionally concatenated with a monotonic counter of size suitable for the application.
payload	Information-bearing fields of a message. These fields are separate from the fields and elements, such as address fields, framing bits, checksums, and so on, that transport the message from one point to another. In some instances, a field can be both a payload field and a transport field.

Term	Definition
physical transport binding	Specifications that define how a base messaging protocol is implemented on a particular physical transport type and medium, such as SMBus/I ² C, PCI Express™ Vendor Defined Messaging, and so on.
Platform Management Component Intercommunications (PMCI)	Working group under the DMTF that defines standardized communication protocols, low-level data models, and transport definitions that support communications with and between management controllers and management devices that form a platform management subsystem within a managed computer system.
record	A record is a unit or chunk of data that is either encrypted and/or authenticated.
Requester	Original transmitter, or source, of a SPDM request message. It is also the ultimate receiver, or destination, of a SPDM response message.
Responder	Ultimate receiver, or destination, of a SPDM request message. It is also the original transmitter, or source of a SPDM response message.
root certificate	First certificate in a certificate chain, which is self-signed.
session keys	Session Keys are any secrets, derived cryptographic keys or any cryptographic information bound to the session.
Session-Secrets-Exchange	This term denotes any SPDM request and their corresponding response that initiates a session and provides initial cryptographic exchange. Examples of such requests are <code>KEY_EXCHANGE</code> and <code>PSK_EXCHANGE</code> .
Session-Secrets-Finish	This term denotes any SPDM request and their corresponding response that finalizes a session setup and provides the final exchange of cryptographic or other information before application data can be securely transmitted. Examples of such requests are <code>FINISH</code> and <code>PSK_FINISH</code> .
secure session	A secure session is a session that provides either or both of encryption or message authentication for communicating data over a transport.
SPDM message	Unit of communication in SPDM communications.
SPDM message payload	Portion of the message body of a SPDM message. This portion of the message is separate from those fields and elements that identify the SPDM version, the SPDM request and response codes, and the two parameters.
SPDM request message	Message that is sent to an endpoint to request a specific SPDM operation. A corresponding SPDM response message acknowledges receipt of a SPDM request message.
SPDM response message	Message that is sent in response to a specific SPDM request message. This message includes a <code>Response Code</code> field that indicates whether the request completed normally.
trusted computing base (TCB)	<p>Set of all hardware, firmware, and/or software components that are critical to its security, in the sense that bugs or vulnerabilities occurring inside the TCB might jeopardize the security properties of the entire system. By contrast, parts of a computer system outside the TCB shall not be able to misbehave in a way that would leak any more privileges than are granted to them in accordance to the security policy.</p> <p>Reference: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_computing_base</p>

62 6 Symbols and abbreviated terms

63 The abbreviations defined in [DSP0004](#), [DSP0223](#), and [DSP1001](#) apply to this document.

64 The following additional abbreviations are used in this document.

Abbreviation	Definition
CA	<i>certificate authority</i>
MAC	Message Authentication Code
DMTF	Formerly the <i>Distributed Management Task Force</i>
MSB	<i>most significant byte</i>
PMCI	<i>Platform Management Component Intercommunications</i>
SPDM	Security Protocol and Data Model
TCB	<i>trusted computing base</i>
AEAD	Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data

65 **7 SPDM message exchanges**

66 The message exchanges defined in this specification are between two endpoints and are performed and exchanged through sending and receiving of SPDM messages defined in [SPDM messages](#). The SPDM message exchanges are defined in a generic fashion that allows the messages to be communicated across different physical mediums and over different transport protocols.

67 The specification-defined message exchanges enable Requesters to:

- Discover and negotiate the security capabilities of a Responder.
- Authenticate the identity of a Responder.
- Retrieve the measurements of a Responder.
- Securely establish cryptographic session keys to construct a secure communication channel for the transmission or reception of application data.

68 These message exchange capabilities are built on top of well-known and established security practices across the computing industry. The following clauses provide a brief overview of each message exchange capability. Some message exchange capabilities are based on the security model that the [USB Authentication Specification Rev 1.0 with ECN and Errata through January 7, 2019](#) defines.

69 **7.1 Security capability discovery and negotiation**

70 This specification defines a mechanism for a Requester to discover the security capabilities of a Responder. For example, an endpoint could support multiple cryptographic hash functions that are defined in this specification. Furthermore, the specification defines a mechanism for a Requester and Responder to select a common set of cryptographic algorithms to use for all subsequent message exchanges before another negotiation is initiated by the Requester, if an overlapping set of cryptographic algorithms exists that both endpoints support.

71 **7.2 Identity authentication**

72 In this specification, the authenticity of a Responder is determined by digital signatures using well-established techniques based on public key cryptography. A Responder proves its identity by generating digital signatures using a private key, and the signatures can be cryptographically verified by the Requester using the public key associated with that private key.

73 At a high-level, the authentication of the identity of a Responder involves these processes:

- [Identity provisioning](#)
- [Runtime authentication](#)

74 **7.2.1 Identity provisioning**

75 Identity provisioning is the process that device vendors follow during or after hardware manufacturing. A trusted root *certificate authority (CA)* generates a *root certificate* (`RootCert`) that is provisioned to the *authentication initiator*. The authentication initiator uses this certificate to verify the validity of certificate chains. A device carries a *certificate chain*, which has the `RootCert` as the root of the certificate chain and a device certificate (`DeviceCert`) as the *leaf certificate* of the certificate chain. The device certificate contains the public key that corresponds to the device private key.

76 Through the certificate chain, the root CA indirectly endorses the per-device public/private key pair in the `DeviceCert` , where the private key is provisioned to or generated by the endpoint.

77 Alternatively to certificate chains, the vendor may provision the raw public key of the Responder to the Requester in a trusted environment; for example, during the secure manufacturing process. In this case, trust of the public key of the Responder is established without the need for a certificate-based public key infrastructure.

78 The format of the provisioned public key is out of scope of this specification. Vendors can use proprietary formats or public key formats that other standards define, such as [RFC7250](#) and [RFC4716](#).

79 **7.2.2 Runtime authentication**

80 Runtime authentication is the process by which an authentication initiator, or Requester, interacts with a Responder in a running system. The authentication initiator can retrieve the certificate chains from the Responder and send a unique challenge to the Responder. The Responder uses the private key to sign the challenge. The authentication initiator verifies the signature by using the public key of the Responder, and any intermediate public keys within the certificate chain by using the root certificate as the trusted anchor.

81 If the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester in a trusted environment, the authentication initiator sends a unique challenge to the Responder. The Responder signs the challenge with the private key. The authentication initiator verifies the signature by using the public key of the Responder. The transport layer should handle device identification, which is outside the scope of this specification.

82 **7.3 Firmware and configuration measurement**

83 A measurement is a representation of firmware/software or configuration data on an endpoint. A measurement is typically a cryptographic hash value of the data, or the raw data itself. The endpoint optionally binds a measurement with the endpoint identity through the use of digital signatures. This binding enables an authentication initiator to establish the identity and measurement of the firmware/software or configuration running on the endpoint.

84 **7.4 Secure sessions**

85 Many devices exchange data with other devices that may require protection. In this specification, the device-specific data that is communicated is generically referred to as application data. The protocol of the application data usually exists at a higher layer and it is outside the scope of this specification. This protocol of the application data usually allows for encrypted and/or authenticated data transfer.

86 This specification provides a method to perform a cryptographic key exchange such that the protocol of the application data can use the exchanged keys to provide a secure channel of communication by using encryption and message authentication. This cryptographic key exchange provides either Responder-only authentication or mutual authentication which can be considered equivalent to [Runtime authentication](#). For more details, see the [Session clause](#).

87 Lastly, but not least, many SPDM requests and their corresponding responses can also be afforded the same protection. See the [SPDM request and response messages validity](#) table and [SPDM request and response code issuance allowance](#) clause for more details.

88 The [SPDM messaging protocol flow](#) gives a very high-level view of when the secure session actually starts.

89 **7.5 Mutual authentication overview**

90 The ability for a Responder to verify the authenticity of the Requester is called mutual authentication. Several mechanisms in this specification are detailed to provide mutual authentication capabilities. The cryptographic means to verify the identity of the Requester is the same as verifying the identity of the Responder. The [Identity authentication](#) discusses identity in regards to the Responder but the details apply to the Requester as well.

91 In general, when this specification places requirements or recommendations for Responders in the context of identity, those same rules also apply to Requesters in the context of mutual authentication. The various clauses in this specification will provide more details.

98 8.1 SPDM bits-to-bytes mapping

99 All SPDM fields, regardless of size or endianness, map the highest numeric bits to the highest numerically assigned byte in monotonically decreasing order until the least numerically assigned byte of that field. The following two figures illustrate this mapping.

100 One-byte field bit map

101 Example: A One-Byte Field

Byte 1							
Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit
7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

102 Two-byte field bit map

103 Example: A Two-Byte Field

Byte 3								Byte 2							
Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit	Bit
15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0

104 8.2 Generic SPDM message format

105 The [Generic SPDM message field definitions](#) table defines the fields that constitute a generic SPDM message, including the message header and payload.

106 Generic SPDM message field definitions

Byte	Bits	Length (bits)	Field	Description
0	[7:4]	4	SPDM Major Version	The major version of the SPDM Specification. An endpoint shall not communicate by using an incompatible SPDM version value. See Version encoding .
0	[3:0]	4	SPDM Minor Version	The minor version of the SPDM Specification. A specification with a given minor version extends a specification with a lower minor version as long as they share the major version. See Version encoding .

Byte	Bits	Length (bits)	Field	Description
1	[7:0]	8	Request Response Code	The request message code or response code, which Table 4 and Table 5 enumerate. 0x00 through 0x7F represent response codes and 0x80 through 0xFF represent request codes. In request messages, this field is considered the request code. In response messages, this field is considered the response code.
2	[7:0]	8	Param1	The first one-byte parameter. The contents of the parameter is specific to the Request Response Code .
3	[7:0]	8	Param2	The second one-byte parameter. The contents of the parameter is specific to the Request Response Code .
4	See the description.	Variable	SPDM message payload	Zero or more bytes that are specific to the Request Response Code .

107 **8.3 SPDM request codes**

108 The [SPDM request codes](#) table defines the SPDM request codes. The **Implementation requirement** column indicates requirements on the Requester.

109 All SPDM-compatible implementations shall use the following [SPDM request codes](#).

110 Unsupported request codes shall return an `ERROR` response message with `ErrorCode=UnsupportedRequest` .

111 **SPDM request codes**

Request	Code value	Implementation requirement	Message format
GET_DIGESTS	0x81	Optional	GET_DIGESTS request message format
GET_CERTIFICATE	0x82	Optional	GET_CERTIFICATE request message format
CHALLENGE	0x83	Optional	CHALLENGE request message format
GET_VERSION	0x84	Required	GET_VERSION request message format
GET_MEASUREMENTS	0xE0	Optional	GET_MEASUREMENTS request message format
GET_CAPABILITIES	0xE1	Required	GET_CAPABILITIES request message format
NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS	0xE3	Required	NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request message format

Response	Value	Implementation requirement	Message format
Reserved	0x00 , 0x05 - 0x5F , 0x62 , 0x6D - 0x7D	SPDM implementations compatible with this version shall not use the reserved response codes.	

117 8.5 SPDM request and response code issuance allowance

118 The [SPDM request and response messages validity](#) table describes the conditions under which a request and response can be issued.

119 The **Session** column describes whether the respective request and response can be sent in a session. If the value is "Allowed", the issuer of the request and response shall be able to send it in a secure session; thereby, affording them the protection of a secure session. If the **Session** column value is `Prohibited`, the issuer shall be prohibited from sending the respective request and response in a secure session.

120 The **Outside of a session** column indicates which requests and responses are allowed to be sent free and independent of a session; thereby lacking the protection of a secure session. An "Allowed" in this column indicates that the respective request and response shall be able to be sent outside the context of a secure session. Likewise, a "Prohibited" in this column shall prohibit the issuer from sending the respective request or response outside the context of a session.

121 A request and its corresponding response can have the `Allowed` value in both the **Session** and **Outside of a session** columns, in which case, they can be sent and received in both scenarios but may have additional restrictions. See the respective request and response clause for further details.

122 A request and its corresponding response that has `Allowed` value in the **Session** and `Prohibited` in the **Outside of a session** columns are commands used by the session. These commands only operate on the session that they were sent under, which is outside of the SPDM specification. The session ID is implicit from the session used to transmit the commands.

123 Finally, the **Session phases** column describes which phases of a session the respective request and response shall be issued when they are allowed to be issued in a session.

124 For details, see the [Session](#) clause.

125 SPDM request and response messages validity

Request	Response	Session	Outside of a session	Session phases
<code>GET_MEASUREMENT</code>	<code>MEASUREMENT</code>	Allowed	Allowed	Application Phase
<code>FINISH</code>	<code>FINISH_RSP</code>	Allowed	Allowed	Session Handshake

Request	Response	Session	Outside of a session	Session phases
PSK_FINISH	PSK_FINISH_RSP	Allowed	Allowed	Session Handshake
HEARTBEAT	HEARTBEAT_ACK	Allowed	Prohibited	Application Phase
KEY_UPDATE	KEY_UPDATE_ACK	Allowed	Prohibited	Application Phase
END_SESSION	END_SESSION_ACK	Allowed	Prohibited	Application Phase
Not Applicable	ERROR	Allowed	Allowed	All Phases
GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST	ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST	Allowed	Allowed	All Phases
DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE	ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK	Allowed	Allowed	All Phases
VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST	VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE	Allowed	Allowed	Application Phase
All others	All others	Prohibited	Allowed	Not Applicable

126 For `ERROR` response in session handshake or application phase of a session, the Requester is only allowed in certain situations to send the `ERROR` response.

127 8.6 Concurrent SPDM message processing

128 This clause describes the specifications and requirements for handling concurrent overlapping SPDM request messages.

129 If an endpoint can act as both a Responder and Requester, it shall be able to send request messages and response messages independently.

130 8.7 Requirements for Requesters

131 A Requester shall not have multiple outstanding requests to the same Responder, with the following exception: as addressed in [GET_VERSION request and VERSION response messages](#), a Requester may issue a `GET_VERSION` to a Responder to restart the protocol due to an internal error or reset, even if the Requester has existing outstanding requests to the same Responder.

132 If the Requester has sent a request to a Responder and wants to send a subsequent request to the same Responder, then the Requester shall wait to send the subsequent request until after the Requester completes one of the following actions:

- Receives the response from the Responder for the outstanding request.
- Times out waiting for a response.
- Receives an indication, from the transport layer, that transmission of the request message failed.

- The Requester encounters an internal error or reset.

133 A Requester may send simultaneous request messages to different Responders.

134 **8.8 Requirements for Responders**

135 A Responder is not required to process more than one request message at a time.

136 A Responder that is not ready to accept a new request message shall either respond with an `ERROR` response message with `ErrorCode=Busy` or silently discard the request message.

137 If a Responder is working on a request message from a Requester, the Responder may respond with `ErrorCode=Busy`.

138 If a Responder enables simultaneous communications with multiple Requesters, the Responder is expected to distinguish the Requesters by using mechanisms that are outside the scope of this specification.

139 9 Timing requirements

140 The [Timing specification for SPDM messages](#) table shows the timing specifications for Requesters and Responders.

141 If the Requester does not receive a response within **T1** or **T2** time accordingly, the Requester may retry a request message. A retry of a request message shall be a complete retransmission of the original SPDM request message.

142 The Responder shall not retry SPDM response messages. It is understood that the transport protocol(s) may retry, but that is outside of the SPDM specification.

143 9.1 Timing measurements

144 A Requester shall measure timing parameters, applicable to it, from the end of a successful transmission of a SPDM request to the beginning of the reception of the corresponding SPDM response. A Responder shall measure timing parameters, applicable to it, from the end of the reception of the SPDM request to the beginning of transmission of the response.

145 9.2 Timing specification table

146 The **Ownership** column in the [Timing specification for SPDM messages](#) table specifies whether the timing parameter applies to the Responder or Requester.

147 Timing specification for SPDM messages

Timing parameter	Ownership	Value	Units	Description
RTT	Requester	See the description.	µs	Worst case round-trip transport timing. The maximum value shall be the worst case total time for the complete transmission and delivery of a SPDM message round trip at the transport layer(s). The actual value for this parameter is transport- or media-specific. Both the actual value and how an endpoint obtains this value are outside the scope of this specification.
ST1	Responder	100,000	µs	Shall be the maximum amount of time the Responder has to provide a response to requests that do not require cryptographic processing, such as the GET_CAPABILITIES , GET_VERSION , or NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request messages.

Timing parameter	Ownership	Value	Units	Description
T1	Requester	RTT+ST1	μs	<p>Shall be the minimum amount of time the Requester shall wait before issuing a retry for requests that do not require cryptographic processing.</p> <p>For details, see ST1 .</p>
CT	Requester and Responder	$2^{CTExponent}$	μs	<p>CTExponent is reported in GET_CAPABILITIES and CAPABILITIES messages.</p> <p>This timing parameter shall be the maximum amount of time the endpoint has to provide any response requiring cryptographic processing, such as the GET_MEASUREMENTS or CHALLENGE request messages.</p>
T2	Requester	RTT+CT	μs	<p>Shall be the minimum amount of time the Requester shall wait before issuing a retry for requests that require cryptographic processing.</p> <p>For details, see CT .</p>
RDT	Responder	$2^{RDTExponent}$	μs	<p>Recommended delay, in microseconds that the Responder needs to complete the requested cryptographic operation. When the Responder cannot complete cryptographic processing response within the CT time, it shall provide RDTExponent as part of the ERROR response. See the ResponseNotReady extended error data table for the RDTExponent value.</p> <p>For details, see ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady in the ResponseNotReady extended error data table.</p>
WT	Requester	RDT	μs	<p>Amount of time that the Requester should wait before issuing the RESPOND_IF_READY request message.</p> <p>The Requester shall measure this time parameter from the reception of the ERROR response to the transmission of RESPOND_IF_READY request. The Requester may take into account the transmission time of the ERROR from the Responder to Requester when calculating WT .</p> <p>For details, see RDT .</p>

Timing parameter	Ownership	Value	Units	Description
WT_{Max}	Requester	$(RDT * RDTM) - RTT$	μs	<p>Maximum wait time the Requester has to issue RESPOND_IF_READY request unless the Requester issued a successful RESPOND_IF_READY request message earlier.</p> <p>After this time the Responder is allowed to drop the response. The Requester shall take into account the transmission time of the ERROR from the Responder to Requester when calculating WT_{Max}.</p> <p>The $RDTM$ value appears in the ResponseNotReady extended error data.</p> <p>The Responder should ensure that WT_{Max} does not result in less than WT in determination of $RDTM$.</p> <p>For details, see <code>ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady</code> in the ResponseNotReady extended error data table.</p>
HeartbeatPeriod	Requester and Responder	Variable	s	See HEARTBEAT request and HEARTBEAT_ACK response for detail.

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
8	BaseAsymAlgo	4	<p>Bit mask listing Requester-supported SPDM-enumerated asymmetric key signature algorithms for the purposes of signature verification. If the capabilities do not support this algorithm, this value is not used and shall be set to zero. Let S be the size of the signature in bytes. If the size of a signature component is less than specified size, then 0x00 octets are padded to the left of the most significant byte.</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 0. TPM_ALG_RSASSA_2048 where S=256.</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 1. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_2048 where S=256.</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 2. TPM_ALG_RSASSA_3072 where S=384.</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 3. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_3072 where S=384.</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 4. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256 where S=64 (32-byte r followed by 32-byte s).</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 5. TPM_ALG_RSASSA_4096 where S=512.</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 6. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_4096 where S=512.</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 7. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384 where S=96 (48-byte r followed by 48-byte s).</p> <p>Byte 1 Bit 0. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P521 where S=132 (66-byte r followed by 66-byte s).</p> <p>All other values reserved.</p>
12	BaseHashAlgo	4	<p>Bit mask listing Requester-supported SPDM-enumerated cryptographic hashing algorithms. If the capabilities do not support this algorithm, this value is not used and shall be set to zero.</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 0. TPM_ALG_SHA_256</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 1. TPM_ALG_SHA_384</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 2. TPM_ALG_SHA_512</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 3. TPM_ALG_SHA3_256</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 4. TPM_ALG_SHA3_384</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 5. TPM_ALG_SHA3_512</p> <p>All other values reserved.</p>
16	Reserved	12	Reserved

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
28	ExtAsymCount	1	Number of Requester-supported extended asymmetric key signature algorithms (=A). A + E + ExtAlgCount2 + ExtAlgCount3 + ExtAlgCount4 + ExtAlgCount5 shall be less than or equal to 20. If the capabilities do not support this algorithm, this value is not used and shall be set to zero.
29	ExtHashCount	1	Number of Requester-supported extended hashing algorithms (=E). A + E + ExtAlgCount2 + ExtAlgCount3 + ExtAlgCount4 + ExtAlgCount5 shall be less than or equal to 20. If the capabilities do not support this algorithm, this value is not used and shall be set to zero.
30	Reserved	2	Reserved
32	ExtAsym	4*A	List of Requester-supported extended asymmetric key signature algorithms. The Extended algorithm field format table describes the format of this field.
32 + 4*A	ExtHash	4*E	List of the extended hashing algorithms supported by Requester. The Extended algorithm field format table describes the format of this field.
32 + 4*A + 4*E	ReqAlgStruct	AlgStructSize	See the AlgStructure request field.

186 `AlgStructSize` is the sum of the size of the following algorithm structure tables. The algorithm structure table shall be present only if the Requester supports that `AlgType`. `AlgType` shall monotonically increase for subsequent entries.

187 Algorithm request structure

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	AlgType	1	Type of algorithm. [1:0] = Reserved 2 = DHE 3 = AEADCipherSuite 4 = ReqBaseAsymAlg 5 = KeySchedule All other values reserved.

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
2	AlgSupported	2	<p>Bit mask for indicating a Requester-supported, Responder-selected, SPDM-enumerated asymmetric key signature algorithm for the purposes of signature generation.</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 0. TPM_ALG_RSASSA_2048</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 1. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_2048</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 2. TPM_ALG_RSASSA_3072</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 3. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_3072</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 4. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P256</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 5. TPM_ALG_RSASSA_4096</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 6. TPM_ALG_RSAPSS_4096</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 7. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P384</p> <p>Byte 1 Bit 0. TPM_ALG_ECDSA_ECC_NIST_P521</p> <p>All other values reserved.</p>
4	AlgExternal	4*ExtAlgCount ⁴	If present: a Requester-supported, Responder-selected, extended asymmetric key signature algorithm. The Extended algorithm field format table describes the format of this field.

200

KeySchedule structure

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	AlgType	1	0x5=KeySchedule
1	AlgCount	1	<p>Bit [7:4] = 2.</p> <p>Bit [3:0] Number of Requester-supported, Responder-selected, extended key schedule algorithms (= ExtAlgCount⁵). This value shall be either 0 or 1.</p>
2	AlgSupported	2	<p>Bit mask for indicating a Requester-supported, Responder-selected, SPDM-enumerated Key Schedule algorithm.</p> <p>Byte 0 Bit 0. SPDM Key Schedule.</p> <p>All other values reserved.</p>
4	AlgExternal	4*ExtAlgCount ⁵	If present: a Requester-supported, Responder-selected, extended key schedule algorithm. The Extended algorithm field format table describes the format of this field.

201 **Extended Algorithm field format**

Offset	Field	Description
0	Registry ID	Shall represent the registry or standards body. The ID column in the Registry or standards body ID table describes the value of this field.
1	Reserved	Reserved
[2:3]	Algorithm ID	Shall indicate the desired algorithm. The registry or standards body owns the value of this field. For details, see the Registry or standards body ID table.


202 For each algorithm type, a Responder shall not select both a SPDM-enumerated algorithm and an extended algorithm.

203 [Hashing algorithm selection: Example 1](#) illustrates how two endpoints negotiate a base hashing algorithm.

204 In [Hashing algorithm selection: Example 1](#), endpoint A issues `NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS` request message and endpoint B selects an algorithm of which both endpoints are capable.

205 **Hashing algorithm selection: Example 1**

206




207 The SPDM protocol accounts for the possibility that both endpoints may issue `NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS` request messages independently of each other. In this case, the endpoint A Requester and endpoint B Responder communication pair may select a different algorithm compared to the endpoint B Requester and endpoint A Responder communication pair.

208 10.5 Responder identity authentication

209 This clause describes request messages and response messages associated with the identity of the Responder authentication operations. The `GET_DIGESTS` and `GET_CERTIFICATE` messages shall be supported by a Responder that returns `CERT_CAP = 1` in the `CAPABILITIES` response message. The `CHALLENGE` message defined in this clause shall be supported by a Responder that returns `CHAL_CAP = 1` in the `CAPABILITIES` response message. The `GET_DIGESTS` and `GET_CERTIFICATE` messages are not applicable if the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester in a trusted environment.

210 The [Responder authentication: Example certificate retrieval flow](#) shows the high-level request-response message flow and sequence for *certificate* retrieval.

211 **Responder authentication: Example certificate retrieval flow**



213 The GET_DIGESTS request message and DIGESTS response message may optimize the amount of data required to be transferred from the Responder to the Requester, due to the potentially large size of a certificate chain. The cryptographic hash values of each of the certificate chains stored on an endpoint is returned with the DIGESTS response message, such that the Requester can cache the previously retrieved certificate chain hash values to detect any change to the certificate chains stored on the device before issuing the GET_CERTIFICATE request message.

214 For the runtime challenge-response flow, the signature field in the CHALLENGE_AUTH response message payload shall be signed by using the device private key over the hash of the message transcript. See the [Request ordering and message transcript computation rules for M1/M2 table](#).

215 This ensures cryptographic binding between a specific request message from a specific Requester and a specific

response message from a specific Responder and enables the Requester to detect the presence of an active adversary attempting to downgrade cryptographic algorithms or SPDM versions.

216 Furthermore, a Requester-generated nonce protects the challenge-response from replay attacks, whereas a Responder-generated nonce prevents the Responder from signing over arbitrary data that the Requester dictates. The message transcript generation for the signature computation is restarted with the latest `GET_VERSION` request received.

217 10.6 Requester identity authentication

218 If the Requester supports mutual authentication, the requirements placed on the Responder in [Responder identity authentication](#) shall also apply to the Requester.

219 If the Responder supports mutual authentication, the requirements placed on the Requester in [Responder identity authentication](#) shall also apply to the Responder. These two statements essentially describe a role reversal.

220 10.6.1 Certificates and certificate chains

221 Each SPDM endpoint that supports identity authentication using certificates shall carry at least one certificate chain. A certificate chain contains an ordered list of certificates, presented as the binary (byte) concatenation of the fields that the [Certificate chain format](#) shows.

222 Each certificate shall be in ASN.1 DER-encoded X.509 v3 format. The ASN.1 DER encoding of each individual certificate can be analyzed to determine its length. The minimum number of certificates within a chain shall be one, in which case the single certificate is the device-specific certificate. The SPDM endpoint shall contain a single public-private key pair per supported algorithm for its hardware identity, regardless of how many certificate chains are stored on the device. The Responder selects a single asymmetric key signature algorithm per Requester.

223 Certificate chains are stored in locations called slots. Each slot shall either be empty or contain one complete certificate chain. A device shall not contain more than eight slots. Slot 0 is populated by default. Additional slots may be populated through the supply chain such as by a platform integrator or by an end user such as the IT administrator. A slot mask identifies the certificate chains from the eight slots.

224 In this document, `H` refers to the output size, in bytes, of the hash algorithm agreed upon in `NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS`.

225 Certificate chain format

Offset	Field	Size	Description
0	<code>Length</code>	2	Total length of the certificate chain, in bytes, including all fields in this table. This field is little endian.
2	<code>Reserved</code>	2	Reserved.

Offset	Field	Size	Description
4	RootHash	H	Digest of the Root Certificate. Note that Root Certificate is ASN.1 DER-encoded for this digest. This field shall be big endian.
4 + H	Certificates	Length - (4 + H)	One or more ASN.1 DER-encoded X.509 v3 certificates where the first certificate is signed by the Root Certificate or is the Root Certificate itself and each subsequent certificate is signed by the preceding certificate. The last certificate is the <i>leaf certificate</i> . This field shall be big endian.

226 **10.7 GET_DIGESTS request and DIGESTS response messages**

227 This request message shall be used to retrieve the certificate chain digests.

228 The [GET_DIGESTS request message format](#) table shows the GET_DIGESTS request message format.

229 The [Successful DIGESTS response message](#) table shows the DIGESTS response message format.

230 The digests in the [Successful DIGESTS response message](#) table shall be big endian.

231 **GET_DIGESTS request message format**

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x81=GET_DIGESTS
2	Param1	1	Reserved
3	Param2	1	Reserved

232 **Successful DIGESTS response message format**

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x01=DIGESTS
2	Param1	1	Reserved
3	Param2	1	Slot mask. The bit in position K of this byte shall be set to 1b if and only if slot number K contains a certificate chain for the protocol version in the SPDMVersion field. (Bit 0 is the least significant bit of the byte.) The number of digests returned shall be equal to the number of bits set in this byte. The digests shall be returned in order of increasing slot number.

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
4	Digest[0]	H	Digest of the first certificate chain.
...
4 + (H * (n - 1))	Digest[n-1]	H	Digest of the last (n th) certificate chain.

233 10.8 GET_CERTIFICATE request and CERTIFICATE response messages

234 This request message shall retrieve the certificate chains.

235 The [GET_CERTIFICATE request message format](#) table shows the `GET_CERTIFICATE` request message format.

236 The [Successful CERTIFICATE response message](#) table shows the `CERTIFICATE` response message format.

237 The Requester should, at a minimum, save the public key of the leaf certificate and associate it with each of the digests returned by `DIGESTS` message response. The Requester sends one or more `GET_CERTIFICATE` requests to retrieve the certificate chain of the Responder.

238 GET_CERTIFICATE request message format

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x82=GET_CERTIFICATE
2	Param1	1	Slot number of the target certificate chain to read from. The value in this field shall be between 0 and 7 inclusive.
3	Param2	1	Reserved
4	Offset	2	Offset in bytes from the start of the certificate chain to where the read request message begins. The Responder should send its certificate chain starting from this offset. For the first <code>GET_CERTIFICATE</code> request, the Requester shall set this field to 0. For non-first requests, Offset is the sum of PortionLength values in all previous <code>GET_CERTIFICATE</code> responses.

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
6	Length	2	<p>Length of certificate chain data, in bytes, to be returned in the corresponding response.</p> <p>Length is an unsigned 16-bit integer.</p> <p>This value is the smaller of the following values:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Capacity of the internal buffer of the Requester for receiving the certificate chain of the Responder. The <code>RemainderLength</code> of the preceding <code>GET_CERTIFICATE</code> response. <p>For the first <code>GET_CERTIFICATE</code> request, the Requester should use the capacity of the receiving buffer of the Requester.</p> <p>If <code>offset=0</code> and <code>length=0xFFFF</code>, the Requester is requesting the entire chain.</p>


239 **Successful CERTIFICATE response message format**

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x02=CERTIFICATE
2	Param1	1	Slot number of the certificate chain returned.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	PortionLength	2	Number of bytes of this portion of certificate chain. This should be less than or equal to <code>Length</code> received as part of the request. For example, the Responder might set this field to a value less than <code>Length</code> received as part of the request due to limitations on the internal buffer of the Responder.
6	RemainderLength	2	Number of bytes of the certificate chain that have not been sent yet after the current response. For the last response, this field shall be 0 as an indication to the Requester that the entire certificate chain has been sent.
8	CertChain	PortionLength	Requested contents of target certificate chain, formatted in DER. This field is big endian.

240 The [Responder unable to return full length data flow](#) shows the high-level request-response message flow for Responder response when it cannot return the entire data requested by the Requester in the first response.

241 **Responder unable to return full length data flow**

242



243 10.8.1 Mutual authentication requirements for GET_CERTIFICATE and CERTIFICATE messages

244 If the Requester supports mutual authentication, the requirements placed on the Responder in [GET_CERTIFICATE request and CERTIFICATE response messages](#) clause shall also apply to the Requester. If the Responder supports mutual authentication, the requirements placed on the Requester in [GET_CERTIFICATE request and CERTIFICATE response messages](#) clause shall also apply to the responder. These two statements essentially describes a role reversal.

245 10.8.2 Leaf certificate

246 The SPDM endpoints for authentication shall be provisioned with DER-encoded X.509 v3 format certificates. The leaf certificate shall be signed by a trusted CA and provisioned to the device. For endpoint devices to verify the certificate, the following [required fields](#) shall be present. In addition, to provide device information, use the `Subject Alternative Name` certificate extension `otherName` field. See the [Definition of otherName using the DMTF OID](#).

247 Required fields

Field	Description
Version	Version of the encoded certificate shall be present and shall be 3 or 2.
Serial Number	CA-assigned serial number shall be present with a positive integer value.
Signature Algorithm	Signature algorithm that CA uses shall be present.
Issuer	CA distinguished name shall be specified.

Field	Description
Subject Name	Subject name shall be present and shall represent the distinguished name associated with the leaf certificate.
Validity	Certificate may include this attribute. If the validity attribute is present, the value for <code>notBefore</code> field should be assigned the generalized <code>19700101000000Z</code> time value and <code>notAfter</code> field should be assigned the generalized <code>99991231235959Z</code> time value.
Subject Public Key Info	Device public key and the algorithm shall be present.
Extended Key Usage	Shall be present and key usage bit for digital signature shall be set.

248 **Optional fields**

Field	Description
Basic Constraints	If present, the CA value shall be <code>FALSE</code> .
Subject Alternative Name otherName	In some cases, it might be desirable to provide device specific information as part of the device certificate. DMTF chose the <code>otherName</code> field with a specific format to represent the device information. The use of the <code>otherName</code> field also provides flexibility for other alliances to provide device specific information as part of the device certificate. See the Definition of otherName using the DMTF OID .

249 **Definition of otherName using the DMTF OID**

```

DMTFOtherName ::= SEQUENCE {
    type-id DMTF-oid
    value [0] EXPLICIT ub-DMTF-device-info
}
-- OID for DMTF device info --
id-DMTF-device-info OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1 3 6 1 4 1 412 274 1 }
DMTF-oid ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER (id-DMTF-device-info)

-- All printable characters except ":" --
DMTF-device-string ::= UTF8String (ALL EXCEPT ":")

-- Device Manufacturer --
DMTF-manufacturer ::= DMTF-device-string

-- Device Product --
DMTF-product ::= DMTF-device-string

-- Device Serial Number --
    
```

```

DMTF-serialNumber          ::= DMTF-device-string

-- Device information string --
ub-DMTF-device-info        ::= UTF8String({DMTF-manufacturer":"DMTF-product":"DMTF-serialNumber})

```

250 The [Leaf certificate example](#) shows an example leaf certificate.

251 10.9 CHALLENGE request and CHALLENGE_AUTH response messages

252 This request message shall authenticate a Responder through the challenge-response protocol.

253 The [CHALLENGE request message format](#) table shows the CHALLENGE request message format.

254 The [Successful CHALLENGE_AUTH response message](#) table shows the CHALLENGE_AUTH response message format.

255 CHALLENGE request message format

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x83=CHALLENGE
2	Param1	1	Slot number of the certificate chain of the Responder that shall be used for authentication. It shall be 0xFF if the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester in a trusted environment.
3	Param2	1	Requested measurement summary hash Type: 0x0 . No measurement summary hash. 0x1 . TCB measurement hash. 0xFF . All measurements hash. All other values reserved. When Responder does not support any measurements, Requester shall set this value to 0x0 .
4	Nonce	32	The Requester should choose a random value.

256 Successful CHALLENGE_AUTH response message format

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x03=CHALLENGE_AUTH
2	Param1	1	Response Attribute Field. Please see CHALLENGE_AUTH Response Attribute Table for details.
3	Param2	1	Slot mask. The bit in position K of this byte shall be set to 1b if and only if slot number K contains a certificate chain for the protocol version in the SPDMVersion field. Bit 0 is the least significant bit of the byte. This field is reserved if the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester in a trusted environment.
4	CertChainHash	H	Hash of the certificate chain or public key (if the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester in a trusted environment) used for authentication. The Requester can use this value to check that the certificate chain or public key matches the one requested. This field is big endian.
4 + H	Nonce	32	Responder-selected random value.
36 + H	MeasurementSummaryHash	H	<p>When the Responder does not support measurement or requested Param2 = 0, the field shall be absent.</p> <p>When the requested Param2 = 1, this field shall be the combined hash of Measurements of all measurable components considered to be in the TCB required to generate this response, computed as hash(Concatenation(MeasurementBlock[0].Measurement, MeasurementBlock[1].Measurement, ...)) where MeasurementBlock[x].Measurement is a measurement in TCB.</p> <p>When the requested Param2 = 1 and there are no measurable components in the TCB required to generate this response, this field shall be 0.</p> <p>When requested Param2=0xFF, this field is computed as the hash(Concatenation(MeasurementBlock[0].Measurement, MeasurementBlock[1].Measurement, ..., MeasurementBlock[n].Measurement)) of all supported measurements.</p>
36 + 2H	OpaqueLength	2	Size of the OpaqueData field. The value shall not be greater than 1024 bytes.
38 + 2H	OpaqueData	OpaqueLength	Free-form field, if present. The Responder may include Responder-specific information and/or information defined by its transport.
38 + 2H + OpaqueLength	Signature	S	S is the size of the asymmetric-signing algorithm output that the Responder selected through the last ALGORITHMS response message to the Requester. The CHALLENGE_AUTH signature generation and CHALLENGE_AUTH signature verification clauses, respectively, define the signature generation and verification processes.

257 CHALLENGE_AUTH response attribute

Bit Offset	Field Name	Description
[3:0]	SlotID	This field shall contain the slot number in the <code>Param1</code> field of the corresponding <code>CHALLENGE</code> request. If the Responder's public key was provisioned to the Requester previously, this field shall be 0xF. The Requester can use this value to check that the certificate matched what was requested.
[6:4]	Reserved	Reserved.
7	BasicMutAuthReq	When mutual authentication is supported by both Responder and Requester, the Responder shall set this bit to indicate the Responder wants to authenticate the identity of the Requester using the basic mutual authentication flow. The Requester shall not set this bit in a basic mutual authentication flow. See Basic mutual authentication flow for more details. If mutual authentication is not supported, this bit shall be zero; otherwise, it should be considered an error.

258 10.9.1 CHALLENGE_AUTH signature generation

259 To complete the `CHALLENGE_AUTH` signature generation process, the Responder shall complete these steps:

- 260 1. The Responder shall construct M1 and the Requester shall construct M2 message transcripts. For Responder authentication, see the [Request ordering and message transcript computation rules for M1/M2](#) table. For Requester authentication in the mutual authentication scenario, see the [Mutual authentication message transcript](#) clause.

261 where:

262 `Concatenate()` is the standard concatenation function that is performed only after a successful completion response on the entire request and response contents.

263 ◦ If a response contains `ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady` :

264 Concatenation function is performed on the contents of both the original request and the response received during `RESPOND_IF_READY` .

265 ◦ If a response contains an `ErrorCode` other than `ResponseNotReady` :

266 No concatenation function is performed on the contents of both the original request and response.

267 2. The Responder shall generate:

```
Signature = Sign(SK, Hash(M1));
```

268 where:

- 269 ◦ `Sign`
- 270 Asymmetric signing algorithm that the Responder selected through the last `ALGORITHMS` response message that the Responder sent.
- 271 The [Successful ALGORITHMS response message format](#) table describes the `BaseAsymSel` and `ExtAsymSel` fields.
- 272 ◦ `SK`
- 273 Private key associated with the leaf certificate of the Responder in `slot=Param1` of the `CHALLENGE` request message. If the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester, then `SK` is the associated private key.
- 274 ◦ `Hash`
- 275 Hashing algorithm the Responder selected through the last `ALGORITHMS` response message that the Responder sent.
- 276 The [Successful ALGORITHMS response message format](#) table describes the `BaseHashSel` and `ExtHashSel` fields.

277 10.9.2 CHALLENGE_AUTH signature verification

- 278 Modifications to the previous request messages or the corresponding response messages by an active person-in-the-middle adversary or media error result in `M2!=M1` and lead to verification failure.
- 279 To complete the `CHALLENGE_AUTH` signature verification process, the Requester shall complete this step:

- 280 1. The Requester shall perform:

```
Verify(PK, Hash(M2), Signature);
```


- 281 where:

- 282 ◦ `Verify`
- 283 Asymmetric verification algorithm that the Responder selected through the last `ALGORITHMS` response message that the Requester received.
- 284 The [Successful ALGORITHMS response message format](#) table describes the `BaseAsymSel` and `ExtAsymSel` fields.

- 285 ◦ PK
- 286 Public key associated with the leaf certificate of the Responder with `s1ot=Param1` of the `CHALLENGE` request message. If the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester, then `PK` is the provisioned public key.
- 287 ◦ Hash
- 288 Hashing algorithm the Responder selected through the last sent `ALGORITHMS` response message as received by the Requester.
- 289 The [Successful ALGORITHMS response message format](#) table describes the `BaseHashSel` and `ExtHashSel` fields.

290 The [Responder authentication: Runtime challenge-response flow](#) shows the high-level request-response message flow and sequence for the authentication of the Responder for runtime challenge-response.

291 **Responder authentication: Runtime challenge-response flow**



293 **10.9.2.1 Request ordering and message transcript computation rules for M1 and M2**

294 This clause applies to Responder-only authentication.

295 The [Request ordering and message transcript computation rules for M1/M2](#) table defines how the message transcript is constructed for M1 and M2, which are used in signature calculation and verification in the `CHALLENGE_AUTH` response message.

296 The possible request orderings after reset leading up to and including `CHALLENGE` are:

- `GET_VERSION` , `GET_CAPABILITIES` , `NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS` , `GET_DIGESTS` , `GET_CERTIFICATE` , `CHALLENGE` (A1, B1,

C1)

- GET_VERSION , GET_CAPABILITIES , NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS , GET_DIGESTS , CHALLENGE (A1, B3, C1)
- GET_VERSION , GET_CAPABILITIES , NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS , CHALLENGE (A1, B2, C1)
- GET_DIGESTS , GET_CERTIFICATE , CHALLENGE (A2, B1, C1)
- GET_DIGESTS , CHALLENGE (A2, B3, C1)
- CHALLENGE (A2, B2, C1)

297 Immediately after reset, M1 and M2 shall be null.

298 After the Requester receives a successful CHALLENGE_AUTH response or the Requester sends a GET_MEASUREMENTS request, M1 and M2 shall be set to null. If a Negotiated State has been established, this will remain intact.

299 If a Requester sends a GET_VERSION message, the Requester and Responder shall reset M1 and M2 to null, clear all Negotiated State and recommence construction of M1 and M2 starting with the new GET_VERSION message.

300 **Request ordering and message transcript computation rules for M1/M2**

Requests	Implementation requirements	M1/M2=Concatenate (A, B, C)
Reset	N/A	M1/M2=null
GET_VERSION issued	Requester issues this request to allow the Requester and Responder to determine an agreed upon Negotiated State . Also issued if the Requester detects an out of sync condition, when the signature verification fails or when the Responder provides an unexpected error response.	M1/M2=null
GET_VERSION , GET_CAPABILITIES , NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS Issued	Requester shall always issue these requests in this order.	A1=Concatenate(GET_VERSION, VERSION, GET_CAPABILITIES, CAPABILITIES, NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS, ALGORITHMS)
GET_VERSION , GET_CAPABILITIES , NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS Skipped	Requester skipped issuing these requests after a new reset if the Responder has previously indicated CACHE_CAP=1 . In this case, the Requester and Responder shall proceed with the previously determined Negotiated State .	A2=null
GET_DIGESTS , GET_CERTIFICATE issued	Requester issued these requests in this order after NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS request completion or immediately after reset, if it chose to skip the previous three requests.	B1=Concatenate(GET_DIGESTS, DIGESTS, GET_CERTIFICATE, CERTIFICATE)
GET_DIGESTS , GET_CERTIFICATE skipped	Requester skipped both requests after a new reset since it could use previously cached certificate information.	B2=null

Requests	Implementation requirements	M1/M2=Concatenate (A, B, C)
GET_DIGESTS issued, GET_CERTIFICATE skipped	Requester skipped GET_CERTIFICATE request after a new reset since it could use the previously cached CERTIFICATE response.	B3=(GET_DIGESTS, DIGESTS)
CHALLENGE issued	Requester issued this request to complete security verification of current requests and responses. The Signature bytes of CHALLENGE_AUTH shall not be included in C.	C1=(CHALLENGE, CHALLENGE_AUTH\Signature) . See the CHALLENGE request message format table.
CHALLENGE completion	Completion of CHALLENGE resets M1 and M2.	M1/M2=null
Other issued	If the Requester issued GET_MEASUREMENTS or KEY_EXCHANGE or FINISH or PSK_EXCHANGE or PSK_FINISH or KEY_UPDATE or HEARTBEAT or GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST or DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE or END_SESSION request(s) and skipped CHALLENGE completion, M1 and M2 are reset to null .	M1/M2=null

301 10.9.3 Basic mutual authentication

302 Unless otherwise stated, if the Requester supports mutual authentication, the requirements placed on the Responder in the [CHALLENGE request and CHALLENGE_AUTH response messages](#) clause shall also apply to the Requester.

Unless otherwise stated, if the Responder supports mutual authentication, the requirements placed on the Requester in the [CHALLENGE request and CHALLENGE_AUTH response messages](#) clause shall also apply to the Responder. These two statements essentially describe a role reversal, unless otherwise stated.


303 The basic mutual authentication flow shall start when the Requester successfully receives a CHALLENGE_AUTH with **BasicMutAuthReq** set. This flow shall utilize message encapsulation as described in [GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request and ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response messages](#) to retrieve request messages. The basic mutual authentication flow shall end when the encapsulated request flow ends.

304 This flow shall only allow GET_DIGESTS , GET_CERTIFICATE , CHALLENGE and their corresponding responses to be encapsulated.

305 The [Mutual authentication basic flow](#) illustrates, as an example, the basic mutual authentication flow.

306 Mutual authentication basic flow

307



308 10.9.3.1 Mutual authentication message transcript

309 This clause applies to the Responder authenticating the Requester in a basic mutual authentication scenario.

310 The [Basic mutual authentication message transcript](#) table defines how the message transcript is constructed for M1

and M2, which are used in signature calculation and verification in the `CHALLENGE_AUTH` response message when the Responder authenticates the Requester.

311 The possible request orderings for the basic mutual authentication flow shall be one of the following (the Flow ID is in parenthesis):

- `GET_DIGESTS` , `GET_CERTIFICATE` , `CHALLENGE` (*BMAF0*)
- `GET_DIGESTS` , `CHALLENGE` (*BMAF1*)
- `GET_CERTIFICATE` , `CHALLENGE` (*BMAF2*)
- `CHALLENGE` (*BMAF3*)

312 When the basic mutual authentication flow starts (i.e., when `GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST` is issued) M1 and M2 shall be set to NULL.

313 **Basic mutual authentication message transcript**

Flow ID	M1/M2
BMAF0	Concatenate(<code>GET_DIGESTS</code> , <code>DIGESTS</code> , <code>GET_CERTIFICATE</code> , <code>CERTIFICATE</code> , <code>CHALLENGE</code> , <code>CHALLENGE_AUTH</code> without the signature)
BMAF1	Concatenate(<code>GET_DIGESTS</code> , <code>DIGESTS</code> , <code>CHALLENGE</code> , <code>CHALLENGE_AUTH</code> without the signature)
BMAF2	Concatenate(<code>GET_CERTIFICATE</code> , <code>CERTIFICATE</code> , <code>CHALLENGE</code> , <code>CHALLENGE_AUTH</code> without the signature)
BMAF3	Concatenate(<code>CHALLENGE</code> , <code>CHALLENGE_AUTH</code> without the signature)

314 For `GET_CERTIFICATE` and `CERTIFICATE` , these messages may need to be issued multiple times to retrieve the entire certificate chain. Thus, each instance of the request and response shall be part of M1/M2 in the order that they are issued.


315 **10.10 Firmware and other measurements**

316 This clause describes request messages and response messages associated with endpoint measurement. All request messages in this clause shall be supported by an endpoint that returns `MEAS_CAP=01b` or `MEAS_CAP=10b` in `CAPABILITIES` response.

317 The [Measurement retrieval flow](#) shows the high-level request-response flow and sequence for endpoint measurement. If `MEAS_FRESH_CAP` bit in the `CAPABILITIES` response message returns 0, and the Requester requires fresh measurements, the Responder shall be reset before `GET_MEASUREMENTS` is resent. The mechanisms employed for resetting the Responder are outside the scope of this specification.

318 **Measurement retrieval flow**

319



320 **10.11 GET_MEASUREMENTS request and MEASUREMENTS response messages**

321 This request message shall retrieve measurements in the form of measurements blocks. A Requester should not send this message until it has received at least one successful CHALLENGE_AUTH response message from the Responder, or should send this message in a secure session. The successful CHALLENGE_AUTH response may have been received before the last reset.

322 The GET_MEASUREMENTS request message format table shows the GET_MEASUREMENTS request message format.

323 The GET_MEASUREMENTS request attributes table shows the GET_MEASUREMENTS request message attributes.

324 The Successful MEASUREMENTS response message format table shows the MEASUREMENTS response message format. The measurement blocks in MeasurementRecord shall be placed contiguously from index 1.

325 **GET_MEASUREMENTS request message format**

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xE0=GET_MEASUREMENTS
2	Param1	1	Request attributes. See the GET_MEASUREMENTS request attributes table.

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
3	Param2	1	Measurement operation. A value of 0x0 shall query the Responder for the total number of measurement blocks available. A value of 0xFF shall request all measurement blocks. A value between 0x1 and 0xFE, inclusively, shall request the measurement block at the index corresponding to that value.
4	Nonce	32	The Requester should choose a random value. This field is only present if a signature is required on the response. See the GET_MEASUREMENTS request attributes table.
36	SlotIDParam	1	Bit[7:4] = Reserved. Bit[3:0] = SlotID. Slot number of the certificate chain of the Responder that shall be used for authenticating the measurement(s). If the Responder's public key was provisioned to the Requester previously, this field shall be 0xF. This field is only present if a signature is required on the response. See the GET_MEASUREMENTS request attributes table.

326 GET_MEASUREMENTS request attributes

Bits	Value	Description
0	1	If the Responder can generate a signature (MEAS_CAP is 10b in the CAPABILITIES response), the value of this bit shall indicate to the Responder that a signature is required. The Responder shall generate a signature in the corresponding response. The Nonce field shall be present in the request.
0	0	For Responders that can generate signatures, the value of this bit shall indicate that the Requester does not require a signature. The Responder shall not generate a signature in the response. The Nonce field shall be absent in the request. For Responders that cannot generate a signature (MEAS_CAP is 01b in the CAPABILITIES response) the Requester shall always use this value.
[7:1]	Reserved	Reserved

327 Successful MEASUREMENTS response message format

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x60=MEASUREMENTS
2	Param1	1	When Param2 in the requested measurement operation is 0, this parameter shall return the total number of measurement indices on the device. Otherwise, this field is reserved.

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
3	Param2	1	Bit[7:4] = Reserved. Bit[3:0] = SlotID. If this message contains a signature, this field contains the slot number of the certificate chain specified in the GET_MEASUREMENTS request, or 0xF if the Responder's public key was provisioned to the Requester previously. If this message does not contain a signature, this field shall be set to 0x0.
4	NumberOfBlocks	1	Number of measurement blocks (N) in MeasurementRecord. If Param2 in the requested measurement operation is 0, this field shall be 0.
5	MeasurementRecordLength	3	Size of the MeasurementRecord field in bytes. If Param2 in the requested measurement operation is 0, this field shall be 0.
8	MeasurementRecord	L = MeasurementRecordLength	Concatenation of all measurement blocks that correspond to the requested Measurement operation. Measurement block defines the measurement block structure.
8 + L	Nonce	32	The Responder should choose a random value.
40 + L	OpaqueLength	2	Size of the OpaqueData field in bytes. The value shall not be greater than 1024 bytes.
42 + L	OpaqueData	OpaqueLength	Free-form field, if present. The Responder may include Responder-specific information and/or information defined by its transport.
42 + L + OpaqueLength	Signature	S	Signature of the GET_MEASUREMENTS request and MEASUREMENTS response messages, excluding the Signature field and signed using the device private key. The Responder shall use the asymmetric signing algorithm it selected during the last ALGORITHMS response message to the Requester, and S is the size of that asymmetric signing algorithm output. This field is conditional.

328 10.11.1 Measurement block

329 Each measurement block that the MEASUREMENTS response message defines shall contain a four-byte descriptor, offsets 0 through 3, followed by the measurement data that correspond to a particular measurement index and measurement type. The blocks are ordered by Index.

330 The Measurement block format table shows the format for a measurement block:

331 Measurement block format

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	Index	1	Index. Shall represent the index of the measurement. In the range of [1, N].

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
1	MeasurementSpecification	1	<p>Bit mask. The value shall indicate the measurement specification that the requested <code>Measurement</code> follows and shall match the selected measurement specification in the <code>ALGORITHMS</code> message. See the Successful ALGORITHMS response message format table. Only one bit shall be set in the measurement block.</p> <p>Bit 0=DMTF, as specified in the Measurement field format when MeasurementSpecification field is Bit 0 = DMTF table.</p> <p>All other bits are reserved.</p>
2	MeasurementSize	2	Size of <code>Measurement</code> , in bytes.
4	Measurement	MeasurementSize	The <code>MeasurementSpecification</code> defines the format of this field.

332 10.11.1.1 DMTF specification for the Measurement field of a measurement block

333 The present clause is the specification for the format of the `Measurement` field in a measurement block when the `MeasurementSpecification` field selects Bit 0=DMTF. This format is specified in [Measurement field format when MeasurementSpecification field is Bit 0 = DMTF](#).

334 The measurement manifest of `DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType` refers to a manifest that describes contents of other indexes. For example, the set of firmware modules executing on the Responder may change at runtime. The measurement manifest tells the Requester which firmware modules' measurements are reported in this response and their indexes. The format of measurement manifest is out of scope of this specification.

335 Measurement field format when MeasurementSpecification field is bit 0 = DMTF

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType	1	<p>Composed of:</p> <p>Bit [7] indicates the representation in <code>DMTFSpecMeasurementValue</code>.</p> <p>Bits [6:0] indicate what is being measured by <code>DMTFSpecMeasurementValue</code>.</p> <p>These values are set independently and are interpreted as follows:</p> <p>[7]=0b . Digest.</p> <p>[7]=1b . Raw bit stream.</p> <p>[6:0]=00h . Immutable ROM.</p> <p>[6:0]=01h . Mutable firmware.</p> <p>[6:0]=02h . Hardware configuration, such as straps, debug modes.</p> <p>[6:0]=03h . Firmware configuration, such as configurable firmware policy.</p> <p>[6:0]=04h . Measurement manifest.</p> <p>All other values reserved.</p>
1	DMTFSpecMeasurementValueSize	2	<p>Size of <code>DMTFSpecMeasurementValue</code>, in bytes.</p> <p>When <code>DMTFSpecMeasurementValueType[7]=0b</code>, the <code>DMTFSpecMeasurementValueSize</code> shall be derived from the measurement hash algorithm that the <code>ALGORITHM</code> response message returns.</p>
3	DMTFSpecMeasurementValue	DMTFSpecMeasurementValueSize	<p><code>DMTFSpecMeasurementValueSize</code> bytes of cryptographic hash or raw bit stream, as indicated in <code>DMTFSpecMeasurementType[7]</code>.</p>

336 10.11.2 MEASUREMENTS signature generation

337 While a Requester may opt to require a signature in each individual `MEASUREMENTS` response, it is advisable that the cost of the signature generation process is minimized by amortizing it over multiple `MEASUREMENTS` responses where applicable. In this scheme, the Requester issues a number of `GET_MEASUREMENTS` requests without requiring signatures followed by a final `GET_MEASUREMENTS` request requiring a signature over the entire set of `GET_MEASUREMENTS` requests and corresponding `MEASUREMENTS` responses exchanged. The steps to complete this scheme are as follows:

- 338 1. The Responder shall construct L1 and the Requester shall construct L2 over their observed messages:

```
L1/L2 = Concatenate(GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUEST1, MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSE1, ...,
                    GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTn-1, MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSEn-1,
                    GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTn, MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSEn)
```

339 where:

340 ◦ Concatenate()

341 Standard concatenation function.

342 ◦ GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUEST1

343 Entire first GET_MEASUREMENTS request message under consideration, where the Requester has not requested a signature on that specific GET_MEASUREMENTS request.

344 ◦ MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSE1

345 Entire MEASUREMENTS response message without the signature bytes that the Responder sent in response to GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUEST1 .

346 ◦ GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTn-1

347 Entire last consecutive GET_MEASUREMENTS request message under consideration, where the Requester has not requested a signature on that specific GET_MEASUREMENTS request.

348 ◦ MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSEn-1

349 Entire MEASUREMENTS response message without the signature bytes that the Responder sent in response to GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTn-1 .

350 ◦ GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTn

351 Entire first GET_MEASUREMENTS request message under consideration, where the Requester has requested a signature on that specific GET_MEASUREMENTS request.

352 n is a number greater than or equal to 1 .

353 When n equals 1 , the Requester has not made any GET_MEASUREMENTS requests without signature prior to issuing a GET_MEASUREMENTS request with signature.

354 ◦ MEASUREMENTS_RESPONSEn

355 Entire `MEASUREMENTS` response message without the signature bytes that the Responder sent in response to `GET_MEASUREMENTS_REQUESTn`.

356 Any communication between Requester and Responder other than a `GET_MEASUREMENTS` request or response resets L1/L2 computation to null.

357 2. The Responder shall generate:

```
Signature = Sign(SK, Hash(L1));
```

358 where:

359 ◦ `Sign`

360 Asymmetric signing algorithm that the Responder selected through the last `ALGORITHMS` response message that the Responder sent.

361 The [Successful ALGORITHMS response message format](#) table describes the `BaseAsymSel` and `ExtAsymSel` fields.

362 ◦ `SK`

363 Private key of the Responder associated with the leaf certificate stored in `S1otID`. If the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester, then `SK` is the associated private key.

364 ◦ `Hash`

365 Hashing algorithm that the Responder selected through the last `ALGORITHMS` response message that the Responder sent.

366 The [Successful ALGORITHMS response message format](#) table describes the `BaseAsymSel` and `ExtAsymSel` fields.

367 10.11.3 MEASUREMENTS signature verification

368 To complete the `MEASUREMENTS` signature verification process, the Requester shall complete this step:

369 1. The Requester shall perform:

```
Verify(PK, Hash(L2), Signature)
```

370 where:

371 ◦ `PK`

372 Public key associated with the slot 0 certificate of the Responder. `PK` is extracted from the `CERTIFICATES` response. If the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester, then `PK` is the provisioned public key.

373 ◦ `Verify`

374 Asymmetric verification algorithm that the Responder selected through the last `ALGORITHMS` response message that the Requester received.

375 The [Successful ALGORITHMS response message format](#) table describes the `BaseAsymSel` and `ExtAsymSel` fields.

376 ◦ `Hash`


377 Hashing algorithm the Responder selected through the last sent `ALGORITHMS` response message that the Requester sent.

378 The [Successful ALGORITHMS response message format](#) table describes the `BaseAsymSel` and `ExtAsymSel` fields.

379 The [Measurement signature computation example](#) shows an example of a typical Requester Responder protocol where the Requester issues 1 to $n-1$ `GET_MEASUREMENTS` requests without a signature, followed by a single `GET_MEASUREMENTS` request n with a signature.

380 **Measurement signature computation example**

381



382 10.12 ERROR response message

383 For a SPDM operation that results in an error, the Responder shall send an `ERROR` response message to the Requester.

384 The [ERROR response message format](#) table shows the `ERROR` response format.

385 The [Error code and error data](#) table shows the detailed error code, error data, and extended error data.

386 The [ResponseNotReady extended error data](#) table shows the `ResponseNotReady` extended error data.

387 The [Registry or standards body ID](#) table shows the registry or standards body ID.

388 The [ExtendedErrorData format for vendor or other standards-defined ERROR response message](#) table shows the `ExtendedErrorData` format definition for vendor or other standards-defined `ERROR` response message.

389 ERROR response message format

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x7F=ERROR
2	Param1	1	Error Code. See Error code and error data .
3	Param2	1	Error Data. See Error code and error data .
4	ExtendedErrorData	0-32	Optional extended data. See Error code and error data .

390 **Error code and error data**

Error code	Value	Description	Error data	ExtendedErrorData
Reserved	0x00	Reserved	Reserved	Reserved
InvalidRequest	0x01	One or more request fields are invalid	0x00	No extended error data is provided.
InvalidSession	0x02	The record layer used an invalid session ID.	This shall be the invalid session ID.	No extended error data is provided.
Busy	0x03	The Responder received the request message and the Responder decided to ignore the request message, but the Responder may be able to process the request message if the request message is sent again in the future.	0x00	No extended error data is provided.
UnexpectedRequest	0x04	The Responder received an unexpected request message. For example, CHALLENGE before NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS .	0x00	No extended error data is provided.
Unspecified	0x05	Unspecified error occurred.	0x00	No extended error data is provided.
DecryptError	0x06	The receiver of the record cannot decrypt the record or verify data during the session handshake.	Reserved	No extended error data is provided.
UnsupportedRequest	0x07	The RequestResponseCode in the request message is unsupported.	RequestResponseCode in the request message.	No extended error data is provided
RequestInFlight	0x08	The Responder has delivered an encapsulated request to which it is still waiting for the response.	Reserved	No extended error data is provided.
InvalidResponseCode	0x09	The Requester delivered an invalid response for an encapsulated response.	Reserved	No extended error data is provided.

Error code	Value	Description	Error data	ExtendedErrorData
SessionLimitExceeded	0x0A	Maximum number of concurrent sessions reached.	Reserved	No extended error data is provided.
Reserved	0x0b - 0x40	Reserved	Reserved	Reserved
MajorVersionMismatch	0x41	Requested SPDM Major Version is not supported.	0x00	No extended error data provided.
ResponseNotReady	0x42	See the RESPOND_IF_READY request message format .	0x00	See the ResponseNotReady extended error data table.
RequestResynch	0x43	Responder is requesting Requester to reissue GET_VERSION to resynchronize. An example is following a firmware update.	0x00	No extended error data provided.
Reserved	0x44 - 0xFE	Reserved	Reserved.	Reserved
Vendor/Other Standards Defined	0xFF	Vendor or Other Standards defined	Shall indicate the registry or standard body using one of the values in the ID column in the Registry or standards body ID table.	See the ExtendedErrorData format for vendor or other standards-defined ERROR response message table for format definition.

391 **ResponseNotReady extended error data**

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	RDTExponent	1	<p>Exponent expressed in logarithmic (base 2 scale) to calculate <code>RDTE</code> time in μs after which the Responder can provide successful completion response.</p> <p>For example, the raw value 8 indicates that the Responder will be ready in $2^8=256 \mu$s.</p> <p>Responder should use <code>RDTE</code> to avoid continuous pinging and issue the RESPOND_IF_READY request message after <code>RDTE</code> time.</p> <p>For timing requirement details, see the Timing specification for SPDM messages table.</p>
1	RequestCode	1	The request code that triggered this response.
2	Token	1	The opaque handle that the Requester shall pass in with the RESPOND_IF_READY request message.

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
3	RDTM	1	<p>Multiplier used to compute WT_{Max} in μs to indicate the response may be dropped after this delay.</p> <p>The multiplier shall always be greater than 1.</p> <p>The Responder may also stop processing the initial request if the same Requester issues a different request.</p> <p>For timing requirement details, see the Timing specification for SPDM messages table.</p>

392 Registry or standards body ID

393 For algorithm encoding in extended algorithm fields, unless otherwise specified, consult the respective registry or standards body.

ID	Vendor ID length (bytes)	Registry or standards body name	Description
0x0	0	DMTF	DMTF does not have a Vendor ID registry. At present, DMTF does not have any algorithms defined for use in extended algorithms fields.
0x1	2	TCG	Vendor is identified by using TCG Vendor ID Registry . For extended algorithms, see TCG Algorithm Registry .
0x2	2	USB	Vendor is identified by using the vendor ID assigned by USB.
0x3	2	PCI-SIG	Vendor is identified using PCI-SIG Vendor ID .
0x4	4	IANA	The Private Enterprise Number (PEN) assigned by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) identifies the vendor.
0x5	4	HDBaseT	Vendor is identified by using HDBaseT HDCD entity.
0x6	2	MIPI	The Manufacturer ID assigned by MIPI identifies the vendor.
0x7	2	CXL	Vendor is identified by using CXL vendor ID.
0x8	2	JEDEC	Vendor is identified by using JEDEC vendor ID.


394 ExtendedErrorData format for vendor or other standards-defined ERROR response message

Byte offset	Length	Field name	Description
0	1	Len	<p>Length of the <code>VendorID</code> field.</p> <p>If the <code>ERROR</code> is vendor defined, the value of this field shall equal the <code>Vendor ID Len</code>, as the Registry or standards body ID table describes, of the corresponding registry or standard body name.</p> <p>If the <code>ERROR</code> is defined by a registry or a standard, this field shall be zero (0), which also indicates that the <code>VendorID</code> field is not present.</p> <p>The <code>Error Data</code> field in the <code>ERROR</code> message indicates the registry or standards body name, such as <code>Param2</code>, and is one of the values in the <code>ID</code> column in the Registry or standards body ID table.</p>
1	Len	VendorID	<p>The value of this field shall indicate the Vendor ID, as assigned by the registry or standards body. The Registry or standards body ID table describes the length of this field. Shall be in little endian format.</p> <p>The registry or standards body name in the <code>ERROR</code> is indicated in the <code>Error Data</code> field, such as <code>Param2</code>, and is one of the values in the <code>ID</code> column in the Registry or standards body ID table.</p>
1 + Len	Variable	OpaqueErrorData	Defined by the vendor or other standards.

395 10.13 RESPOND_IF_READY request message format

396 This request message shall ask for the response to the original request upon receipt of `ResponseNotReady` error code. If the response to the original request is ready, the Responder shall return that response message. If the response to the original request is not ready, the Responder shall return the `ERROR` response message, set `ErrorCode = ResponseNotReady` and return the same token as the previous `ResponseNotReady` response message.

397



398 The [RESPOND_IF_READY request message format](#) table shows the `RESPOND_IF_READY` request message format.

399 **RESPOND_IF_READY request message format**

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xFF=RESPOND_IF_READY
2	Param1	1	The original request code that triggered the <code>ResponseNotReady</code> error code response. Shall match the request code returned as part of the <code>ResponseNotReady</code> extended error data.
3	Param2	1	The token that was returned as part of the <code>ResponseNotReady</code> extended error data.

400 **10.14 VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST request message**

401 A Requester intending to define a unique request to meet its need can use this request message. The [VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST request message format](#) table defines the format.

402 The Requester should send this request message only after sending `GET_VERSION` , `GET_CAPABILITIES` and `NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS` request sequence.

403 If the vendor intends that these messages are to be used before a session has been established, and the vendor wishes to have the requests authenticated, then the vendor shall indicate how the transcript hashes and/or message transcript are changed to add the vendor defined commands.

404 The [VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST request message format](#) table shows the `VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST` request message format.

405 **VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST request message format**

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	<code>SPDMVersion</code>	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xFE=VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST
2	<code>Param1</code>	1	Reserved
3	<code>Param2</code>	1	Reserved
4	<code>StandardID</code>	2	Shall indicate the registry or standards body by using one of the values in the ID column in the Registry or standards body ID table.
6	<code>Len</code>	1	Length of the <code>VendorID</code> field. If the <code>VendorDefinedRequest</code> is standard defined, Len shall be 0. If the <code>VendorDefinedRequest</code> is vendor-defined, Len shall equal <code>VendorIDLen</code> , as the Registry or standards body ID table describes.
7	<code>VendorID</code>	Len	Vendor ID, as assigned by the registry or standards body. Shall be in little endian format.
7 + Len	<code>ReqLength</code>	2	Length of the <code>VendorDefinedReqPayload</code> .
7 + Len + 2	<code>VendorDefinedReqPayload</code>	ReqLength	The standard or vendor shall use this field to send the request payload.

406 **10.15 VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE response message**

407 A Responder can use this response message in response to `VENDOR_DEFINED_REQUEST`. The [VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE response message format](#) table defines the format.

408 The [VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE response message format](#) table shows the response message format.

409 **VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE response message format**

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	<code>SPDMVersion</code>	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x7E=VENDOR_DEFINED_RESPONSE

Offset	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
2	Param1	1	Reserved
3	Param2	1	Reserved
4	StandardID	2	Shall indicate the registry or standard body using one of the values in the ID column in the Registry or standards body ID table.
6	Len	1	Length of the <code>Vendor ID</code> field. If the <code>VendorDefinedRequest</code> is standards-defined, length shall be 0. If the <code>VendorDefinedRequest</code> is vendor-defined, length shall equal <code>Vendor ID Len</code> , as the Registry or standards body ID table describes.
7	VendorID	Len	Shall indicate the Vendor ID, as assigned by the registry or standards body. Shall be in little endian format.
7 + Len	RespLength	2	Length of the <code>VendorDefinedRespPayload</code>
7 + Len + 2	VendorDefinedRespPayload	ReqLength	Standard or vendor shall use this value to send the response payload.


410 10.16 KEY_EXCHANGE request and KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP response messages

411 This request message shall initiate a handshake between Requester and Responder intended to authenticate the Responder (or optionally both parties), negotiate cryptographic parameters (in addition to those negotiated in the last `NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS / ALGORITHMS` exchange), and establish shared keying material. The [KEY_EXCHANGE request message format](#) table shows the `KEY_EXCHANGE` request message format and the [Successful KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP response message format](#) table shows the `KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP` response message format. The handshake is completed by the successful exchange of the `FINISH` request and `FINISH_RSP` response messages, presented in the next clause, and depends on the tight coupling between the two request/response message pairs.

412 The Requester and Responder pair may support two modes of handshakes. If `HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP` is set in both the Requester and the Responder all SPDM messages exchanged during the Session Handshake Phase are sent in the clear (outside of a secure session). Otherwise both the Requester and the Responder use encryption and/or message authentication during the Session Handshake Phase using the Handshake secret derived at the completion of `KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP` message for subsequent message communication until `FINISH_RSP` message completion.

413 Responder authentication key exchange example


414



415 The [Responder authentication multiple key exchange example](#) provides an example of multiple sessions using two independent sets of root session keys that coexist at the same time. The specification does not require a specific temporal relationship between the second `KEY_EXCHANGE` request message and the first `FINISH` response message. To simplify implementation, however a Responder may generate an `ErrorCode=Busy` response to the second `KEY_EXCHANGE` request message until the first `FINISH` response message is complete.

416 **Responder authentication multiple key exchange example**

417



418 The handshake includes an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DHE) key exchange in which the Requester and Responder each generate an ephemeral (that is, temporary) Diffie-Hellman key pair and exchange the public keys of those key pairs in the `ExchangeData` fields of the `KEY_EXCHANGE` request message and `KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP` response message. The Responder generates a DHE secret by using the private key of the DHE key pair of the Responder and the public key of the DHE key pair of the Requester provided in the `KEY_EXCHANGE` request message. Similarly, the Requester generates a DHE secret by using the private key of the DHE key pair of the Requester and the public key of the DHE key pair of the Responder provided in the `KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP` response message. The DHE secrets are computed as specified in clause 7.4 of [RFC 8446](#). Assuming that the public keys were received correctly, both the Requester and Responder generate identical DHE secrets from which session secrets are generated.

419 Diffie-Hellman group parameters are determined by the DHE group in use, which is selected in the most recent `ALGORITHMS` response. The contents of the `ExchangeData` field are computed as specified in clause 4.2.8 of [RFC 8446](#). Specifically, if the DHE key exchange is based on finite-fields (FFDHE), the `ExchangeData` field in `KEY_EXCHANGE` and `KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP` shall contain the computed public value ($Y = g^X \text{ mod } p$) for the specified group (see [DHE structure](#) for group definitions) encoded as a big-endian integer and padded to the left with zeros to the size of p in bytes. If the key exchange is based on elliptic curves (ECDHE), the `ExchangeData` field in `KEY_EXCHANGE` and `KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP` shall contain the serialization of X and Y , which are the binary representations of the x and y values

respectively in network byte order, padded on the left by zeros if necessary. The size of each number representation occupies as many octets as implied by the curve parameters selected. Specifically, X is [0: C - 1] and Y is [C : D - 1], where C and D are determined by the [group](#).

420 A Requester should generate a fresh DHE key pair for each `KEY_EXCHANGE` request message that the Requester sends. A Responder should generate a fresh DHE key pair for each `KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP` response message that the Responder sends.

421 **KEY_EXCHANGE request message format**

Offset	Field	Size in bytes	Value
0	<code>SPDMVersion</code>	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	<code>RequestResponseCode</code>	1	0xE4 = KEY_EXCHANGE
2	<code>Param1</code>	1	Requested <code>MeasurementSummaryHash</code> type: 0x0 . No measurement summary hash. 0x1 . TCB measurement hash. 0xFF . All measurements hash. All other values reserved. When Responder does not support any measurements, Requester shall set this value to 0x0 .
3	<code>Param2</code>	1	The slot number of the target certificate chain that the Responder will use for authentication. The value in this field shall be between 0 and 7 inclusive to identify a valid certificate slot. It shall be 0xFF if the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester previously.
4	<code>ReqSessionID</code>	2	Two-byte Requester contribution to allow construction of a unique four-byte session ID between a Requester-Responder pair. The final session ID = Concatenate (ReqSessionID, RspSessionID).
6	<code>Reserved</code>	2	Reserved
8	<code>RandomData</code>	32	Requester-provided random data.
40	<code>ExchangeData</code>	D	DHE public information generated by the Requester. If the DHE group selected in the most recent <code>ALGORITHMS</code> response is finite-field-based (FFDHE), the <code>ExchangeData</code> represents the computed public value. If the selected DHE group is elliptic curve-based (ECDHE), the <code>ExchangeData</code> represents the X and Y values in network byte order. Specifically, X is [0: C - 1] and Y is [C : D - 1]. In both cases the size of D (and C for ECDHE) is derived from the selected DHE group.

Offset	Field	Size in bytes	Value
40 + D	OpaqueDataLength	2	Size of the <code>OpaqueData</code> field that follows in bytes. Shall be 0 if no <code>OpaqueData</code> is provided.
42 + D	OpaqueData	OpaqueDataLength	If present, <code>OpaqueData</code> sent by the Requester. Used to indicate any parameters that Requester wishes to pass to the Responder as part of key exchange.

422 Successful KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP response message format

Offset	Field	Size in bytes	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x64 = KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP
2	Param1	1	HeartbeatPeriod The value of this field shall be zero if Heartbeat is not supported. Otherwise, the value shall be in units of seconds.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	RspSessionID	2	Two-byte Responder contribution to allow construction of a unique four-byte session ID between a Requester-Responder pair. The final session ID = Concatenate (ReqSessionID, RspSessionID).
6	MutAuthRequested	1	<p>Bit 0 - If set, the Responder is requesting to authenticate the Requester (mutual authentication). No encapsulated request flow is required.</p> <p>Bit 1 - If set, Responder is requesting mutual authentication with the encapsulated request flow.</p> <p>Bit 2 - If set, Responder is requesting mutual authentication with an implicit GET_DIGESTS request. The Responder and Requester shall follow the optimized encapsulated request flow.</p> <p>Bit [7:3] - Reserved.</p> <p>Bit 1 and Bit 2 shall only be set if Bit 0 is set. Bit 1 and Bit 2 shall not be set at the same time.</p> <p>For details on the encapsulated request flow or the optimized encapsulated request flow, see the GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request and ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response messages clause.</p>

Offset	Field	Size in bytes	Value
7	SlotIDParam	1	<p>Bit[7:4] = Reserved.</p> <p>Bit[3:0] = SlotID. The slot number of the certificate chain of the Requester to be used for mutual authentication. The value in this field shall be between 0 and 7 inclusive, or 0xF if the public key of the Requester was provisioned to the Responder through other means. All other values Reserved. If MutAuthRequested = 0x00 this field shall be set to 0 and ignored by the Requester.</p>
8	RandomData	32	Responder-provided random data.
40	ExchangeData	D	DHE public information generated by the Requester. If the DHE group selected in the most recent ALGORITHMS response is finite-field-based (FFDHE), the ExchangeData represents the computed public value. If the selected DHE group is elliptic curve-based (ECDHE), the ExchangeData represents the X and Y values in network byte order. Specifically, X is [0: C - 1] and Y is [C : D - 1]. In both cases the size of D (and C for ECDHE) is derived from the selected DHE group.
40 + D	MeasurementSummaryHash	H	<p>When the Responder does not support measurement or requested Param1 = 0, this field shall be absent.</p> <p>When the requested Param1 = 1, this field shall be the combined hash of Measurements of all measurable components considered to be in the TCB required to generate this response, computed as hash(Concatenation(MeasurementBlock[0].Measurement, MeasurementBlock[1].Measurement, ...)) where MeasurementBlock[x].Measurement is a measurement in TCB.</p> <p>When the requested Param1 = 1 and there are no measurable components in the TCB required to generate this response, this field shall be 0.</p> <p>When requested Param1=0xFF, this field is computed as the hash(Concatenation(MeasurementBlock[0].Measurement, MeasurementBlock[1].Measurement, ..., MeasurementBlock[n].Measurement)) of all supported measurements.</p>
40 + D + H	OpaqueDataLength	2	Size of the OpaqueData field that follows in bytes. Shall be 0 if no OpaqueData is provided.
42 + D + H	OpaqueData	OpaqueDataLength	If present, OpaqueData sent by the Responder. Used to indicate any parameters that the Responder wishes to pass to the Requester as part of key exchange.
42 + D + H + OpaqueDataLength	Signature	S	Signature over the transcript hash. S is the size of the asymmetric signing algorithm output the Responder selected via the last ALGORITHMS response message to the Requester. The construction of the transcript hash is defined in Transcript Hash for KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP signature .

Offset	Field	Size in bytes	Value
42 + D + H + OpaqueDataLength + S	ResponderVerifyData	H	<p>Conditional field.</p> <p>If the Session Handshake Phase is encrypted and/or message authenticated, then this field shall be of length H and it shall equal the HMAC of the transcript hash, using <code>finished_key</code> as the secret key and using the negotiated hash algorithm as the hash function. The transcript hash shall be the Transcript Hash for KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP HMAC. The <code>finished_key</code> shall be derived from the Response Direction Handshake Secret and is described in the finished_key derivation clause. HMAC is described in RFC 2104.</p> <p>If both the Requester and Responder set <code>HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP</code> to 1, then this field shall be absent.</p>

423 10.16.1 Mutual authentication

424 To perform authentication of the Requester in the `KEY_EXCHANGE` flow, either the encapsulated request flow or the optimized encapsulated request flow shall be used. For details and illustration of this flow, see [GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request and ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response messages](#).

425 The only messages that shall be encapsulated in this case are `GET_DIGESTS`, `DIGESTS`, `GET_CERTIFICATE`, and `CERTIFICATE`.

426 10.16.2 Specifying Requester certificate for mutual authentication

427 The SPDM key exchange protocol is optimized to perform key exchange with the least number of messages exchanged. When Responder-only authentication, or mutual authentication where the Responder has obtained the certificate chains of the Requester in a previous interaction is performed, key exchange is carried out with two request/response message pairs (`KEY_EXCHANGE`, `KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP`, `FINISH` and `FINISH_RSP`). In other cases where mutual authentication is desired, additional [encapsulated messages](#) are exchanged between `KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP` and `FINISH` to enable the Responder to obtain the certificate chains and certificate chain digests of the Requester. However, in all cases the certificate chain (or raw public key) the Requester should authenticate against is specified by the Responder via the `SlotID` field in `KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP`, which precedes the aforementioned encapsulated messages. This means that a Responder authenticating a Requester whose certificates it has not obtained in a previous interaction, using a slot other than the default (slot 0), has no way of knowing in advance which `SlotID` value to use.

428 To address this case, the Responder explicitly designates the certificate chain to be used via the final `ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK` request issued inside the encapsulated request flow. Specifically, if either Bit 1 or 2 in `MutAuthRequested` is set to 1 and `SlotID` is set to 0, the Responder shall use a `ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK` request with `Param2 = 0x02` and an 1-byte long `Encapsulated Request` field containing the `SlotID` value. This shall

be interpreted by the Requester as a valid request indicating the slot number to be used, and the `SlotID` field in `KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP` shall be ignored.

429 If Bit 0 of `MutAuthRequested` is set and Bits 1 and 2 are cleared, then no encapsulated messages are exchanged after `KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP` and the certificate chain of the Requester is determined by the value of `SlotID`.

430 10.17 FINISH request and FINISH_RSP response messages

431 This request message shall complete the handshake between Requester and Responder initiated by a `KEY_EXCHANGE` request. The purpose of the `FINISH` request and `FINISH_RSP` response messages is to provide key confirmation, bind the identify of each party to the exchanged keys and protect the entire handshake against manipulation by an active attacker. The [FINISH request message format](#) table shows the `FINISH` request message format and the [Successful FINISH_RSP response message format](#) table shows the `FINISH_RSP` response message format.

432 FINISH request message format

Offset	Field	Size in bytes	Value
0	<code>SPDMVersion</code>	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	<code>RequestResponseCode</code>	1	0xE5 = FINISH
2	<code>Param1</code>	1	Bit 0 – If set, the Signature field is included. This bit shall be set when mutual authentication occurs. All other bits reserved.
3	<code>Param2</code>	1	Slot ID. Only valid if <code>Param1</code> = 0x01, otherwise reserved. Slot number of the target Certificate Chain being authenticated in signature field. The value in this field shall be between 0 and 7 inclusive. It shall be 0xFF if the public key of the Responder was provisioned to the Requester previously.
4	<code>Signature</code>	S	Signature over the transcript hash. S is the size of the asymmetric signing algorithm output the Responder selected via the last <code>ALGORITHMS</code> response message to the Requester. S is zero and field not present if <code>Param1</code> = 0x00. The construction of the transcript hash is defined in Transcript Hash for FINISH signature, mutual authentication .
4+S	<code>RequesterVerifyData</code>	H	This field shall be an HMAC of the transcript hash using the <code>finished_key</code> as the secret key and using the negotiated hash algorithm as the hash function. For mutual authentication, the transcript hash shall be the Transcript Hash for FINISH HMAC, mutual authentication . Otherwise, it shall be the Transcript Hash for FINISH HMAC, Responder-only authentication . The <code>finished_key</code> shall be derived from Request Direction Handshake Secret and is described in the finished_key derivation clauses. HMAC is described in RFC 2104 .

433 Successful FINISH_RSP response message format

Offset	Field	Size in bytes	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x65 = FINISH_RSP
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	ResponderVerifyData	H	<p>Conditional field.</p> <p>If the Session Handshake Phase is encrypted and/or message authenticated (i.e., if either the Requester or the Responder set <code>HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP</code> to 0), this field shall be absent.</p> <p>If both the Requester and Responder support <code>HANDSHAKE_IN_THE_CLEAR_CAP</code> field, this field shall be of length H and it shall equal the HMAC of the transcript hash using <code>finished_key</code> as the secret key and using the negotiated hash algorithm as the hash function. For mutual authentication, the transcript shall be the Transcript Hash for FINISH_RSP HMAC, mutual authentication. Otherwise, the transcript hash shall be the Transcript Hash for FINISH_RSP HMAC, Responder Only authentication. The <code>finished_key</code> shall be derived from Response Direction Handshake Secret and is described in the finished_key derivation clause. HMAC is described in RFC 2104.</p>

434 10.17.1 Transcript hash calculation rules

435 The transcript hash is calculated by hashing the concatenation of the prescribed full messages or message fields in order.

436 The notation `[${message_name}].${field_name}` is used, where:

- `${message_name}` is the name of the request or response message.
- `${field_name}` is the name of the field in the request or response message. The asterisk (`*`) means all fields in that message, except from any conditional fields that are empty (for example `KEY_EXCHANGE.OpaqueData`).

437 Transcript hash for `KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP` signature

1. `[GET_VERSION].*` (if issued)
2. `[VERSION].*` (if issued)
3. `[GET_CAPABILITIES].*` (if issued)
4. `[CAPABILITIES].*` (if issued)
5. `[NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS].*` (if issued)
6. `[ALGORITHMS].*` (if issued)
7. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (i.e., `KEY_EXCHANGE.Param2`)
8. `[KEY_EXCHANGE].*`
9. `[KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP].*` except the ``Signature`` and ``ResponderVerifyData`` fields.

438 Transcript hash for KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP HMAC

1. [GET_VERSION].* (if issued)
2. [VERSION].* (if issued)
3. [GET_CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
4. [CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
5. [NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
6. [ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
7. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (i.e., KEY_EXCHANGE Param2)
8. [KEY_EXCHANGE].*
9. [KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP].* except the `ResponderVerifyData` field.

439 Transcript hash for FINISH signature, mutual authentication

1. [GET_VERSION].* (if issued)
2. [VERSION].* (if issued)
3. [GET_CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
4. [CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
5. [NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
6. [ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
7. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (i.e., KEY_EXCHANGE Param2)
8. [KEY_EXCHANGE].*
9. [KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP].*
10. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (i.e., FINISH Param2)
11. [FINISH].SPDM Header Fields

440 Transcript hash for FINISH HMAC, Responder-only authentication

1. [GET_VERSION].* (if issued)
2. [VERSION].* (if issued)
3. [GET_CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
4. [CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
5. [NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
6. [ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
7. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (i.e., KEY_EXCHANGE's request Param2)
8. [KEY_EXCHANGE].*
9. [KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP].*
10. [FINISH].SPDM Header Fields

441 Transcript hash for FINISH HMAC, mutual authentication

1. [GET_VERSION].* (if issued)
2. [VERSION].* (if issued)

3. [GET_CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
4. [CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
5. [NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
6. [ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
7. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (i.e., KEY_EXCHANGE's request Param2)
8. [KEY_EXCHANGE].*
9. [KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP].*
10. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (i.e., FINISH's Param2).
11. [FINISH].SPDM Header Fields
12. [FINISH].Signature

442 Transcript hash for FINISH_RSP HMAC, Responder-only authentication

1. [GET_VERSION].* (if issued)
2. [VERSION].* (if issued)
3. [GET_CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
4. [CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
5. [NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
6. [ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
7. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (i.e., KEY_EXCHANGE's request Param2)
8. [KEY_EXCHANGE].*
9. [KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP].*
10. [FINISH].*
11. [FINISH_RSP].SPDM Header fields

443 Transcript hash for FINISH_RSP HMAC, mutual authentication

1. [GET_VERSION].* (if issued)
2. [VERSION].* (if issued)
3. [GET_CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
4. [CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
5. [NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
6. [ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
7. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (i.e., KEY_EXCHANGE's request Param2)
8. [KEY_EXCHANGE].*
9. [KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP].*
10. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (i.e., FINISH's Param2).
11. [FINISH].*
12. [FINISH_RSP].SPDM Header fields

444 When multiple session keys are being established between the same Requester and Responder pair, Signature over Transcript HASH during FINISH request is computed using only the corresponding KEY_EXCHANGE, KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP and FINISH request parameters.

445 **10.18 PSK_EXCHANGE request and PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP response messages**

446 The Pre-Shared Key (PSK) key exchange scheme provides an option for a Requester and a Responder to perform mutual authentication and session key establishment with symmetric-key cryptography. This option is especially useful for endpoints that do not support asymmetric-key cryptography or certificate processing. This option can also be leveraged to expedite the session key establishment, even if asymmetric-key cryptography is supported.

447 This option requires the Requester and the Responder to have prior knowledge of a common PSK before the handshake. Essentially, the PSK serves as a mutual authentication credential and the base of the session key establishment. As such, only the two endpoints and potentially a trusted third party that provisions the PSK to the two endpoints may know the value of the PSK.

448 A Requester may be paired with multiple Responders. Likewise, a Responder may be paired with multiple Requesters. A pair of Requester and Responder may be provisioned with one or more PSKs. An endpoint may act as a Requester to one device and simultaneously a Responder to another device. It is the responsibility of the transport layer to identify the peer and establish communication between the two endpoints, before the PSK-based session key exchange starts.

449 The PSK may be provisioned in a trusted environment, for example, during the secure manufacturing process. In an untrusted environment, the PSK may be agreed upon between the two endpoints using a secure protocol. The mechanism for PSK provisioning is out of scope of this specification. The size of the provisioned PSK is determined by the requirement of security strength of the application, but should be at least 128 bits and recommended to be 256 bits or larger, to resist dictionary attacks especially when the Requester and Responder cannot both contribute sufficient entropy during the exchange. During PSK provisioning, the capabilities of an endpoint and supported algorithms may be communicated to the peer. Therefore, SPDM commands `GET_CAPABILITIES` and `NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS` are not required during session key establishment with the PSK option.


450 Two message pairs are defined for this option: `PSK_EXCHANGE / PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP` and `PSK_FINISH / PSK_FINISH_RSP`.

451 The `PSK_EXCHANGE` message carries three responsibilities:

1. Prompts the Responder to retrieve the specific PSK.
2. Exchanges contexts between the Requester and the Responder.
3. Proves to the Requester that the Responder knows the correct PSK and has derived the correct session keys.

452 **PSK_EXCHANGE: Example**

453



454 **PSK_EXCHANGE request message format**

Offsets	Field	Size in bytes	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xE6 = PSK_EXCHANGE

Offsets	Field	Size in bytes	Value
2	Param1	1	Requested measurement summary hash Type: 0x0 . No measurement summary hash. 0x1 . TCB measurement hash. 0xFF . All measurements hash. All other values reserved. When Responder does not support any measurements, Requester shall set this value to 0x0 .
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	ReqSessionID	2	Two-byte Requester contribution to allow construction of a unique four-byte session ID between a Requester-Responder pair. The final session ID = Concatenate (ReqSessionID, RspSessionID).
6	P	2	Length of PSKHint in bytes.
8	R	2	Length of RequesterContext in bytes. R shall be equal to or greater than H, where H is the size of the underlying MAC used in the context of the Requester.
10	OpaqueDataLength	2	Length of OpaqueData in bytes.
12	PSKHint	P	Information required by the Responder to retrieve the PSK. Optional.
12 + P	RequesterContext	R	The context of the Requester. Should include a nonce (random number or monotonic counter) and optionally the information belonging to the Requester.
12 + P + R	OpaqueData	OpaqueDataLength	Optional. If present, the OpaqueData sent by the Requester is used to indicate any parameters that Requester wishes to pass to the Responder as part of PSK-based key exchange.

455 The field PSKHint is optional (absent if P is set to 0). It is introduced to address two scenarios:

- The Responder is provisioned with multiple PSKs and stores them in secure storage. The Requester uses PSKHint as an identifier to specify which PSK will be used in this session.
- The Responder does not store the value of the PSK, but can derive the PSK using PSKHint. For example, if the Responder has an immutable UDS (Unique Device Secret) in fuses, then during provisioning, a PSK may be derived from the UDS or its derivative and a non-secret salt known by the Requester. During session key establishment, the same salt is sent to the Responder in PSKHint of PSK_EXCHANGE. This mechanism allows the Responder to support any number of PSKs, without consuming secure storage.

456 The RequesterContext is the contribution of the Requester to session key derivation. It shall contain a nonce (random number or monotonic counter) to make sure that the derived session keys are ephemeral to mitigate against replay attacks. It may also contain other information from the Requester.

457 Upon receiving PSK_EXCHANGE request, the Responder:

1. Generates PSK from PSKHint, if necessary.
2. Generates ResponderContext, if supported.
3. Derives the finished_key of the Responder by following [Key Schedule](#).
4. Constructs PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP response message and sends to the Requester.

458 **PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP response message format**

Offsets	Field	Size in bytes	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x66 = PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP
2	Param1	1	HeartbeatPeriod The value of this field shall be zero if Heartbeat is not supported. Otherwise, the value shall be in units of seconds.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	RspSessionID	2	Two-byte Responder contribution to allow construction of a unique four-byte session ID between a Requester-Responder pair. The final session ID = Concatenate (ReqSessionID, RspSessionID).
6	Reserved	2	Reserved.
8	Q	2	Length of ResponderContext in bytes.
10	OpaqueDataLength	2	Length of OpaqueData in bytes.
12	MeasurementSummaryHash	H	<p>When the Responder does not support measurement or requested param1 = 0, the field shall be absent.</p> <p>When the requested param1 = 1, this field shall be the combined hash of Measurements of all measurable components considered to be in the TCB required to generate this response, computed as hash(Concatenation(MeasurementBlock[0].Measurement, MeasurementBlock[1].Measurement, ...)) where MeasurementBlock[x].Measurement is a measurement in TCB.</p> <p>When the requested param1 = 1 and there are no measurable components in the TCB required to generate this response, this field shall be 0.</p> <p>When requested param1=0xFF, this field is computed as the hash(Concatenation(MeasurementBlock[0].Measurement, MeasurementBlock[1].Measurement, ..., MeasurementBlock[n].Measurement)) of all supported measurements.</p>

Offsets	Field	Size in bytes	Value
12 + H	ResponderContext	Q	Context of the Responder. Optional. If present, shall include a nonce and/or information belonging to the Responder.
12 + H + Q	OpaqueData	OpaqueDataLength	Optional. If present, the OpaqueData sent by the Responder is used to indicate any parameters that Responder wishes to pass to the Requester as part of PSK-based key exchange.
12 + H + Q + OpaqueDataLength	ResponderVerifyData	H	Data to be verified by the Requester using the <code>finished_key</code> of the Responder.

459 The ResponderContext is the contribution of the Responder to session key derivation. It should contain a nonce (random number or monotonic counter) and other information of the Responder. Because the Responder may be a constrained device that is not able to generate a nonce, ResponderContext is optional. However, the Responder is required to use ResponderContext if it can generate a nonce.

460 It should be noted that the nonce in ResponderContext is critical for anti-replay. If a nonce is not present in ResponderContext, then the Responder is not challenging the Requester for real-time knowledge of PSK. Such a session is subject to replay attacks - a man-in-the-middle attacker could record and replay prior PSK_EXCHANGE and PSK_FINISH messages and set up a session with the Responder. But the bogus session would not leak secrets, so long as the PSK or session keys of the prior replayed session are not compromised.

461 If ResponderContext is absent, such as when `PSK_CAP` in the `CAPABILITIES` of the Responder is `01b`, the Requester shall not send `PSK_FINISH`, because the session keys are solely determined by the Requester and the Session immediately enters the Application Phase. If and only the ResponderContext is present in the response, such as when `PSK_CAP` in the `CAPABILITIES` of the Responder is `10b`, the Requester shall send `PSK_FINISH` with `RequesterVerifyData` to prove that it has derived correct session keys.

462 To calculate ResponderVerifyData, the Responder calculates a MAC. The MAC key is the `finished_key` of the Responder. The data is the hash of the concatenation of all messages sent so far between the Requester and the Responder:

1. [GET_VERSION].* (if issued)
2. [VERSION].* (if issued)
3. [GET_CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
4. [CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
5. [NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
6. [ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
7. [PSK_EXCHANGE].*
8. [PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP].* except the ResponderVerifyData field

463 Upon receiving PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP, the Requester:

1. Derives the `finished_key` of the Responder by following [Key Schedule](#).

2. Verify ResponderVerifyData by calculating the MAC in the same manner as the Responder. If verification fails, the Requester aborts the session.
3. If the Responder contributes to session key derivation, such as when `PSK_CAP` in the `CAPABILITIES` of the Responder is `10b`, construct `PSK_FINISH` request and send to the Responder.

464 10.19 PSK_FINISH request and PSK_FINISH_RSP response messages

465 The PSK_FINISH request proves to the Responder that the Requester knows the PSK and has derived the correct session keys. This is achieved by a MAC value calculated with the `finished_key` of the Responder and messages of this session. The Requester is required to send the PSK_FINISH only if ResponderContext is present in PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP. Otherwise, PSK_FINISH is optional.

466 PSK_FINISH request message format

Offsets	Field	Size in bytes	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	<code>RequestResponseCode</code>	1	0xE7 = PSK_FINISH
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	RequesterVerifyData	H	Data to be verified by the Responder by using the <code>finished_key</code> of the Requester.

467 To calculate RequesterVerifyData, the Requester calculates a MAC. The key is the `finished_key` of the Requester, as described in [Key Schedule](#). The data is the hash of the concatenation of all messages sent so far between the Requester and the Responder:

1. [GET_VERSION].* (if issued)
2. [VERSION].* (if issued)
3. [GET_CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
4. [CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
5. [NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
6. [ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
7. [PSK_EXCHANGE].*
8. [PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP].*
9. [PSK_FINISH].* except the RequesterVerifyData field

468 Upon receiving PSK_FINISH request, the Responder derives the `finished_key` of the Requester and calculates the MAC independently in the same manner and verifies the result matches RequesterVerifyData. If verified, the Responder constructs PSK_FINISH_RSP response and sends to the Requester. Otherwise, the Responder sends ERROR response with error code `InvalidRequest` to the Requester.

469 **Successful PSK_FINISH_RSP response message format**

Offsets	Field	Size in bytes	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x67 = PSK_FINISH_RSP
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

470 **10.20 HEARTBEAT request and HEARTBEAT_ACK response messages**

471 This request shall keep a session alive if HEARTBEAT is supported by both the Requester and Responder. The HEARTBEAT request shall be sent periodically as indicated in HeartbeatPeriod in either KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP or PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP response messages. The Responder shall terminate the session if session traffic is not received in twice HeartbeatPeriod. Likewise, the Requester shall terminate the session if session traffic, including ERROR response, is not received in twice HeartbeatPeriod. Session traffic includes encrypted data at the transport layer. How SPDM is informed of encrypted data at the transport layer is outside of the scope of this specification. If an Error with ErrorCode=InvalidSessionID Response is received, the Requester shall terminate the session. The Requester may retry HEARTBEAT requests. The Requester shall wait ST1 time for the response before retrying.

472 The timer for the Heartbeat period shall start at the transmission, for Responders, or reception, for Requester, of either the FINISH_RSP or PSK_FINISH_RSP response messages. When determining the value of HeartbeatPeriod, the Responder should ensure this value is sufficiently greater than RTT.

473 For further details of session termination, see [Session termination phase](#).

474 The [HEARTBEAT request message format](#) describes the message format.

475 **HEARTBEAT request message format**

Offsets	Field	Size in bytes	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xE8 = HEARTBEAT Request
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

476 The [HEARTBEAT_ACK response message format](#) describes the format for the Heartbeat Response.

477 **HEARTBEAT_ACK response message format**

Offsets	Field	Size in bytes	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x68 = HEARTBEAT_ACK Response
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

478 **10.20.1 Heartbeat additional information**

479 The transport layer may allow the HEARTBEAT request to be sent from the Responder to the Requester. This is recommended for transports capable of asynchronous bidirectional communication.

480 **10.21 KEY_UPDATE request and KEY_UPDATE_ACK response messages**

481 To update session keys, this request shall be used. There are many reasons for doing this but an important one is when the per-record nonce will soon reach its maximum value and rollover. The KEY_UPDATE request can be issued by the Responder as well using the GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST mechanism. A KEY_UPDATE request shall update session keys in the direction of the request only. Because the Responder can also send this request, it is possible that two simultaneous key updates, one for each direction, can occur. However, only one KEY_UPDATE request for a single direction shall occur. Until the session key update synchronization successfully completes, subsequent KEY_UPDATE request for the same direction shall be considered a retry of the original KEY_UPDATE request.

482 **KEY_UPDATE request message format**

Offsets	Field	Size in bytes	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xE9 = KEY_UPDATE Request
2	Param1	1	Key Operation. See KEY_UPDATE Operations Table .
3	Param2	1	Tag. This field shall contain a unique number to aid the responder in differentiating between the original and retry request. A retry request shall contain the same tag number as the original.

483 **KEY_UPDATE_ACK response message format**

Offsets	Field	Size in bytes	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x69 = KEY_UPDATE_ACK Response
2	Param1	1	Key Operation. This field shall reflect the Key Operation field of the request.
3	Param2	1	Tag. This field shall reflect the Tag number in the KEY_UPDATE request.

484 **KEY_UPDATE operations**

Value	Operation	Description
0	Reserved	Reserved
1	UpdateKey	Update the single-direction key.
2	UpdateAllKeys	Update keys for both directions.
3	VerifyNewKey	Ensure the key update is successful and the old keys can be safely discarded.
4 - 255	Reserved	Reserved

485 **10.21.1 Session key update synchronization**

486 For clarity, in the key update process, the term, sender, means the SPDM endpoint that issued the [KEY_UPDATE](#) request and the term, receiver, means the SPDM endpoint that received the [KEY_UPDATE](#) request. To ensure the key update process is seamless while still allowing the transmission and reception of records, both sender and receiver shall follow the prescribed method described in this clause.

487 The data transport layer shall ensure that data transfer during key updates is managed in such a way that the correct keys are used before, during, and after the key update operation. How this is accomplished by the data transport layer is outside of the scope of this specification.

488 Both the sender and the receiver shall derive the new keys as detailed in [Major secrets update](#).


489 The sender shall not use the new transmit key until after reception of the [KEY_UPDATE_ACK](#) response.

490 The sender and receiver shall use the new key on the [KEY_UPDATE](#) request with [VerifyNewKey](#) command and all subsequent commands until another key update is performed.

491 In the case of [KEY_UPDATE](#) request with [UpdateAllKeys](#), the receiver shall use the new transmit key for the [KEY_UPDATE_ACK](#) response. The [KEY_UPDATE](#) request with [UpdateAllKeys](#) should only be used with physical transports that are single master to ensure that simultaneous [UpdateAllKeys](#) requests do not occur.

- 492 If the sender has not received `KEY_UPDATE_ACK`, the sender may retry or end the session. The sender shall not proceed to the next step until successfully receiving the corresponding `KEY_UPDATE_ACK`.
- 493 Upon the successful reception of the `KEY_UPDATE_ACK`, the sender shall transmit a `KEY_UPDATE` request with `VerifyNewKey` operation using the new session keys. The sender may retry until the corresponding `KEY_UPDATE_ACK` response is received. However, the sender shall be prohibited, at this point, from restarting this process or going back to a previous step. Its only recourse in error handling is either to retry the same request or to terminate the session. Upon successful reception of the `KEY_UPDATE` with `VerifyNewKey` operation, the receiver can now discard the old session keys. After the sender successfully receives the corresponding `KEY_UPDATE_ACK`, the transport layer may start using the new keys.
- 494 In certain scenarios, the receiver may need additional time to process the `KEY_UPDATE` request such as processing data already in its buffer. Thus, the receiver may reply with an `ERROR` message with `ErrorCode=Busy`. The sender should retry the request after a reasonable period of time with a reasonable amount of retries to prevent premature session termination.
- 495 Finally, it bears repeating that a key update in one direction can happen simultaneously with a key update in the opposite direction. Still, the aforementioned synchronization process occurs independently but simultaneously for each direction.
- 496 The [KEY_UPDATE protocol example flow](#) figure illustrates a typical key update initiated by the Requester to update its secret. In this example, the Responder and Requester are both capable of message authentication and encryption.
- 497 **KEY_UPDATE protocol example flow**


498



499 The [KEY_UPDATE protocol change all keys example flow](#) illustrates a typical key update initiated by the Requester to update all secrets. In this example, the Responder and Requester are both capable of message authentication and encryption.

500 **KEY_UPDATE protocol change all keys example flow**

501



502 **10.21.2 KEY_UPDATE transport allowances**


503 On some transports, bidirectional communication can occur asynchronously. On such transports, the transport may allow or disallow the KEY_UPDATE to be sent asynchronously without using the GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST

mechanism. The actual method to use should be defined by the transport and is outside the scope of this specification.

504 The [KEY_UPDATE protocol example flow 2](#) illustrates a key update over a physical transport that has a limitation whereby only a single device (often called the master) is allowed to initiate all transactions on that bus. This physical transport specifies that a Responder shall alert the Requester via a sideband mechanism and to utilize the `GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST` mechanism to fulfill SPDM-related requirements. Also, in this same example, the Requester and Responder are both capable of encryption and message authentication.

505 **KEY_UPDATE protocol example flow 2**

506



507 **10.22 GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request and ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response messages**

508 In certain use cases, such as mutual authentication, the Responder needs the ability to issue its own SPDM request messages to the Requester. Certain transports prohibit the Responder from asynchronously sending out data on that transport. Cases like these are addressed through message encapsulation, which preserves the roles of Requester and Responder as far as the transport is concerned, but enables the Responder to issue its own requests to the Requester. Message encapsulation is only allowed in certain scenarios. The [Mutual authentication key exchange](#) figure and [Optimized mutual authentication key exchange example](#) figure are examples that illustrate the use of this scheme.

509 A Requester issues a `GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST` request message to retrieve an encapsulated SPDM request message from the Responder. The response to this message (`ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST`) encapsulates the SPDM request message as if the Responder was acting as a Requester. The request message format is described in [GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request format table](#). The Responder shall use the same SPDM version the Requester used.

510 **10.22.1 Encapsulated request flow**

511 The encapsulated request flow starts with the Requester sending a `GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST` message and ends with an `ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK` that carries no more encapsulated requests. The `GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST` shall only be issued once with the exception of retries. This is also illustrated in [Mutual authentication key exchange](#).

512 When the Requester issues a `GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST`, the encapsulated request flow shall start. Upon the successful reception of the `ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST` and when the encapsulated response is ready, the Requester shall continue the flow by issuing the `DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE`. During this period, with the exception of `GET_VERSION`, `RESPOND_IF_READY` and `DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE`, the Requester shall not issue any other message. If a Responder receives a request other than `DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE`, `RESPOND_IF_READY` or `GET_VERSION`, the Responder shall respond with `ErrorCode=RequestInFlight`.

513 **10.22.2 Optimized encapsulated request flow**


514 The optimized encapsulated request flow is similar to the encapsulated request flow but without the need of `GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST`. This is because the encapsulated request accompanies one of the `Session-Secrets-Exchange` responses; thereby, removing the necessity on the Requester from issuing a `GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST`. When the Responder includes an encapsulated requests with a `Session-Secrets-Exchange` response, the optimized encapsulated request flow shall start. This is also illustrated in [Optimized mutual authentication key exchange](#).

515 When the Requester successfully receives a `Session-Secrets-Exchange` response with an included encapsulated request, the Requester shall send a `DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE` after processing the encapsulated request. The Requester shall not issue any other requests except for `DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE`, `RESPOND_IF_READY` and

GET_VERSION . If a Responder receives a request other than DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE , RESPOND_IF_READY , GET_VERSION or Session-Secrets-Exchange, then the Responder shall respond with ErrorCode=RequestInFlight .


516 Mutual authentication key exchange example

517



518 **Optimized mutual authentication key exchange example**

519



520 **GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST request message format**

Offsets	Field	Size in bytes	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xEA = GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

521 The `ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST` response message format describes the format this response.

522 **ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST response message format**

Offsets	Field	Size in bytes	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x6A = ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST Response
2	Param1	1	Request ID. This field should be unique to help the Responder match response to request.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.
4	Encapsulated Request	Variable	SPDM Request Message. The value of this field shall represent a valid SPDM request message. The length of this field is dependent on the SPDM Request message. The field shall start with the <code>SPDMVersion</code> field. The <code>SPDMVersion</code> field of the <code>Encapsulated Request</code> shall be the same as <code>SPDMVersion</code> of the <code>ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST</code> response. Both <code>GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST</code> and <code>DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE</code> shall be invalid requests and the Requester shall respond with <code>ErrorCode=UnexpectedRequest</code> if these requests are encapsulated.

523 **10.22.3 Triggering `GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST`**

524 Once a session has been established, the Responder may wish to send a request asynchronously such as a `KEY_UPDATE` request but cannot due to the limitations of the physical bus or transport protocol. In such a scenario, the transport and/or physical layer is responsible for defining an alerting mechanism for the Requester. Upon receiving the alert, the Requester shall issue a `GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST` to the Responder.

525 **10.22.4 Additional constraints**

526 The `GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST` and `ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST` messages shall only be allowed to encapsulate certain

requests in certain scenarios. For details on these constraints, see the [Session, Basic mutual authentication, and KEY_UPDATE request and KEY_UPDATE_ACK response messages](#) clauses.

527 **10.23 DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE request and ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK response messages**

528 As a Requester processes an encapsulated request, it needs a mechanism to deliver back the corresponding response. That mechanism shall be the `DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE` and `ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK` messages. The `DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE`, which is an SPDM request, encapsulates the response and delivers it to the Responder. The `ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK`, which is an SPDM response, acknowledges the reception of the encapsulated response.

529 Furthermore, if there are additional requests from the Responder, the Responder shall provide the next request in the `ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK` response message.

530 In an encapsulated request flow and after the successful reception of the first encapsulated request, the Requester shall not send any other requests with the exception of `DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE`, `RESPOND_IF_READY` and `GET_VERSION`. After the successful reception of the first `DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE` and if a Responder receives a request other than `DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE`, `RESPOND_IF_READY` or `GET_VERSION`, the Responder shall respond with `ErrorCode=RequestInFlight`.

531 If `Param2` of `ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK` is set to `0x00` or `0x02` then this shall be the final encapsulated flow message that the Responder shall issue and the encapsulated flow shall be completed.

532 The timing parameters for the response shall depend on the encapsulated request. This enables the Responder to process the response before delivering the next request. See [Additional Information](#) for more details.

533 The request message format is described in `DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE` Request Message Format Table.

534 **DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE request message format**

Offsets	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xEB = DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE Request
2	Param1	1	Request ID. The Requester shall use the same <code>Request ID</code> as provided by the Responder in the corresponding <code>ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST</code> or <code>ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK</code> .
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

Offsets	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
4	Encapsulated Response	Variable	<p>SPDM Response Message.</p> <p>The value of this field shall represent a valid SPDM response message. The length of this field is dependent on the SPDM Response message. The field shall start with the <code>SPDMVersion</code> field. The <code>SPDMVersion</code> field of the <code>Encapsulated Response</code> shall be the same as <code>SPDMVersion</code> of the <code>DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE</code> request. Both <code>ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST</code> and <code>ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK</code> shall be invalid responses and the Responder shall respond with <code>ErrorCode=InvalidResponseCode</code> if these responses are encapsulated.</p>

535 The [ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK response message format](#) describes the response message format.

536 **ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK response message format**

Offsets	Field	Size (bytes)	Value
0	<code>SPDMVersion</code>	1	<code>V1.1 = 0x11</code>
1	<code>RequestResponseCode</code>	1	<code>0x6B = ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK</code>
2	<code>Param1</code>	1	<p>Request ID.</p> <p>If a request is encapsulated (<code>Param2 = 0x01</code>) this field should contain a unique, non-zero number to help the Responder match response to request. Otherwise, this field shall be <code>0x00</code> .</p>
3	<code>Param2</code>	1	<p>Payload Type.</p> <p>If set to <code>0x00</code> no request message is encapsulated and the <code>Encapsulated_Request</code> field is absent.</p> <p>If set to <code>0x01</code> the <code>Encapsulated_Request</code> field follows.</p> <p>If set to <code>0x02</code> a 1-byte <code>Encapsulated_Request</code> field follows containing the slot number corresponding to the certificate chain the Requester shall authenticate against.</p> <p>All other values Reserved.</p>
4	Encapsulated Request	Variable	<p>If <code>Param2 = 0x01</code> , the value of this field shall represent a valid SPDM request message. The length of this field is dependent on the SPDM Request message. The field shall start with the <code>SPDMVersion</code> field. The <code>SPDMVersion</code> field of the <code>Encapsulated Request</code> shall be the same as <code>SPDMVersion</code> of the <code>ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST</code> response. Both <code>GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST</code> and <code>DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE</code> shall be invalid requests and the Requester shall respond with <code>ErrorCode=UnexpectedRequest</code> if these requests are encapsulated.</p> <p>If <code>Param2 = 0x02</code> , the value of this field shall contain the slot number corresponding to the certificate chain the Requester shall authenticate against. The field size shall be 1 Byte.</p> <p>If <code>Param2 = 0x00</code> , this field shall be absent.</p>

537 10.23.1 Additional information

538 Using a unique request ID is highly recommended to aid the Responder in avoiding confusion between a retry and a new `DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE` message. For example, if the Responder sent the `ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK` with a new encapsulated request and that failed in transmission over the wire, the Requester would send a retry but that retry would still contain the response to the previous encapsulated request. Without a different request ID, the Responder might mistake the retried `DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE` for a new request when, in fact, it was a retry. This mistake may cause additional mistakes to occur.

539 In general, the response timing for `ENCAPSULATED_RESP_ACK` shall be subject to the same timing constraints as the encapsulated request. For example, if the encapsulated request was `CHALLENGE_AUTH`, the Responder, too, shall adhere to `CT` timing rules when it has a subsequent request. The Responder may return `ErrorCode=ResponseNotReady`.

540 The `DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE` and `ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE_ACK` messages shall only be allowed to encapsulate certain requests in certain scenarios. For details on these constraints, see [Session, Basic mutual authentication](#), and [KEY_UPDATE request and KEY_UPDATE_ACK response messages](#) clauses.

541 10.24 END_SESSION request and END_SESSION_ACK response messages

542 This request shall terminate a session. Further communication between the Requester and Responder using the same session ID shall be prohibited. The Responder shall return `ErrorCode=InvalidSession` after session termination. See [Session termination phase](#) clause for details.

543 The [END_SESSION request message format](#) table describes this format.

544 END_SESSION request message format

Offset	Value	Field	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0xEC = END_SESSION
2	Param1	1	See the End session request attributes table.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

545 End session request attributes

Offset	Value	Field	Description
0	0	Negotiated State Preservation Indicator	If the Responder supports Negotiated State caching (<code>CACHE_CAP=1</code>), the Responder shall preserve the Negotiated State.
0	1	Negotiated State Preservation Indicator	If the Responder supports Negotiated State caching, the Responder shall also clear the Negotiated State as part of session termination.
[7:1]	Reserved	Reserved	Reserved.


546 The [END_SESSION_ACK response message format](#) describes the response message.

547 **END_SESSION_ACK response message format**

Offset	Value	Field	Description
0	SPDMVersion	1	V1.1 = 0x11
1	RequestResponseCode	1	0x6C = END_SESSION_ACK
2	Param1	1	Reserved.
3	Param2	1	Reserved.

548 **END_SESSION protocol flow**

549




550 11 Session

551 Sessions enable a Requester and Responder to have multiple channels of communication. More importantly, it enables a Requester and Responder to build a secure communication channel with cryptographic information that is bound ephemerally. Specifically, an SPDM session provides either or both of encryption or message authentication.

552 There are three phases in a session, as [Session phases](#) shows: the handshake, the application, and termination.

553 Session phases



555 11.1 Session handshake phase

556 The session handshake phase begins with either `KEY_EXCHANGE` or `PSK_EXCHANGE`. This phase also allows for authentication of the Requester if the Responder indicated that earlier in `ALGORITHMS` response. Furthermore, this phase of the session uses the handshake secrets to secure the communication as described in the [Key Schedule](#).

557 The purpose of this phase is to build trust between the Responder and Requester, first, before either side can send application data. Additionally, it also ensures the integrity of the handshake and to a certain degree, synchronicity with the derived handshake secrets.

558 In this phase of the session, `GET_ENCAPSULATED_REQUEST` and `DELIVER_ENCAPSULATED_RESPONSE` shall be used to obtain requests from the Responder to complete the authentication of the Requester, if the Responder indicated this in `ALGORITHMS` message. The only requests allowed to be encapsulated shall be `GET_DIGESTS` and `GET_CERTIFICATE`. The Requester shall provide a signature in the `FINISH` request, as the [FINISH request and FINISH_RSP response messages](#) clause describes.

559 If an error occurs in this phase with `ErrorCode = DecryptError`, the session shall immediately terminate and proceed to session termination.

560 A successful handshake ends with either `FINISH_RSP` or `PSK_FINISH_RSP` and the application phase begins.

561 11.2 Application phase

562 Once the handshake completes and all validation passes, the session reaches the application phase where either the Responder and Requester may send application data.

563 The application phase ends when either the `HEARTBEAT` requirements fail, `END_SESSION` or an `ERROR` message with `ErrorCode = DecryptError`. The next phase is the session termination phase.

564 11.3 Session termination phase

565 This phase signals the end of the Application phase and the enactment of internal clean-up procedures by the endpoints. Requesters and Responders may have various reasons for terminating a session, outside the scope of this specification.

566 SPDM provides the `END_SESSION / END_SESSION_ACK` message pair to explicitly trigger the session termination phase if needed, but depending on the transport it may simply be an internal phase with no explicit SPDM messages sent or received.

567 When a session terminates, both Requester and Responder shall destroy or clean up all session secrets such as derived major secrets, DHE secrets and encryption keys. Endpoints may have other internal data associated with a session that they should also clean up.

568 11.4 Simultaneous active sessions

569 If a Responder supports key exchanges, the maximum number of simultaneous active sessions shall be a minimum of one. If the `KEY_EXCHANGE` or `PSK_EXCHANGE` request will exceed the maximum number of simultaneous active sessions of the Responder, the Responder shall respond with an `ErrorCode = SessionLimitExceeded`.

570 This specification does not prohibit concurrent sessions in which the same Requester and Responder reverses role. For example, SPDM endpoint ABC, acting as a Requester, can establish a session to SPDM endpoint XYZ, which is

acting as a Responder. At the same time, SPDM endpoint XYZ, now acting as a Requester, can establish a session to SPDM endpoint ABC, now acting as a Responder. Since these two sessions are distinct and separate, the two endpoints should ensure they do not mix sessions. To ensure proper session handling, each endpoint should ensure their portion of the session IDs are unique at time of Session-Secrets-Exchange. This would form a final unique session ID for that new session. Additionally, the endpoints may use information at the transport layer to further ensure proper handling of sessions.

571 **11.5 Records and session ID**

572 When the session starts, the communication of secured data is done using records. A record represents a chunk or unit of data that is either or both encrypted or authenticated. This data can be either an SPDM message or application data. Usually, the record contains the session ID resulting from one of the Session-Secrets-Exchange messages to aid both the Responder and Requester in binding the record to the respective derived session secrets.

573 The actual format and other details of a record is outside the scope of this specification. It is generally assumed that the transport protocol will define the format and other details of the record.

574 12 Key schedule

575 A key schedule describes how the various keys such as encryption keys used by a session are derived, and when each key is used. The default SPDM key schedule makes heavy use of `HMAC` as defined by [RFC2104](#) and `HKDF-Expand` as described in [RFC5869](#). SPDM defines the following additional functions:

```
BinConcat(Length, Version, Label, Context)
```

576 where `BinConcat` shall be the concatenation of binary data, in the order shown in BinConcat Details Table:

577 BinConcat details

Order	Data	Form	Endianness	Size
1	Length	Binary	Little	16 bits
2	Version	Text	Text	8 bytes
3	Label	Text	Text	Variable
4	Context	Binary	Little	Hash.Length

578 If Context is NULL, then `BinConcat` is the concatenation of the first three components only.

579 Version details

SPDM version	Version text
SPDM 1.1	"spdm1.1 "

580 The `HKDF-Expand` function prototype, as used by the default SPDM key schedule, is as follows:

```
HKDF-Expand(secret, context, Hash.Length)
```

581 The `HMAC-Hash` function prototype is described as follows:

```
HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM);
```


582 where IKM is the Input Keying Material and HMAC-Hash uses `HMAC` as defined in [RFC2104](#).

583 For HKDF-Expand and HMAC-Hash, the hash function shall be the selected hash function in ALGORITHMS response.
 Hash.Length shall be the length of the output of the hash function selected by the ALGORITHMS response.

584 Both Responder and Requester shall use the key schedule shown in the Key Schedule Figure.

585 **Key schedule**

586



587 In the figure, arrows going out of the box are outputs of that box. Arrows going into the box and point to the specific input parameter they are used in. All boxes represent a single function producing a single output and are given a name for clarity.

588 The Key Schedule table accompanies the figure to complete the Key Schedule. The Responder and Requester shall also adhere to the definition of this table.

589 **Key schedule**

Variable	Definition
Salt_0	A zero filled array of Hash.Length length.
0_filled	A zero filled array of Hash.Length length.
bin_str0	BinConcat(Hash.Length, Version, "derived", NULL).
bin_str1	BinConcat(Hash.Length, Version, "req hs data", TH1).
bin_str2	BinConcat(Hash.Length, Version, "rsp hs data", TH1).
bin_str3	BinConcat(Hash.Length, Version, "req app data", TH2)
bin_str4	BinConcat(Hash.Length, Version, "rsp app data", TH2)
DHE Secret	This shall be the secret derived from <code>KEY_EXCHANGE/KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP</code>
Pre-shared Key	PSK

590 Note: With common hash functions, any label longer than 12 characters requires an additional iteration of the hash function to compute. As in [RFC8446](#) the labels defined above have all been chosen to fit within this limit.

591 12.1 Transcript hash in key derivation

592 There are two transcript hashes used in the key schedule, namely, **TH1** and **TH2**.

593 12.2 TH1 definition

594 If the Requester and Responder used `KEY_EXCHANGE/KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP` to exchange initial keying information, then **TH1** shall be the output of applying the negotiated hash function to the concatenation of the following:

1. `[GET_VERSION].*` (if issued)
2. `[VERSION].*` (if issued)
3. `[GET_CAPABILITIES].*` (if issued)
4. `[CAPABILITIES].*` (if issued)
5. `[NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS].*` (if issued)
6. `[ALGORITHMS].*` (if issued)
7. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (i.e., `KEY_EXCHANGE Param2`)
8. `[KEY_EXCHANGE].*`
9. `[KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP].*` except the `ResponderVerifyData` field

595 If the Requester and Responder used `PSK_EXCHANGE/PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP` to exchange initial keying information, then **TH1** shall be the output of applying the negotiated hash function to the concatenation of the following:

1. [GET_VERSION].* (if issued)
2. [VERSION].* (if issued)
3. [GET_CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
4. [CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
5. [NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
6. [ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
7. [PSK_EXCHANGE].*
8. [PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP].* except the ResponderVerifyData field

596 12.3 TH2 definition

597 If the Requester and Responder used KEY_EXCHANGE/KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP to exchange initial keying information, then **TH2** shall be the output of applying the negotiated hash function to the concatenation of the following:

1. [GET_VERSION].* (if issued)
2. [VERSION].* (if issued)
3. [GET_CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
4. [CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
5. [NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
6. [ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
7. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (i.e., KEY_EXCHANGE Param2)
8. [KEY_EXCHANGE].*
9. [KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP].*
10. Hash of the specified certificate chain in DER format (i.e., FINISH's Param2). (Valid only in mutual authentication)
11. [FINISH].*
12. [FINISH_RSP].*

598 If the Requester and Responder used PSK_EXCHANGE/PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP to exchange initial keying information, then **TH2** shall be the output of applying the negotiated hash function to the concatenation of the following:

1. [GET_VERSION].* (if issued)
2. [VERSION].* (if issued)
3. [GET_CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
4. [CAPABILITIES].* (if issued)
5. [NEGOTIATE_ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
6. [ALGORITHMS].* (if issued)
7. [PSK_EXCHANGE].*

8. [PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP].*
9. [PSK_FINISH].* (if issued)
10. [PSK_FINISH_RSP].* (if issued)

599 12.4 Key schedule major secrets

600 The key schedule produces four major secrets:

- Request-direction handshake secret (S_0)
- Response-direction handshake secret (S_1)
- Request-direction data secret (S_2)
- Response-direction data secret (S_3)

601 Each secret applies in a certain direction of transmission and only valid during a certain time frame. These four major secrets, each, will be used to derive their respective encryption key and IV to be used in the AEAD function as selected in the `ALGORITHMS` response.

602 12.4.1 Request-direction handshake secret

603 This secret shall only be used during the session handshake phase and shall be applied to all requests after `KEY_EXCHANGE` or `PSK_EXCHANGE` up to and including `FINISH` or `PSK_FINISH`.

604 12.4.2 Response-direction handshake secret

605 This secret shall only be used during the session handshake phase and shall be applied to all responses after `KEY_EXCHANGE_RSP` or `PSK_EXCHANGE_RSP` up to and including `FINISH_RSP` or `PSK_FINISH_RSP`.

606 12.4.3 Requester-direction data secret

607 This secret shall be used for any data transmitted during the application phase of the session. This secret shall only be applied for all data traveling from the Requester to the Responder.


608 12.4.4 Responder-direction data secret

609 This secret shall be used for any data transmitted during the application phase of the session. This secret shall only be applied for all data traveling from the Responder to the Requester.

610 The [Secrets Usage Figure](#) illustrates where each of the major secrets are used as described previously.

611 Secrets usage

612



613 **12.5 Encryption key and IV derivation**

614 For each key schedule major secret, the following function shall be applied to obtain the encryption key and IV value.

```

EncryptionKey = HKDF-Expand(major-secret, bin_str5, key_length);
IV = HKDF-Expand(major-secret, bin_str6, iv_length);

bin_str5 = BinConcat(key_length, Version, "key", NULL);
bin_str6 = BinConcat(iv_length, Version, "iv", NULL);
    
```

615 Both `key_length` and `iv_length` shall be the lengths associated with the selected AEAD algorithm in `ALGORITHMS` message.

616 12.6 finished_key derivation

617 This key shall be used to compute the `RequesterVerifyData` and `ResponderVerifyData` fields used in various SPDM messages. The key, `finished_key` is defined as follows:

```
finished_key = HKDF-Expand(handshake-secret, bin_str7, Hash.Length);
bin_str7 = BinConcat(Hash.Length, Version, "finished", NULL);
```

618 The handshake-secret shall either be request-direction handshake secret or response-direction handshake secret.

619 12.7 Deriving additional keys from the Export Master Secret

620 After a successful SPDM key exchange, additional keys can be derived from the Export Master Secret. How keys are derived is outside the scope of this specification.

```
Export Master Secret = HKDF-Expand(Master-Secret, bin_str8, Hash.Length);
bin_str8 = BinConcat(Hash.Length, Version, "exp master", TH2);
```

621 12.8 Major secrets update

622 The major secrets can be updated during an active session to avoid the overhead of closing down a session and recreating the session. This is achieved by issuing the `KEY_UPDATE` request.

623 The major secrets are re-keyed as a result of this. To compute the new secret for each new major data secret, the following algorithm shall be applied.

```
new_secret = HKDF-Expand(current_secret, bin_str9, Hash.Length);
bin_str9 = BinConcat(Hash.Length, Version, "traffic upd", NULL);
```

624 In computing the new secret, `current_secret` shall either be the current Requester-Direction Data Secret or Responder-Direction Data Secret. As a consequence of updating these secrets, new encryption keys and salts shall be derived from the new secrets and used immediately.

625 13 Application data

626 SPDM utilizes authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) cipher algorithms in much the same way that TLS 1.3 does to protect both the confidentiality and integrity of data that shall remain secret, as well as the integrity of data that need to be transmitted in the clear, such as protocol headers, but shall be protected from manipulation. AEAD algorithms provide both encryption and message authentication. Each algorithm specifies the details such as the size of the nonce, the position and length of the MAC and many other factors to ensure a strong cryptographic algorithm.

627 AEAD functions shall provide the following functions and comply with the requirements defined in [RFC5116](#):

```
AEAD_Encrypt(encryption_key, nonce, associated_data, plaintext);
AEAD_Decrypt(encryption_key, nonce, associated_data, ciphertext);
```

628 where

Value	Description
AEAD_Encrypt	Function that fully encrypts the <code>plaintext</code> , computes the MAC across both the <code>associated_data</code> and <code>plaintext</code> , and produces the <code>ciphertext</code> , which includes the MAC.
AEAD_Decrypt	Function that verifies the MAC and if validation is successful, fully decrypts the <code>ciphertext</code> and produces the original <code>plaintext</code> .
encryption_key	Derived encryption key for the respective direction. For details, see the Key schedule clause.
nonce	Nonce computation. For details, see the Nonce derivation clause.
associated_data	Associated data.
plaintext	Data to encrypt.
ciphertext	Data to decrypt.

629 13.1 Nonce derivation

630 Certain AEAD ciphers have specific requirements on nonce construction, as their security properties may be compromised by the accidental reuse of a nonce value. Implementations should follow the requirements, such as those provided in [RFC5116](#) for nonce derivation.

631 **14 ANNEX A (informative) TLS 1.3**

632 This specification heavily models TLS 1.3. TLS 1.3 and consequently this specification assumes the transport layers provide these capabilities or attributes:

- Reliability in transmission and reception of data.
- Transmission of data is either in order or the order of data can be reconstructed at reception.

633 While not all transports are created equal, if a transport cannot meet these capabilities, adoption of SPDM is still possible. In these transports, this specification recommends [DTLS 1.3](#), which at the time of this specification is still in draft form.

634 15 ANNEX B (normative) Leaf certificate example

635 The [Leaf certificate example](#) shows an example leaf certificate:

636 Leaf certificate example

```
Data:
  Version: 3 (0x2)
  Serial Number: 8 (0x8)
  Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
  Issuer: C=CA, ST=NC, L=city, O=ACME, OU=ACME Devices, CN=CA
  Validity
    Not Before: Jan  1 00:00:00 1970 GMT
    Not After  : Dec 31 23:59:59 9999 GMT
  Subject: C=US, ST=NC, O=ACME Widget Manufacturing, OU=ACME Widget Manufacturing Unit, CN=w0123456789
  Subject Public Key Info:
    Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
      RSA Public-Key: (2048 bit)
      Modulus:
        00:ba:67:47:72:78:da:28:81:d9:81:9b:db:88:03:
        e1:10:a4:91:b8:48:ed:6b:70:3c:ec:a2:68:a9:3b:
        5f:78:fc:ae:4a:d1:1c:63:76:54:a8:40:31:26:7f:
        ff:3e:e0:bf:95:5c:4a:b4:6f:11:56:ca:c8:11:53:
        23:e1:1d:a2:7a:a5:f0:22:d8:b2:fb:43:da:dd:bd:
        52:6b:e6:a5:3f:0f:3b:60:b8:74:db:56:08:d9:ee:
        a0:30:4a:03:21:1e:ee:60:ad:e4:00:7a:6e:6b:32:
        1c:28:7e:9c:e8:c3:54:db:63:fd:1f:d1:46:20:9e:
        ef:80:88:00:5f:25:db:cf:43:46:c6:1f:50:19:7f:
        98:23:84:38:88:47:5d:51:8e:11:62:6f:0f:28:77:
        a7:20:0e:f3:74:27:82:70:a7:96:5b:1b:bb:10:e7:
        95:62:f5:37:4b:ba:20:4e:3c:c9:18:b2:cd:4b:58:
        70:ab:a2:bc:f6:2f:ed:2f:48:92:be:5a:cc:5c:5e:
        a8:ea:9d:60:e8:f8:85:7d:c0:0d:2f:6a:08:74:d1:
        2f:e8:5e:3d:b7:35:a6:1d:d2:a6:04:99:d3:90:43:
        66:35:e1:74:10:a8:97:3b:49:05:51:61:07:c6:08:
        01:1c:dc:a8:5f:9e:30:97:a8:18:6c:f9:b1:2c:56:
        e8:67
      Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
      X509v3 extensions:
        X509v3 Basic Constraints:
          CA:FALSE
        X509v3 Key Usage:
          Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment
        X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
          otherName:1.3.6.1.4.1.412.274.1;UTF8STRING:ACME:WIDGET:0123456789
      Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
      Signature Value:
```

```
30:45:02:21:00:fc:8f:b0:ad:6f:2d:c3:2a:7e:92:6d:29:1d:  
c7:fc:0d:48:b0:c6:39:5e:c8:76:d6:40:9a:12:46:c3:39:0e:  
36:02:20:1a:ea:3a:59:ca:1e:bc:6d:6e:61:79:af:a2:05:7c:  
7d:da:41:a9:45:6d:cb:04:49:43:e6:0b:a8:8d:cd:da:e
```

637

16 ANNEX C (informative) Change log

Version	Date	Description
1.1.0	2020-07-15	Editorial updates
1.0.0	2019-10-22	

638 **17 Bibliography**

639 DMTF DSP4014, *DMTF Process for Working Bodies 2.6*.